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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the implications of the financial liberalisation of the
Chinese economy for savings, investment, monetary policy and the exchange rate,
in China.
In the first part, the financial repression hypothesis is tested on savings and invest-
ment, with the result that there is some evidence to support the complementarity
between money and physical capital in China since 1987, although this effect is
shown to have become weaker over the sample period as liberalisation has taken
place.
The second issue is to investigate the consequences of interest rate liberalisation
in China, using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. There
are two main findings. First, raising deposit rates serves to alter the division of
production between consumption and investment and to improve the efficiency of
the monetary policy transmission mechanism through interest rates. Second, the
deregulation of deposit and loan rates leads to less volatility in inflation as interest
rates are allowed to partly absorb shocks to the economy. Other monetary policies
under financial repression in China are examined as well. The results based on the
DSGE model suggest that the interest rate rule is more effective and powerful than
the conventional money growth rule and the adjustment of the required reserve
ratio helps little to contain inflation. In addition, the administrative window
guidance on bank loans contributes to less volatility of inflation and stabilises the
deregulation process of deposit and loan rates.
The final part of the thesis examines the sources of the volatility in real exchange
rate, which are shown to stem essentially from demand shocks, although up to a
quarter of the volatility comes from relative supply disturbances, perhaps reflecting
the importance of supply-side reform in China since the early 1990s.
Key words: Financial repression; Interest rate liberalisation; Monetary policy;
Exchange rate
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 An overview of China’s financial reforms
The reform of China’s financial system started in 1978, and according to He (2008)
has passed through four stages. The initial stage covered 1978 to 1983 where the
objective was to establish the central banking system. In September 1983, the
State Council decided to formally designate the People’s Bank of China (PBoC)
as a central bank. Before that, the PBoC was the only bank in the People’s Repub-
lic of China, serving the functions of both a central bank and those of commercial
banks. The second stage of the reform between 1984 and 1992 focused on the trans-
formation of the function of the central bank. Commercial banks emerged during
this period, but the main objective of the monetary policy was still to stimulate
economic growth only. The third stage, from 1993 to 2003, saw the development
of a modern central banking system. Three policy banks were established in 1994,
which had the PBoC focus on the implementation of monetary policy. The PBoC
therefore, started to monitor nominal money supply growth in the autumn in
1994. Since then, adjusting the growth of nominal money supply, measured as M1
and M2, has become the official policy to promote economic growth and maintain
price stability. Moreover, open market operations were introduced and used by
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the PBoC in April 1996. Since 2003, China’s financial reform has entered into the
fourth stage where the responsibility of financial regulation was taken from the
central bank, and moved to the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC),
which was opened in April 2003 and takes the role of regulating the banking sector
in China.
The objective of China’s financial liberalisation is to establish a thorough and
effective financial system to promote economic growth, facilitate internal rebalan-
cing and to maintain financial stability. Along with the reform of the economic and
financial system, monetary policy in China has been adjusted frequently. Though
the PBoC has been transformed and developed into the central bank in China,
it is not independent of the central government (Chen et al., 2012). The PBoC
and the central government set monetary policy targets every year, as outlined
in Table 1.1, along with inflation targets and real GDP growth rate targets. As
mentioned above, the nominal money growth target has been the official monet-
ary policy indicator since 1994. The target is published in the People’s Banks of
China Annual Report and recently it has been announced by the Prime Minister,
not the PBoC, in his speech at the National People’s Congress every March. For
example, the target of M2 growth in 2016, announced by Prime Minister Li Keqi-
ang in March, was set to be “around 13%” in the 2016 Report on the Work of
the Government1. The objective of the PBoC as a central bank, when implement-
ing monetary policy, is to safeguard price stability and help facilitate economic
growth. Open market operations, central bank lending and a required reserve ra-
tio are classified as market-based monetary policy instruments which are widely
used by the PBoC and other central banks. Conventional monetary policy theory
considers the adjustment of the required reserve ratio to be too sensitive to use
and many central banks in advanced economies rarely use it due to the potential
huge effects it may have. Nevertheless, it has been actively used by the PBoC in
1The full report in English is available at
http://english.gov.cn/premier/news/2016/03/17/content 281475309417987.htm
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Table 1.1: Monetary policy targets (1994-2016)
Year M2 Growth Real GDP Growth Inflation Year M2 Growth Real GDP Growth Inflation
1994 24% 9% 10% 2006 16% 8% 3%
1995 23%-25% 8%-9% 15% 2007 16% 8% 3%
1996 25% 8% 10% 2008 17% 8% 5%
1997 23% 8% 6% 2009 17% 8% 4%
1998 16%-18% 8% 5% 2010 17% 8% 3%
1999 14%-15% 8% 2% 2011 16% 8% 4%
2000 14%-15% 8% 1% 2012 14% 8% 4%
2001 15%-16% 7% 1%-2% 2013 13% 8% 4%
2002 13% 7% 1%-2% 2014 13% 8% 4%
2003 16% 7% 1% 2015 12% 7% 3%
2004 17% 7% 3% 2016 13% 6.5%-7% 3%
2005 15% 8% 4%
Note: 1. All the targets above are annualised rates. 2. Data are collected from the People’s
Bank of China Annual Report and the National People’s Congress website. 3. Inflation targets
were represented by the growth rate of RPI between 1994 and 1997, and since 1998 the central
government has started to publish the inflation targets based on CPI.
China as an important monetary policy instrument, especially since 2007. Table
1.2 summarises the historical adjustment of reserved required ratio since 1984. It
shows that the ratio has been adjusted 50 times since 1985, and has been used more
frequently since 2006. For example, the ratio was raised 12 times between January
2010 and June 2011, each time by 0.5 percentage points. He (2008) proposes that
the frequent adjustments of the required reserve ratio in China helps to control
the excess liquidity of banking system, so as to avoid the volatility in the financial
markets. In April 2004, the PBoC introduced different required reserve ratios tak-
ing account of capital adequacy ratio and asset quality of individual commercial
banks, and further developed a dynamic different required reserve ratio in 2011 to
allow for monthly variation (Chen et al., 2012). However, the details of financial
institutions with different required reserve ratios remain highly confidential.
Meanwhile, some non-market based monetary policy instruments in the presence
of financial repression are more frequently used, such as regulated interest rates
and the window guidance for bank lending. Interest rate liberalisation has long
been proposed in China’s financial reform and the objective is to improve the
3
Table 1.2: Previous adjustments of required reserve ratio
No. Effective Date Before After Variation No. Effective Date Before After Variation
1 1985 10.0% 26 25-Sep-2008 17.5% 17.5% 0.0%
2 1987 10.0% 12.0% 2.0% 27 15-Oct-2008 17.5% 17.0% -0.5%
3 Sep-1988 12.0% 13.0% 1.0% 28 05-Dec-2008 17.0% 16.0% -1.0%
4 21-Mar-1998 13.0% 8.0% -5.0% 29 25-Dec-2008 16.0% 15.5% -0.5%
5 21-Nov-1999 8.0% 6.0% -2.0% 30 18-Jan-2010 15.5% 16.0% 0.5%
6 21-Sep-2003 6.0% 7.0% 1.0% 31 25-Feb-2010 16.0% 16.5% 0.5%
7 25-Apr-2004 7.0% 7.5% 0.5% 32 10-May-2010 16.5% 17.0% 0.5%
8 05-Jul-3006 7.5% 8.0% 0.5% 33 16-Nov-2010 17.0% 17.5% 0.5%
9 15-Aug-2006 8.0% 8.5% 0.5% 34 19-Nov-2010 17.5% 18.0% 0.5%
10 15-Nov-2006 8.5% 9.0% 0.5% 35 20-Dec-2010 18.0% 18.5% 0.5%
11 15-Jan-2007 9.0% 9.5% 0.5% 36 20-Jan-2011 18.5% 19.0% 0.5%
12 25-Feb-2007 9.5% 10.0% 0.5% 37 14-Feb-2011 19.0% 19.5% 0.5%
13 16-Apr-2007 10.0% 10.5% 0.5% 38 25-Mar-2011 19.5% 20.0% 0.5%
14 15-May-2007 10.5% 11.0% 0.5% 39 21-Apr-2011 20.0% 20.5% 0.5%
15 05-Jun-2007 11.0% 11.5% 0.5% 40 18-May-2011 20.5% 21.0% 0.5%
16 15-Aug-2007 11.5% 12.0% 0.5% 41 20-Jun-2011 21.0% 21.5% 0.5%
17 25-Sep-2007 12.0% 12.5% 0.5% 42 05-Dec-2011 21.5% 21.0% -0.5%
18 25-Oct-2007 12.5% 13.0% 0.5% 43 24-Feb-2012 21.0% 20.5% -0.5%
19 26-Nov-2007 13.0% 13.5% 0.5% 44 18-May-2012 20.5% 20.0% -0.5%
20 25-Dec-2007 13.5% 14.5% 1.0% 45 05-Feb-2015 20.0% 19.5% -0.5%
21 25-Jan-2008 14.5% 15.0% 0.5% 46 20-Apr-2015 19.5% 18.5% -1.0%
22 25-Mar-2008 15.0% 15.5% 0.5% 47 28-Jun-2015 18.5% 18.0% -0.5%
23 25-Apr-2008 15.5% 16.0% 0.5% 48 06-Sep-2015 18.0% 17.5% -0.5%
24 20-May-2008 16.0% 16.5% 0.5% 49 24-Oct-2015 17.5% 17.0% -0.5%
25 25-Jun-2008 16.5% 17.5% 1.0% 50 01-Mar-2016 17.0% 16.5% -0.5%
Note: 1. Data are collected from the PBoC’s website. 2. The PBoC set the required reserve
ratio to be various from different deposit types in 1984, i.e. 20% for enterprise deposits, 25%
for rural deposits and 40% for savings deposits. In 1985, the PBoC then adopted the unified
required reserve ratio, and set it to be 10%. 3. Since September 2008, required reserve ratio
has been different between large financial institutions and medium to small and medium-sized
financial institutions. Only the ratios applied to large financial institutions are reported above.
4. On 25-Sep-2008, the adjustment applied to small and medium-sized financial institutions
only, by decreasing from 17.5% to 16.5%.
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efficiency of capital allocation as well as the monetary policy transmission. Interest
rate liberalisation started in the capital market in late 1990s. On the first day
of 1996, the China Interbank Offered Rate was introduced and was soon freely
determined by the market on 17 May 1996. Following that, the Shanghai Interbank
Offered Rate (Shibor) was introduced in April 2007, which is now considered as
the benchmark interest rate for asset pricing. In addition, the PBoC has been
freeing controls on the interbank bond repurchase rate as well as the bond market
rate since 5 June 1997, and the China Development Bank, one of the three policy
banks opened in 1994, issued the first market-priced bonds in 1998. One year
later, in 1999, government bonds are first issued via an open bid.
Reforms of deposit and lending interest rates are considered as the last and the
most difficult step in interest rate liberalisation and are still under way. The reform
starts from foreign currency deposit and lending interest rates. On 21 September
2000, the control of foreign exchange lending rates was removed, together with
the control of foreign exchange deposit rates for large accounts (3 million dollars
equivalently and above). Additionally, the floor of foreign exchange deposit rates
for small accounts was removed on 11 November 2003 and following that, the
PBoC liberalised the small-account foreign exchange deposit rates with maturity
of over one year.
A timeline of deposit and lending rates liberalisation for domestic currency, RMB,
is outlined in Table 1.3. The lending interest rates for RMB were allowed to be
floating within an interval in 1998. The ceiling of lending interest rates was lifted
three times during 1998 to 1999, and was then removed on 29 October 2004 among
financial institutions (excluding urban and rural credit cooperatives). The floor of
lending interest rates was eventually removed on 20 July 2013, since when the loan
rates were allowed to be freely determined by the market. Meanwhile, the floor of
deposit rates was also removed in 2004, and the ceiling has been gradually lifted
since 2012. The ceiling of deposit rates with maturity of over 1 year was removed
on 26 August 2015, and soon in two months the ceiling of 1-year deposit rates
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Table 1.3: A timeline of RMB deposit and lending rates liberalisation in China
Date Deposit rates Lending rates
1998-1999 The floating interval was
extended three times. The
floor is 0.9 times the policy
benchmark loan rates
(0.9×), whilst the ceilings
are 1.1× and 1.3× for large
enterprises and SMEs,
respectively.
01-Jan-2004 The floating interval was set
at (0.9×, 1.7×) for
commercial banks and
urban credit cooperatives,
and (0.9×, 2×) for rural
credit cooperatives.
29-Oct-2004 Floor was removed. Ceiling was removed.
08-Jun-2012 Ceiling was raised to 1.1×. Floor was lowered to 0.8×.
06-Jul-2012 Floor was lowered to 0.6×.
20-Jul-2013 Floor was removed.
28-Feb-2015 Ceiling was raised to 1.3×.
11-May-2015 Ceiling was raised to 1.5×.
26-Aug-2015 Ceiling of deposit rates with
maturity of over 1 year was
removed
24-Oct-2015 Ceiling of 1-year deposit rates was
removed.
Note: “×” after the numbers in the table means “times the policy benchmark deposit or lending
rates”.
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was eventually removed from the PBoC’s control on 24 October 2015. Since then,
commercial banks in China have got the opportunity to allow lending and deposit
rates to be determined by the market. The PBoC, however, continues publishing
the policy lending and deposit rates as a guide, which most commercial banks
are still likely to follow due to the absence of full independence in the financial
market2. The reason why the PBoC announces policy deposit and lending rates
is to manage the loan-deposit difference level, which enables commercial banks
to acquire monopoly profits and protects their profit margins, but reduces the
banks’ power of independent pricing. Interest rate liberalisation is not completed,
but has just started. In fact, interest rate adjustment has become one of the
most actively used and important tools to influence inflation and deflation since
1996. For example, the 1-year deposit rate was adjusted 45 times from 1978 until
now, where 5 times of adjustment took place in 2015. The loan-deposit difference
however, remained relatively stable at around 3% since 2000. Figure 1.1 plots the
1-year benchmark loan and deposit rates, with the loan-deposit difference being
the spread between them. Detailed previous adjustments of benchmark deposit
and loan rates are outlined in Tables 1.4 and 1.5, respectively.
Another non-market monetary policy instrument actively used in China is the
administrative window guidance for bank lending, through which bank credits are
controlled by the PBoC and the CBRC. Although the control of lending rates has
been removed, the PBoC could control bank loans by persuading commercial banks
to follow its guidance. The guidance includes the appropriate level of loan growth
that bank should follow and the sectors to which the bank loans should be directed.
This may lower the efficiency of credit allocation and commercial banks could not
arrange the bank loans based on the demand and supply in the market. According
to the 2015 annual report of the PBoC, bank lending accounts for over 81% of social
funding stock for domestic enterprises in 2015, which remains dominant in the
2The last time the PBoC published the policy lending and deposit rates was 24 October
2015. However, no official benchmark policy rate has been proposed and the PBoC has not
taken further steps since then.
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Figure 1.1: 1-year benchmark deposit and loan rates
Table 1.4: Previous adjustments of 1-year benchmark deposit rates
No. Effective Date Rate (%) No. Effective Date Rate (%) No. Effective Date Rate (%)
1 15-Sep-1952 14.4 19 15-May-1993 9.18 37 09-Oct-2008 3.87
2 01-Jan-1953 14.4 20 11-Jul-1993 10.98 38 30-Oct-2008 3.6
3 01-Sep-1954 14.4 21 01-May-1996 9.18 39 27-Nov-2008 2.52
4 01-Oct-1955 7.92 22 23-Aug-1996 7.47 40 23-Dec-2008 2.25
5 01-Jan-1959 4.8 23 23-Oct-1997 5.67 41 20-Oct-2010 2.5
6 01-Jul-1959 6.12 24 25-Mar-1998 5.22 42 26-Dec-2010 2.75
7 01-Jun-1965 3.96 25 01-Jul-1998 4.77 43 09-Feb-2011 3
8 01-Oct-1971 3.24 26 07-Dec-1998 3.78 44 06-Apr-2011 3.25
9 01-Apr-1979 3.96 27 10-Jun-1999 2.25 45 07-Jul-2011 3.5
10 01-Apr-1980 5.4 28 21-Feb-2002 1.98 46 08-Jun-2012 3.25
11 01-Apr-1982 5.76 29 29-Oct-2004 2.25 47 06-Jul-2012 3
12 01-Apr-1985 6.84 30 19-Aug-2006 2.52 48 22-Nov-2014 2.75
13 01-Aug-1985 7.2 31 18-Mar-2007 2.79 49 01-Mar-2015 2.5
14 01-Sep-1988 8.64 32 19-May-2007 3.06 50 11-May-2015 2.25
15 01-Feb-1989 11.34 33 21-Jul-2007 3.33 51 28-Jun-2015 2
16 15-Apr-1990 10.08 34 22-Aug-2007 3.6 52 26-Aug-2015 1.75
17 21-Aug-1990 8.64 35 15-Sep-2007 3.87 53 24-Oct-2015 1.5
18 21-Apr-1991 7.56 36 21-Dec-2007 4.14
Note: Full dataset containing deposit rates with various maturities is available on the PBoC
website.
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Table 1.5: Previous adjustments of 1-year benchmark loan rates
No. Effective Date Rate (%) No. Effective Date Rate (%) No. Effective Date Rate (%)
1 01-Feb-1989 11.34 16 21-Feb-2002 5.31 31 20-Oct-2010 5.56
2 15-Apr-1990 11.34 17 29-Oct-2004 5.58 32 26-Dec-2010 5.81
3 21-Aug-1990 9.36 18 28-Apr-2006 5.85 33 09-Feb-2011 6.06
4 21-Apr-1991 8.64 19 19-Aug-2006 6.12 34 06-Apr-2011 6.31
5 15-May-1993 9.36 20 18-Mar-2007 6.39 35 07-Jul-2011 6.56
6 11-Jul-1993 10.98 21 19-May-2007 6.57 36 08-Jun-2012 6.31
7 01-Jan-1995 10.98 22 21-Jul-2007 6.84 37 06-Jul-2012 6
8 01-Jul-1995 12.06 23 22-Aug-2007 7.02 38 22-Nov-2014 5.6
9 01-May-1996 10.98 24 15-Sep-2007 7.29 39 01-Mar-2015 5.35
10 23-Aug-1996 10.08 25 21-Dec-2007 7.47 40 11-May-2015 5.1
11 23-Oct-1997 8.64 26 16-Sep-2008 7.2 41 28-Jun-2015 4.85
12 25-Mar-1998 7.92 27 09-Oct-2008 6.93 42 26-Aug-2015 4.6
13 01-Jul-1998 6.93 28 30-Oct-2008 6.66 43 24-Oct-2015 4.35
14 07-Dec-1998 6.39 29 27-Nov-2008 5.58
15 10-Jun-1999 5.85 30 23-Dec-2008 5.31
Note: Full dataset containing loan rates with various maturities is available on the PBoC website.
source of financing. The loans to small and medium-sized enterprises, according
to the 2015 Financial Institutions Loans Directions Report published by the PBoC,
account for 31.2% of total loans to domestic enterprises, which is much lower than
the loans to large state-owned enterprises. Nevertheless, commercial banks are
willing to follow the guidance because it is less risky, and more importantly, it is
good for the career of numerous executives and senior personnel in state-owned
commercial banks, as they are usually appointed by the central government (Funke
& Paetz, 2012).
China still has a long way to go to become a fully financially liberalised economy.
Repressive financial policies, contributing to price distortions, are still present
and widely used these years, such as high reserve requirements, policy deposit and
lending rates and capital account controls. Such repressive financial policies reduce
public debt and fill government coffers. In the newly released national 13th five-
year plan for 2016-2020, financial reform has been highlighted again, especially
the reform of financial system and monetary policy instruments. Future works
for China’s financial reforms include deepening direct finance market, phasing
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out policy guidance for deposit and loan rates and bank lending, exchange rate
liberalisation and capital account liberalisation. Capital account liberalisation,
according to Funke & Paetz (2012), or referred to as removing the control of capital
account to make RMB freely convertible, is achievable provided that all the other
financial reforms above have been finalised, otherwise because of China’s current
immature creditor status it may stimulate hot money inflows and precipitate a
currency crisis.
1.2 Research topics and contributions
Although recent years have witnessed the smooth development of financial re-
form in China, financial repression is never believed to be absent and the role
of interest rates as a resource allocation mechanism is widely considered to be
distorted. For example, China’s commercial banks are still subject to a range
of regulations such as the high required reserve ratio and the window guidance
on loans. Also, the loan rates were subject to a floor until July 2013 whilst de-
posit rates were subject to a ceiling until October 2015. Nowadays China still
maintains strict capital account controls and the nominal exchange rate of RMB,
China’s currency, was pegged to the U.S. dollar until July 2005, since when the
exchange rate was set to be managed floating with reference to a basket of curren-
cies. According to the latest five-year plan, China’s financial liberalisation policies
aim to establish a thorough and effective financial system to promote economic
growth, facilitate internal rebalancing and to maintain financial stability. In fact,
China has achieved financial liberalisation to a certain degree, but it still has a
long way to go. Future steps of workable financial liberalisation policies call for
large number of investigations and research work. It is therefore worth conducting
empirical analysis of financial repression during recent decades in order to evaluate
the effects of financial liberalisation and offer evidence to inform future reforms.
Building upon the literature to date, this thesis provides a comprehensive empir-
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ical analysis of China’s financial repression (or inversely financial liberalisation)
in some typical areas including savings and investment, monetary policy and the
exchange rates. Specifically, it examines McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis
between money balances and physical capital, and explores the role of interest rate
reform in China’s financial reform, as well as the effectiveness of monetary policies
implemented in China during the reform period. Besides, the PBoC serves to
maintain the balance of international payments, and Chinese government is also
undertaking the exchange rate market liberalisation reform. On 21 July 2005,
China adopted a managed floating exchange rate regime where exchange rate is
determined by the market but adjustable based on a group of currencies (Cheng,
2013). It is therefore important to investigate the sources of the exchange rate
fluctuations during this period, which is considered in the thesis. Meanwhile, it
makes some methodological contributions to the related empirical literature.
1.2.1 Complementarity hypothesis between money and cap-
ital
Financial repression, as was first introduced by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973),
is often referred to as distorted prices. For example, it means that interest rates
under financial repression are restricted to be under market equilibrium levels, and
are inflexible in developing countries. The repressive financial policies consist of
various controls by the central bank, from which government could expropriate a
large amount of seigniorage. These policies, such as regulated interest rates, high
reserve requirements and domestic credit controls, according to McKinnon and
Shaw, result in efficiency losses and a lower rate of economic growth. Keynesians,
however, suggest low interest rate policies to encourage investment and promote
economic growth. Interest rates are considered as part of the cost of investment by
Keynesian and neoclassical economists. Investment takes place when the marginal
efficiency of capital is greater than the rates of interest in the case of macroeco-
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nomic stability. Besides, Keynesians contend that government is able to finance
large fiscal deficits by keeping interest rate low, instead of raising taxes and in-
flation (Ang, 2008). However, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) challenged the
applicability of the Keynesian view in developing countries and proposed that the
real interest rates in less developed countries are negative and below the market
equilibrium level. Raising interest rates would extend more loans to the investors
by attracting more savings and converting them into bank deposits, hence the
equilibrium rate of investment increases.
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) show that direct controls on interest rates lead
to negative real interest rates, which lowers both savings and investment and also
reduces the efficiency in financial resource allocation. This hypothesis contradicts
the neoclassical theories, which assume that money and physical capital are sub-
stitutes. For example, in the view of neoclassical economists, economic agents are
likely to prefer the real capital assets with higher return so that an increase in
the average return on capital raises the demand for physical capital but lowers
the money demand. However, McKinnon argues that money and physical capital
are not substitutes, but complements in the complementarity hypothesis. Money
balances need to be accumulated before investment can be undertaken, provided
that all economic units are limited to self-finance and investment is indivisible.
According to the survey in Chapter 2, the empirical literature holds different per-
spectives on the availability of McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis, and there
is no consensus with respect to the effects of real interest rate on savings and in-
vestment3. Moreover, it is noted that few empirical papers have studied financial
repression in China.
Chapter 3 tests the credibility of McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis between
3In the financial liberalisation theory by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), raising real
interest rate encourages more savings and investment, whist neo-structuralist economists argue
that raising real interest rate inhibits investment, and many empirical literature have detected
this negative relationship between real interest rate and investment (see de Melo & Tybout 1986;
Greene & Villanueva 1991, etc). Section 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.2.2 in Chapter 2 have included a detailed
discussion on this issue.
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money and physical capital in China. In addition, the relationship between invest-
ment and the actual deposit rates is also examined in this hypothesis. Moreover,
following the argument by Fry (1978), this chapter additionally allows the savings
equation to enter the complementarity hypothesis model by replacing the invest-
ment equation. This chapter is considered as the first empirical analysis of the
complementarity hypothesis in China during the period of reform. In addition,
in contrast to the existing literature where least squares method or cointegra-
tion analysis were employed, this chapter adopts the bounds testing method with
autoregressive distributed lags (ARDL) modelling approaches to allow all the un-
derlying variables to be integrated of different orders between 0 and 1.
1.2.2 Interest rate liberalisation
According to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), interest rates in developing coun-
tries like China are below the market equilibrium levels and investment is subject
to the shortage of savings. Financial liberalisation thus indicates an increase in
the deposit rate. China has removed the ceilings of the deposit rate since October
2015, before that, the floors of the lending rate were removed in July 2013. It is
therefore necessary to investigate both the opportunities and the risks of interest
rate liberalisation in China’s economic development during the period of dereg-
ulation. Jin et al. (2013) constructed a neoclassical Real Business Cycle (RBC)
model with a cash-in-advance constraint proposed by Stockman (1981) and the
interest rate liberalisation process was represented by gradually raising the steady
state levels of interest rates. Following this method, Chapter 4 simulates China’s
economy under interest rate liberalisation in a dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) modelling framework where interest rate liberalisation is reflected
by raising the equilibrium level of deposit rates. It enriches the model of Jin et al.
(2013) by considering a Taylor-type money growth rule. Also, the new Keyne-
sian DSGE model is considered in this chapter. This research further contributes
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to current literature by providing a comparative empirical study among several
DSGE model specifications.
Unlike central banks in developed economies that control benchmark interest rates
alone, the PBoC sets both benchmark loan rates and deposit rates. In Chapter
5, deposit and loan rates are separated by two types of households and a private
bank sector is included in the DSGE model following Gerali et al. (2010), Chen
et al. (2012) and Funke & Paetz (2012). Unlike Funke et al. (2015) where the
wholesale loan and deposit rates in equilibrium are dependent on the parameters
in the management cost function, this model introduces a stochastic elasticity of
demand for loans and deposits in the retailing commercial bank section, which
is in spirit of Gerali et al. (2010). Actual deposit and loan rates are represented
by a geometric weighted average between the market-determined rates and the
central bank rates. The liberalisation process can thus be illustrated by changing
the weighted parameters accordingly, which is a contribution to current research
on interest rate liberalisation in China. Although the DSGE model is developed
in the spirit of the existing literature on China, this chapter novelly uses Bayesian
estimation approach in addition to calibrated parameters when estimating the
model.
1.2.3 Monetary policy under financial repression
With nominal money growth target as one of the official monetary policy indicators
since 1994, the PBoC has been using the nominal money growth as an instrument
when implementing monetary policy in addition to the conventional Taylor-type
interest rate rule. However, it is acknowledged that the nominal money supply is
difficult to control as the velocity of money has not always been stable in China
during the reform period, and the link between nominal money growth and infla-
tion has become weaker due to the volatility of money demand. Nonetheless, the
nominal money growth target is published in the People’s Banks of China Annual
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Report every year, and the target of M2 growth in 2016, for example, is set to be
around 13%. This thesis aims to compare the conventional money growth rule and
the currently frequently adopted the interest rate rule and seeks to find out which
rule is more preferable during the financial liberalisation period. In order to eval-
uate the effectiveness of the money growth rule and the interest rate rule, Zhang
(2009) adopted the new Keynesian money-in-utility DSGE model and the results
based on pure calibration showed that the interest rate rule was more effective
and powerful.
Chapter 4 compares the two rules in the new Keynesian DSGE model with a cash-
in-advance constraint, as well as in the money-in-utility DSGE model. Calibration
method and Bayesian estimation method are both employed and the results sug-
gest the interest rate rule to be more effective and powerful, which is consistent
with Zhang (2009).
In addition to interest rate adjustment, the PBoC sets targets of nominal broad
money growth and sets high required reserve ratios due to the imperfect monet-
ary policy transmission mechanisms. Interest rate adjustment, together with the
adjustment of the required reserve ratio, is often employed to maintain the stabil-
ity of the domestic stock market, so as to maintain social stability and promote
economic development. Another non-market monetary policy instrument actively
used in China is the administrative window guidance for bank lending, through
which bank credits are controlled by the PBoC and the CBRC. Although the direct
control of lending rates has been removed, the PBoC could control the quantity of
bank loans by persuading commercial banks to follow its guidance. The guidance
includes the appropriate level of loan growth that a bank should follow and the
sectors to which the bank loan should be directed. This may lower the efficiency
of credit allocation and commercial banks could not arrange the bank loans based
on the demand and supply in the market. Financial repression can be reflected by
implementing those monetary policies above. In recent years, such policies aim-
ing to achieve financial stability are also referred to as macroprudential policies,
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and widely recommended to be applied counter-cyclically (Reinhart, 2012; Posen
& Ve´ron, 2015). It is therefore important to evaluate the effectiveness of those
repressive financial policies and to look into the reason why the PBoC usually
intervenes.
In Chapter 5, these typical repressive financial policies are included in the new
Keynesian DSGE model to investigate the effects on economy when removing one
or all of these policies so as to achieve financial liberalisation. Chen et al. (2012)
and Funke & Paetz (2012) also considered the required reserve ratios and the
window guidance on bank loans in their models, but overlooked the effect of the
nominal money growth target. Also, their results were based on pure calibration
of the DSGE model, while Chapter 5 uses the Bayesian estimation method when
estimating some structural parameters.
1.2.4 Sources of real exchange rate fluctuations
Following the theory of McKinnon and Shaw, many less developed countries have
undertaken some form of financial liberalisation, especially liberalising deposit
and loan rates. However, the policy of low interest rates in developing countries
is, to some extent, determined by the mature industrial economies. According to
McKinnon (2013), the world is still on a U.S.-dollar standard at present. McKin-
non & Schnabl (2014) point out that developing countries facing the dollar stand-
ard are forced to lower the interest rates to avoid volatility given that the U.S.
and other principal developed economies adopt near-zero interest rates and put
downward pressure on the long-term interest rates via quantitative easing. Be-
sides, McKinnon & Schnabl (2014) suggest keeping the currency pegged to the
U.S. dollar and maintaining strict capital controls in the presence of undeveloped
capital markets in developing countries, which helps to avoid hot money inflows,
as excessive inflows of hot money may lead to a rise in the housing price and
contribute to inflation. Moore & Pentecost (2006) propose that an increase in
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interest rates as well as rapid economic growth during financial liberalisation may
contribute to a dramatic rise in capital inflows, which lifts the money supply and
calls for higher aggregate demand given a fixed nominal exchange rate policy, and
this in turn leads to an increase in domestic price level, hence a permanent real
exchange rate appreciation. If a floating exchange rate regime is adopted, the net
capital flow is likely to increase both the nominal and real exchange rate appreci-
ation directly. The demand for domestic products falls in response to a nominal
appreciation, so that domestic price level would fall to restore the real exchange
rate. This result, however, is subject to change if there is a general price liberal-
isation process, as suggested by Moore & Pentecost, thus higher domestic prices
leads to a continuous real exchange rate appreciation and the effects last long.
In China, the PBoC also serves to maintain the balance of international payments,
and Chinese government is also undertaking exchange rate market liberalisation
reforms. On 1 January 1994, China officially announced the decision to implement
a managed floating exchange rate system with reference to the U.S. dollar. How-
ever, the exchange rate of RMB to U.S. dollars was de facto fixed at 8.28 from
1998. On 21 July 2005, China embarked on a managed floating exchange rate re-
gime where exchange rate is tied to a group of currencies, rather than pegging to
U.S. dollars only (Cheng, 2013). Prasad et al. (2005) suggest that a more flexible
exchange rate arrangement is in China’s own interest in that China has been more
exposed to various types of macroeconomic shocks, and the flexibility helps to
better adjust to such shocks and facilitates a more independent monetary policy.
According to Huang & Guo (2007), the Chinese RMB has long been regulated
during these years, so that identifying a path of exchange rate is challenging and
even impossible based on the actual path of the bilateral exchange rate. Moreover,
real exchange rate is considered to be related to the export price competitiveness.
Therefore, it is vital to investigate the sources of real exchange rate movements
during the reform period and it has important implications for the PBoC to make
decisions about the future exchange rate reform, which is done in Chapter 6. To
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be specific, Chapter 6 follows the spirit of Blanchard & Quah (1989) by consid-
ering nominal and real shocks, but employs a trivariate structural VAR model
to investigate fluctuations of real exchange rate. Moreover, this chapter modifies
the theoretical model of Clarida & Gali (1994) by allowing for imperfect capital
mobility, which is more reliable in China. The long-run restrictions are imposed
following Clarida & Gali (1994) in order to estimate the model using both quarterly
and monthly data. One contribution of this chapter is to construct a time-varying
traded-weighted average of China’s major trading partners as the foreign country,
rather than using the U.S. data alone. Another contribution is that, in addition to
the long-run restrictions when estimating the model, this chapter imposes the sign
restrictions to identify supply and nominal shocks, which has been widely used in
recent years, as the credibility of imposing long-run restrictions is questioned in
finite samples (Faust & Leeper, 1997).
1.3 Structure of the thesis
This thesis consists of seven chapters, and it proceeds as follows. In Chapter
2, a critical survey of major theoretical and empirical analysis is presented on
the following issues: a) how savings, investment and economic growth respond to
financial liberalisation; b) whether money and physical capital are complementary
or substitutable under repressed financial economy; and c) how real and nominal
shocks contribute to the fluctuations of nominal and real exchange rates under
financial repression.
Chapter 3 examines the credibility of McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis in
China between 1987Q1 and 2013Q2 using bounds testing with the ARDL model-
ling approaches which allow all the underlying variables to be integrated of differ-
ent orders. The empirical results suggest weak evidence to support the hypothesis
but turn out to be fully consistent with the hypothesis when the investment model
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is augmented with some additional variables. In addition to testing the two equa-
tions of the hypothesis of money and investment, the savings equation is considered
as a replacement for the investment equation and the results suggest that raising
real deposit rates inhibits the savings in China.
Chapter 4 starts with a simple neoclassical Real Business Cycle (RBC) model
with a cash-in-advance constraint to simulate China’s money growth rule. The
method of undetermined coefficients is used to solve the model. In the spirit of
Jin et al. (2013), the liberalisation process in this model is represented by raising
the steady state levels of deposit rate. It shows that interest rate liberalisation
helps reorganise the economic structure between consumption and investment in
China, and contributes to a thorough and efficient transmission mechanism of
monetary policy. Also, a new Keynesian calibrated closed economy model with
a cash-in-advance constraint is built to compare two monetary policy rules, i.e.
the interest rate rule and the money growth rule. In addition, a money-in-utility
DSGE model is also included to compare with the DSGE model with a cash-in-
advance constraint. The results suggest that the interest rate rule is more powerful
and effective than the money growth rule.
In Chapter 5, the deregulation of deposit and loan rates is illustrated in a DSGE
model, together with some market and non-market monetary policies implemen-
ted by the PBoC. Actual deposit and loan rates are represented by a geometric
weighted average between market and central bank rates, so that interest rate
liberalisation process can be captured by changing the weighted parameters ac-
cordingly. Required reserve ratio and the window guidance on bank loans are
included in the model. It shows that the liberalisation process is actively affected
by the window guidance rule, which helps reduce the inflation volatility. However,
although the adjustment of the required reserve ratio helps reduce the quantity of
bank loans, it seems not very useful to contain inflation or stabilise the economy.
Following that, this model considers the nominal money growth variable in the
interest rate Taylor rule. This is important as the PBoC and the central govern-
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ment announce and monitor broad money growth target every year. However, the
modified Taylor rule brings about more volatility in inflation.
Sources of real exchange rate fluctuations are investigated in Chapter 6, where the
real exchange rate movements are broken down and led by structural shocks in the
economy. It follows Clarida & Gali (1994) by constructing a trivariate structural
VAR model to investigate the movements of real relative output, real exchange rate
and relative price level. The long-run restrictions are imposed following Clarida
& Gali (1994) in order to estimate the model using quarterly data covering 1995
until recently. To check the robustness of the result, this chapter also looks at
a sub-sample period between 2005Q3 until 2015Q2, during which the exchange
rate is managed floating with reference of a basket of currencies. Moreover, as the
model with quarterly data is subject to insufficient observations, this chapter then
selects the monthly data to estimate the model with long-run restrictions for the
period after July 2005. Following that, sign restrictions are imposed to identify
supply and nominal shocks, instead of the long-run restrictions due to the critique
of Faust & Leeper (1997), and the model with monthly data yields similar results
as that based on quarterly data. The results overall confirm that demand shocks
are the main sources of real exchange rate fluctuations, but supply shocks and
nominal shocks play a significant rule as well.
Chapter 7 summarises the main results and implications obtained in the previous
chapters.
20
Chapter 2
Literature review
2.1 Introduction
Financial repression exists extensively among developing countries. The repress-
ive financial policies consist of various controls by the central bank, from which
government could expropriate a large amount of seigniorage. A large number of
literature have explained the theory of financial repression after it was proposed
by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), together with the empirical analysis among
developing countries. This chapter presents a critical survey of major theoretical
and empirical analysis on the following issues: a) how savings, investment and
economic growth respond to financial liberalisation; b) whether money and phys-
ical capital are complementary or substitutable under repressed financial economy
and c) how real and nominal shocks contribute to the fluctuations of nominal and
real exchange rates under financial repression. The rest of the literature review
proceeds along the following lines: Section 2.2 presents a summary of the current
literature on McKinnon and Shaw’s theory of the behaviour of savings, investment
and economic growth under financial liberalisation. McKinnon’s complementary
hypothesis and empirical tests on the hypothesis are outlined in Section 2.3. Sec-
tion 2.4 looks at the behaviour of real exchange rate in terms of repressive financial
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policies and the sources of fluctuations of nominal and real exchange rates. Some
conclusions are drawn in Section 2.5.
2.2 McKinnon-Shaw theory of financial repres-
sion
Financial repression was introduced by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) in their
respective works. The repressive financial policies consist of various controls by the
central bank, such as direct controls on interest rate, high reserve requirements and
domestic credit controls. Government expropriates a large seigniorage from these
financial restrictions. According to McKinnon and Shaw, such repressive policies
result in efficiency loss and lower the rate of economic growth. They argue that
the interest rate liberalisation would contribute to an increase in interest rate
and hence savings and investment, and the allocation process of financial resource
would be more efficient.
2.2.1 Financial liberalisation theory
Many developing countries adopted the low interest rates policies suggested by
Keynesians to encourage investment. However, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973)
challenged the applicability of the Keynesian view and proposed that the real in-
terest rates in less developed countries is negative and below the market equilib-
rium level. Raising interest rates would extend more loans to the investors by
attracting more savings and converting them into bank deposits, hence the equi-
librium rate of investment increases. They proposed the financial liberalisation
theory and concluded that raising interest rates, one of the financial liberalisation
policies, would increase savings and investment in a country with rudimentary
capital markets.
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Figure 2.1: Savings and investment under financial repression (Fry, 1978)
Fry (1978) summaries the core elements of the theory, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Savings and investment are presented in the horizontal axis while real interest rate
is measured in the vertical axis. Saving is a function of economic growth. S (g0)
indicates the saving level at a level of economic growth, g0, and I, represents the
level of investment at specific level of real rates of interest, r. F is the financially
repressed managed nominal interest rate determined by the government under
repressive financial policies, which holds the real rate of interest, r, below its
equilibrium level where market clears.
Given the level of r0 and the growth rate g0, actual investment is fixed at I0 due to
the limited amount of saving. If the ceiling is applicable to the deposit rates only,
investors would confront a market-clearing interest rate, r3. The spread r3 − r0,
the dashed area, would be spent by financial institutions on non-price competition.
In this case, non-price allocation of available funds for investment must take place
and it often results in inefficiency, because financial institutions would prefer to
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supply loans to conventional investment projects with low yields, as those projects
are less risky and more easily to finance. Hence the interest rate ceiling rations
out large amount of investment opportunities. When the interest rate ceiling is
raised from F to F ′, it increases levels of savings and investment, and also rations
out the investment of low yields that was financed before, as illustrated by the
shaded area in Figure 2.1. The efficiency of investment thus increases as well. The
growth rate of economy meanwhile rises to g1, shifting the saving curve to S (g1).
Actual investment is also increased to I1. Therefore, raising real interest rates
has a positive effect on both saving and investment. One of the goals in financial
liberalisation is to remove interest rate controls in a perfectly competitive market
by raising the nominal interest rate ceiling or reducing the rate of inflation. This is
described in Figure 2.1 by the equilibrium level of I2, r2 and a higher growth rate
of g2, where there are abundant investment opportunities and the overall efficiency
of investment rises as well.
Following the theory of McKinnon and Shaw, many less developed countries have
started the financial liberalisation, but the outcome of the reform has been in-
conclusive. The critics, or neo-structuralist economists, argue that an increase in
the real interest rate leads to a fall in the investment. They assumed that indi-
viduals hold “curb market loans” in addition to cash, bank deposits and inflation
hedges. Curb markets are often referred to as informal credit markets that are
not regulated, but efficient and competitive (Edwards, 1988). The informal credit
markets, for example, are not required to hold reserves as commercial banks do.
Therefore, a high level of bank savings following an increase in interest rates is
only attributed to the transfer of funds away from other asset holdings such as
share markets and informal credit markets, thus reducing the stock of loanable
funds in the curb market. The investment eventually decreases and so does the
economic growth (Taylor, 1983; Edwards, 1988).
However, Bencivenga & Smith (1992) and Kapur (1992) argue that the unregulated
curb markets are not necessarily more efficient, and the argument of those neo-
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structuralist economists ignores the economic functions served by reserves in terms
of liquidity enhancement and seigniorage creation. Therefore, it is not credible to
conclude that the efficiency of informal credit market is greater due to the absence
of reserve requirement, as the central bank could make proper use of the reserves
and thereby yields no additional social costs.
Besides, Beckerman (1988) demonstrates that the argument that the market clear-
ing rate is always positive is not valid. There are some cases when the rate is non-
positive, due to the existence of unemployment resources, for example. Policy-
makers who force up the interest rate to make the real interest rate positive would
aggravate financial repression, resulting stagflation and financial system decapit-
alisation. Therefore, Stiglitz (1993) contends that the “mild financial repression”
with the real interest rate to be slightly greater than zero would be optimal (Mur-
dock & Stiglitz, 1993; Agrawal, 2004). Hellmann et al. (2000) suggest an interest
rate on deposits lower than the market clearing rates, which maintains banks’
profits at a satisfactory level. In fact, McKinnon (1973) advocated the so-called
“restrained financial liberalisation”, with an appropriate ceiling of the real interest
rate during financial liberalisation, and suggests the rate to be in the range of 5%
to 9%, which is not consistent with Stiglitz’s view of “mild financial repression”
where the real interest rate is restricted to be around zero. In addition, Clarke
(1996) has shown that an instability is induced during financial liberalisation due
to portfolio adjustment and therefore a positive but small interest rate, as well as
moderate financial regulation, is required to stabilise the economy.
2.2.2 Empirical evidence
2.2.2.1 Savings under financial liberalisation
In recent years, a number of investigators have undertaken empirical studies follow-
ing the seminal work of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). The McKinnon-Shaw
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financial liberalisation theory suggests the positive effect of real interest rates on
savings. According to the financial liberalisation roadmap proposed by McKinnon
and Shaw, raising real interest rates encourages more savings, and converts them
into the loanable funds. The empirical results, however, are ambiguous. Fry (1978)
tested the response of real interest rates to the ratio of aggregate domestic savings
to GNP for seven Asian developing countries in 1960s and found a positive link
between real interest rates and savings. Yusuf & Peters (1984) employed dummy
variables in their model for Korea to capture the second oil shock and its first
economic recession. The aggregate savings were positively related to real interest
rates during 1965 until 1982. Pentecost & Ramlogan (2000) modelled the private
savings to income ratio in Trinidad and Tobago during 1961 to 1991. Real interest
rates, according to the Johansen maximum likelihood tests for cointegration, were
positively associated with the savings ratio in the long run. Shrestha & Chow-
dhury (2007) examined the hypothesis by using the ARDL modelling approach
to conduct cointegration tests. The result based on Nepalese quarterly data from
1970 to 2003 offered strong evidence of the positive savings-interest rate link.
Giovannini (1983) reproduced Fry’s (1978) estimation over a different sample
period. Using instrumental variables regression, he found that the coefficient of
real interest rates was either negative or positive but small and insignificant. Gio-
vannini (1985) then estimated a larger sample period spanning from 1962 to 1972
for seven Asian countries in Fry’s (1978) model, and the empirical results from
TSLS estimation were still not supportive of the hypothesis. Giovannini (1985)
concluded that the validity of the financial liberalisation theory is affected by the
sample periods selected. Fry (1995) asserted that it was possible that savings
could be increased by lifting the interest rate on deposits, provided that there is
a significantly negative interest rate of deposits in one country. Schmidt-Hebbel
& Serven (2002) documented that financial liberalisation could affect savings via
various potential channels, and the effects would be ambiguous. For example,
savings could be accumulated by raising interest rates due to a substitution effect,
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but on the other side it could be reduced well in the presence of strong income
effects.
In addition to aggregate savings, some research considered the private savings
in their analysis. de Melo & Tybout (1986) used the data of Uruguay spanning
the period 1962 to 1983. They introduced foreign savings and real income growth
together with the real interest rate in their savings model. Considering the possib-
ility of endogeneity within the variables, they adopted instrumental variables and
the result showed that the real interest rate exhibited a weakly positive correlation
with aggregate saving rates during the period before the reform in Uruguay. How-
ever, this positive link did not exist when using private savings as the dependant
variable. Leite & Makonnen (1986) selected cross-country data to estimate the
gross private savings for the six BCEAO countries, and the private savings in each
equation was significantly positively affected by the real rate of interest. Warman
& Thirlwall (1994) estimated private savings for Mexico, and found a positive
but insignificant link between real interest rate and private savings. Loayza et al.
(2000) showed the negative effect of real rate of interest on private savings. They
employed panel data analysis on 150 countries with data ranging from 1965 to
1994. The result suggested that in the short run private savings would decline by
0.25% in response of a 1% rise in the real rate of interest. Morisset (1993) con-
ducted a three-stage least squares estimates for Argentina over the 1961 to 1982
period. Compatible with the Argentine experience, the results revealed that the
effects of real rates of interest appeared to be positive on financial savings, but
negative on real total savings.
Gupta (1987) argued that it was not credible to assert that the effect of the
change in the inflation rate on the real interest rate variations would be indifferent
from the effect of the change in the nominal rate of interest. In his aggregate
savings model, expected inflation rate and nominal interest rate are both adopted
as independent variables for Asia and Latin America. It was suggested that there
was some support for the financial liberalisation theory in Asian countries, but not
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in Latin America. However, the coefficients of nominal interest rate were positive
in both groups, thus providing some evidences that lifting up the interest rate
ceilings would be conducive to increasing savings. Leff & Sato (1988) replaced the
real interest rate by another two variables, namely, the consumer price index and
the expected inflation. The increasing expected inflation was expected to lower the
real interest rate so that the savings would decline. The saving model with data
for Latin American countries spanning from 1955 to 1983 was estimated, together
with the investment model. The results reflected the expected conclusion and
the coefficient of the expected inflation was negative and significant. Khatkhate
(1988) dropped the regression analysis and classified 64 developing countries into
three groups on the basis of the mean of the real interest rate prevailing during the
period 1971 to 1980. He stated that the interest rates would be higher in numerical
average provided that it had a significant impact on any macroeconomic variable.
Therefore, the saving to income ratio in the group with non-negative real interest
rate should be the highest due to the highest level of average real interest rates.
The results, however, revealed that the group with severely negative real interest
rate had the highest saving ratio, which is conflict to the financial liberalisation
theory.
Ramlogan (1996) argued that most studies confined the measure of financial re-
pression to the interest rate. In her thesis, five other proxies of financial repression
were adopted in addition to the real interest rate, i.e. a dummy variable, reserve
requirement ratio, inflation rate, differences between foreign and domestic interest
rates and deviations of the actual exchange rate from the equilibrium level. The
results were mixed depending on which proxy was selected. For example, when
the real interest rate was included in the model, the negative coefficient suggested
that isolated increases in the interest rate would not increase savings, which was
in conflict with the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. The variable representing the
deviation of the actual exchange rate from its equilibrium was shown to match the
expected results, suggesting that government should relax exchange rate controls.
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Bandiera et al. (2000) estimated the relationship by considering the ratio of private
savings to income to be associated with the real interest rate as well as a financial
liberalisation index. The results based on eight developing countries from 1970 to
1994 indicated that the real rate of interest played a small but positive role on
driving savings, whilst the financial liberalisation index exerted no positive effect.
2.2.2.2 Investment under financial liberalisation
According to the financial liberalisation theory, raising interest rate also increases
investment. Figure 2.1 indicates that a higher interest rate in terms of repress-
ive policies increases savings and hence the equilibrium flow of investment. Seck
& El Nil (1993) tested the investment model by including nine African countries
covering the annual data from 1974 to 1989. The real deposit rate was shown
to positively affect the gross investment to GDP ratio, which was consistent with
McKinnon’s hypothesis. Shrestha & Chowdhury (2007) used total bank credit to
represent investment, and utilised the Nepalese quarterly data during 1970 and
2003. Based on the ARDL approach in cointegration analysis, their result indic-
ated investment increases as interest rate ascends. Some papers focused on the
qualitative impact other than the quantitative impact on investment and adopted
the capital to output ratio to measure the productivity of investment. According
to McKinnon and Shaw, raising interest rate would ration out the lowest yielding
investment, thus making the investment more productive. Therefore, raising the
interest rate leads to a fall in the capital-output ratio.
On the other hand, most empirical studies refuted the positive effect of interest
rate on investment. de Melo & Tybout (1986) found a negative, though weak,
response of private investment rate to real interest rate in Uruguay during 1962
and 1983. Besides, they noted that real exchange rate weakly affected investment
positively. Edwards (1988) discussed the behaviour of two types of interest rates,
namely the officially controlled deposit rates and the unregulated curb market in-
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terest rates. A change in the official deposit rates was positively associated with
a variation in the interest rates in the curb market. Following that, an aggreg-
ate investment function using the Korean data was estimated and it suggested
that a rise in the curb market interest rates discourages investment, whilst more
investment funds become available when the supply of real credits grows rap-
idly in the official market. Greene & Villanueva (1991) investigated the effect
on private investment during 1975 and 1987 and the results from among 23 de-
veloping countries suggested that private investment was significantly negatively
associated with the real interest rate. Rittenberg (1991) also failed to support
the hypothesis in Turkey. He argued that investment was constrained by savings
and was positively responded to an increase in the interest rate given that the
interest rate was below the equilibrium level. Once the level of interest rate was
higher than that of equilibrium, investment declined with an increase in the rate
of interest. Demetriades & Devereux (1992) conducted the panel data analysis
on the investment model for 63 less developed countries and suggested that the
impact of domestic real interest rate on investment was insignificant. Morisset
(1993) demonstrated with a structural model for Argentina that a change in real
interest rate is not necessarily responsible for a change in the private investment.
He noted the crowding-out effect that financial liberalisation would attract the
domestic credit from public sector, thereby restricting the available funds to flow
to the private sector. Agrawal (2004) conditioned the investment model by terms
of trade, economic growth, foreign capital inflows and the real exchange rate in
addition to the real interest rate, but found that the investment ratio increased
with the real interest rate by 9% at most among four Asian countries. However,
the investment to income ratio in two of the countries started to decline once the
interest rate went up to a higher level. This result is supportive of McKinnon’s
theory of “restrained financial liberalisation”.
The effect on the investment is also reflected on the McKinnon’s complementarity
hypothesis where the real money demand is positively related to the investment to
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income ratio. The reason is that investors have to accommodate money balances
before investment. Pentecost & Moore (2006) tested the McKinnon’s complement-
arity hypothesis in India and the results from the investment equation indicated
that the coefficient of real deposit rate was positive. Similar research papers testing
the complementarity hypothesis tend to be supportive of the financial liberalisa-
tion theory in terms of the investment (see Fry, 1978; Thornton, 1990; Laumas,
1990; Khan & Hasan, 1998). The investment model is often extended with other
variables. For example, Moore (2010) extended the investment equation, and
found that the credibility of the complementarity hypothesis remained undeter-
mined when the investment function was augmented with financial development
indicators, income level differentials, external inflows, trade barriers and public
finance. McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis is questionable in the countries
of middle income levels and those that have reached a certain degree of financial
liberalisation.
2.2.2.3 Economic growth under financial liberalisation
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) concluded that financial liberalisation pro-
moted economic growth. In fact, the positive effect on economic growth is the
combining effects of financial liberalisation on savings and investment (Ramlogan,
1996). Economic growth follows by the increased savings and the quality and
quantity of investment, as stated in Figure 2.1. Seck & El Nil (1993) documented
that the economic growth was positively related to the real interest rate on deposit,
whilst Warman & Thirlwall (1994) found that raising interest rate would increase
the flow of financial savings in Mexico during 1960 and 1990, but the impact of
financial liberalisation on economic growth was negative and insignificant.
However, Stiglitz (1993), Hellman et al. (1997) and Hellmann et al. (2000) argued
that under financial repression, developing countries were more able to adminis-
trate money supply, and the repressive financial policies would promote economic
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growth. Huang & Wang (2011) constructed a composite financial repression index
by considering typical repressive policies and controls implemented by government.
They conducted a case study of China, and argued that, on average, repressive
policies promoted economic growth both at the country and the province level.
Besides, they found that financial repression lowered the growth rate in recent
years after 2000, but helped the growth in 1980s and 1990s. In fact, their measure
of financial repression can be adopted in the validation of McKinnon-Shaw liber-
alisation theory and other indicators like credit controls, barriers to entry in the
financial sector and repression of security markets could also be added to construct
the aggregate financial repression index.
2.3 McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis
McKinnon assumes that all economic units are limited to self-finance and invest-
ment is indivisible. Money balances have to be accumulated before investment can
be undertaken. The more alluring the procedure to accumulate money balances,
the stronger the motivation to invest. This leads to the core content of McKinnon’s
complementarity hypothesis, in which real money balances and physical capital are
complementary to each other. The complementarity hypothesis between money
and physical capital among the developing countries, summarised by Pentecost
& Moore (2006), suggests that the real money demand relies, inter alia, on the
overall real capital return, while the investment to income ratio increases with
the real deposit rates. It postulates demand for money and investment functions,
respectively, as follows:
M/P = f (Y, r, R) ; fY > 0, fr > 0, fR > 0 (2.1)
I/Y = g (r, R) ; gr > 0, gR > 0 (2.2)
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where M/P is the real money balances, Y is the real income, r is the real average
return on capital, I/Y is the investment to income ratio, R is the real rate of
interest on bank deposits and f∗ (or g∗) denote partial derivative of f (or g) with
respect to each variable, Y , r or R.
McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis is therefore reflected by fr > 0 and gR >
0. Additionally, Shaw’s model assumes that investors are not necessarily confined
to self-finance and stresses the role of financial intermediation in borrowing and
lending activities. Shaw (1973) constructed the demand for money model function
in the debt intermediation view:
M/P = f (Y, v, R) (2.3)
where v captures opportunity costs of holding money.
The debt intermediation view assumes that the money created as loans to the
private sector is based on the internal debt, and it suggests no complementarity
between money and physical capital, as non-institutional credits will appear when
institutional credits are unavailable. Financial intermediaries thus play an import-
ant role in Shaw’s model, and the extent of financial intermediation between in-
vestors and savers is positively associated with the relationship between money and
economic activity. Shaw’s debt intermediation hypothesis is reflected by fv < 0.
Asset holders may switch their assets from holding money to other assets if the
interest rate of other assets increases. This model also suggests fR > 0, i.e. rais-
ing real deposit rates will attract more financial savings, and hence enhance the
role of financial intermediation between investors and savers. Molho (1986) has
shown that McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis and Shaw’s debt intermedi-
ation hypothesis are compatible. He employed a two-period intertemporal model
to suggest that money balances are, during the first period, complements to the
physical capital, whilst substitutes in the second period when financing most pro-
jects.
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It is noted that McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis model is in contrast to
the Keynesian and neoclassical economists. In Keynesian model, investment is de-
termined by the market real interest rate only, and the interest rate is negatively
related to the real money demand, and hence the investment. The neoclassical
approach suggests fr < 0 in equation (2.1) and gR < 0 in equation (2.2). They as-
sume that money and physical capital are substitutes, and capital markets operate
perfectly and efficiently, which is unlikely in less developed countries. Burkett &
Vogel (1992) enriched the complementarity hypothesis by introducing a firm with
credit constrains where the working capital is interpreted using “non-capital asset
balances” and the constraint of credit is loosened by increasing its deposits. Their
model has shown that the benefit of increasing real interest rates are not restricted
to the case of self-financing and indivisible investment. Moreover, increasing the
deposit holdings contributes to more efficiency of capital utilisation.
Recent years have witnessed a number of empirical studies on McKinnon’s com-
plementarity hypothesis testing. Various econometric techniques are adopted to
investigate real money balances, savings, investment and economic growth among
different developing countries. The empirical results, however, are ambiguous.
Practically, it is difficult to find an appropriate variable to represent the real capital
return, r. McKinnon (1973) suggested the investment to income ratio, I/Y , to
replace it in equation (2.1), which varies in the same direction as r. The real
money demand equation thus becomes:
M/P = f (Y, I/Y, R) ; fY > 0, fI/Y > 0, fR > 0 (2.4)
An impressive number of empirical studies have been carried out to test the com-
plementarity hypothesis in developing countries. However, Fry (1978) argued that
the investment function must be replaced by the savings function, as explained
in Figure 2.1. The demand for investment is plentiful, and it is the supply of
savings that contributes to the binding constraint. I/Y in equation (2.4) is re-
34
placed by the ratio of domestic savings to GNP, thus opting out the investment
financed from foreign savings as well. He used pooled data from ten Asian less
developed countries to test the demand for money equation during the period
of 1962 to 1972. McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis failed to explain the
empirical results among these countries. Similarly, Min (1976) and Harris (1979)
modelled the real money equation and they both found weak evidence to be sup-
portive of the hypothesis among Asian countries. Following the spirit of Fry’s
(1978) method, Thornton & Poudyal (1990) tested this hypothesis in the demand
for money function for Nepal with the data ranging from 1974 to 1986. The
coefficient of the domestic savings to income ratio was positive and statistically
significant, which was in sharp contrast to Fry’s conclusion. The results tended
to show strong evidence to support McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis in
Nepal. Additionally, Thornton (1990) applied Fry’s demand for money model
to India for the period between 1964 and 1984. Both the results of OLS and
TSLS estimates were in favour of McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis. Fry
(1978) then found that the financial liberalisation of the selected Asian countries
had proceeded to a relatively advanced level, therefore alternative financial assets
other than broad money might be used to accumulate the supply for investment.
In addition, semi-industrial developing countries, like those Asian economies in
his study, may have some self-governed effects to develop modern agriculture or
achieve industrialisation (McKinnon, 1973).
Khan & Hasan (1998) found that the results in Pakistan during 1959 to 1995
were in favour of McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis. Following Fry (1978),
a savings model was introduced to replace the investment in their analysis, and
the ratio of savings to GNP was significantly positive in the real money demand
equation. Besides, real money demand yielded a positive effect on savings ratio in
the savings equation. The results held in the long-run cointegration regressions as
well as in the dynamic error correction analysis. Odhiambo (2005) also replaced
the investment by domestic savings, and tested the availability of the hypothesis
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for South Africa. Unlike the method of testing OLS residuals for cointegration
in Khan & Hasan (1998), the maximum likelihood cointegration test was applied
to both money and investment equations. Only short-run dynamic error correc-
tion models were reported and the results were in favour of the complementarity
hypothesis. Another finding of Odhiambo (2005) was that domestic savings and
foreign savings1 were complements rather than substitutes, which is contrary to
most research work. Kargbo (2010) recently employed the autoregressive distrib-
uted lag (ARDL) model to test the cointegration relationships in the money and
savings models, respectively. The one-period lagged per capita real money variable
was introduced in the domestic savings function to test the nature of the comple-
mentarity hypothesis. In the short run, the result from Sierra Leone during 1977
to 2008 exerted a positive and significant effect of money demand on domestic
savings to income ratio.
Laumas (1990) followed McKinnon’s initial model for money demand equation and
estimated equation (2.4) using annual data for India during 1954-55 to 1974-75.
Quite a few studies adopt broad money stock, M2, for the money supply variable,
M . Laumas (1990) showed that M2 did not work well in this model. M1, part
of M2, must drop if the real interest rate on deposits increases. Therefore, time
deposits alone were adopted for M . As to the investment equation, the real re-
turn on capital, r, was computed using the data of medium and large-sized Indian
enterprises. Gross private investment was used in I/Y . Also, aggregate ratio of
public investment to income was added into the explanatory variable, which is ex-
pected to negatively affect the private investment. 2SLS estimation procedure was
used to estimate both money demand and investment equations simultaneously.
The result provided strong support for the complementarity hypothesis in India.
Pentecost & Moore (2006) kept McKinnon’s initial money demand function, and
1Domestic savings variable is usually represented by GDP less final consumption expenditure,
and foreign savings variable is defined as current account deficits in the balance of payments,
according to Odhiambo (2005), because a deficit indicates that a home country absorbs savings
abroad to finance domestic investment.
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replaced the real capital return, r, by the domestic credit relative to income,
DC/Y , in equation (2.2). They argue that McKinnon’s initial model overlooked
the progress of financial liberalisation. As domestic credit becomes available, in-
vestment will increase independently of money demand. The investment equation
thus becomes:
I/Y = g (DC/Y, R) ; gDC/Y > 0, gR > 0 (2.5)
Pentecost & Moore (2006) looked at the money demand equation and the in-
vestment equation as a system and employed the Johansen-Juselius cointegration
test. They also argued that the exogenous assumption of the explanatory variables
should also be tested. Similarly, they found that money and physical capital were
complementary to each other in India from 1951 to 1999, which is in line with
Laumas (1990). Following the models developed by Pentecost & Moore (2006),
Moore (2010) constructed a panel data framework for 107 developing countries cov-
ering the period 1970 to 2006, and ran a simultaneous estimation of money and
investment equations using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method.
The estimation also concluded that the long-run and dynamic formulations offered
significant evidences to be supportive of the complementarity hypothesis.
Ogwumike & Ofoegbu (2012) combined equation (2.4) and equation (2.5) by repla-
cing I/Y in the money demand equation by DC/Y . Following that, the financial
liberalisation index was included in the money demand equation as well. They
applied the ARDL model to the real money balances in Nigeria spanning from
1970 to 2009. M is represented by the total financial savings. The bounds test-
ing result indicated that, in the long run, the effect of domestic credit to income
ratio on real money balances was positive and significant, but the coefficient of
the real interest rate was negative. As to the short-run dynamic analysis, changes
in the real interest rate and domestic credit both positively affected the change
in the money balances. However, this combination of two models rules out the
verification of gR > 0 in equation (2.5).
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Natke (1999) looked at the complementarity hypothesis in a microeconomic view
and investigated the real money demand equation at the firm level. 86 manufac-
turing firms were chosen during 1972 and 1976 in Brazil. The real money variable
is represented by the liquid assets. The revenue of the firm, real interest rate, the
planned investment spending and the return on capital are included in the liquid
assets model. The study overall found some evidence of McKinnon’s hypothesis
that the planned spending on investment affects current liquid asset holdings.
2.4 Fluctuations of real exchange rate under fin-
ancial repression
In McKinnon and Shaw’s analysis of financial repression, the behaviours of savings
and investment are mostly cited and numerous research studies have examined the
impact of financial repression on the savings and investment theoretically and em-
pirically. In fact, the existence of financial repression (or liberalisation) exerts
great influence on not only savings, investment and economic growth, but also
the behaviour of the real exchange rates. Recent work postulates that financial
repression and the less developed financial markets in developing countries are
primarily responsible for the movement of real exchange rates. The suggestion of
financial liberalisation, proposed by McKinnon and Shaw, contributes to a dra-
matic increase in capital inflows and real exchange rate appreciation. This section
begins with the definition of real exchange rate, and the theoretical framework
and empirical studies on the sources of real exchange rate fluctuations follow.
2.4.1 Concept of real exchange rate
Real exchange rate is defined as a relative price which reflects the external com-
petitiveness of a country. Also, it is often interpreted as the nominal exchange
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rate considering the inflation inequality in different countries. Traditionally, the
real exchange rate, q, is defined in line with the purchasing power parity (PPP)
in the long run. :
q = ε
P ∗
P
where ε is nominal exchange rate, P ∗ and P are price levels of foreign and home
countries, respectively. A decline in the real exchange rate can be interpreted as a
real exchange rate appreciation. Another definition considers the price of tradable
goods in one country relative to the price of nontradable goods, which can also rep-
resent the level of external competitiveness in one country (see Dornbusch, 1974;
Dornbusch, 1980; Frenkel & Mussa, 1985 and Neary & Purvis, 1983). Assuming
that the law of one price holds for the tradables and that no taxes are imposed on
trade, the real exchange rate can be defined as follows:
q = ε
P ∗T
PN
where P ∗T is the world price of the tradable goods, and PN denotes the domestic
price of the nontradable goods.
In this case, an increase of q represents a real depreciation of the domestic cur-
rency. This definition, however, confronts the measurement problem as no coun-
tries formulate price statistics on the basis of the tradable and nontradable goods.
Harberger (1986) suggested using the domestic consumer price index to represent
the price of the tradables, and the foreign wholesale or producer price index as the
proxy for the international price of the tradables. He also proposed another al-
ternative definition of real exchange rate and it is defined by the general domestic
price index, Pd:
q =
ε
Pd
All the definitions above are built on the assumption that there is only one trading
partner for the home country, which is unrealistic in most cases. The real effective
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exchange rate (REER) is introduced to incorporate both the nominal exchange
rate and the price levels of other countries. In this case, a trade-weighted criteria
is included in order to define the multilateral real exchange rates in terms of the
trading partners of a country and the REER in country i is defined as:
REERi =
n∏
j=1
(
εij
P ∗j
Pi
)wij
where εij is the nominal exchange rate between i and j, P
∗
j is the price level for
foreign country j, Pi is the domestic price level for country i, and the weighting
pattern, wij , is time-varying and represented by the trade allocation of each trading
partner of a country such that
∑
i 6=j
wij = 1. The REER data, together with the
time-varying weights data, are often calculated and published by the Bank for
International Settlements.
2.4.2 Real exchange rate fluctuations
An increase in interest rate during financial liberalisation contributes to a rise
in the capital inflow, which lifts the money supply and higher aggregate demand
given a fixed nominal exchange rate policy, and boosts domestic price level, and
hence a real appreciation. If a flexible exchange rate regime takes effect, the net
capital flow is likely to increase both nominal and real exchange rate appreciation
directly (Moore & Pentecost, 2006). Kohli & Kletzer (2001) studied the function
of financial repression in exchange rate management in presence of capital controls
in India. Government could intervene by adopting policy tools of financial repres-
sion to manage exchange rate under the managed floating exchange rate regime in
India. Using a stylized model based on optimizing the behaviour of households and
firms in a monetary economy, they revealed how financial liberalisation without
fiscal policy reforms would bring about the balance of payments crisis in an eco-
nomy where capital account was non-convertible. Besides, given the existence of
40
rising capital inflows, government borrowing from the domestic financial sector
played a crucial role in managing exchange rate. In addition, many methods were
proposed and used to pinpoint the sources of real exchange rate movements, which
is summarised as follows.
2.4.2.1 Monetary approach with sticky prices
Based on the concept of PPP, one popular way to measure fluctuations of real
exchange rate is the monetary approach with sticky prices. In line with this dis-
equilibrium approach, changes in real exchange rate respond to changes in nom-
inal exchange rate due to the slow adjustment of nominal price. Dornbusch (1976)
models this approach and explains that the interaction of monetary shocks with
sticky prices contributes to movements in real exchange rate. Frankel (1979) con-
structed a general monetary model of exchange rate where flexible and sticky
price monetarists are included and considered as special cases. Hooper & Morton
(1982) extended the Dornbusch-Frankel model by allowing for large and sustained
changes in real exchange rate.
Many empirical analyses seek to investigate movements of real exchange rate using
this approach. Hooper & Morton (1982) related real exchange rate to the balance
of current account. Using the quarter data in the U.S, during 1973 and 1978,
they suggested that the cumulative first difference of current account balance
affected negatively on the U.S. real exchange rate, and the real dollar appreciation
would be caused by a rise in the current balances. Kletzer & Kohli (2000) argued
that the monetary approach with sticky prices offered a reasonable description
for the Indian real exchange rate under the managed floating regime. Junttila
& Korhonen (2011) analysed the nonlinear relationships between macroeconomic
fundamentals and exchange rate among five industrial countries. They developed
Frenkel’s (1976) model of exchange rate with flexible prices and modified the error
correction model with time-varying parameters. Their estimation concluded that
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it was the inflation rate differentials that drove exchange rates in the long run.
2.4.2.2 General equilibrium approach
Another approach to determine fluctuations of real exchange rate is to generate a
general equilibrium model where the nominal prices are flexible. Stockman (1980,
1983 and 1987) consider real exchange rate as endogenous which is determined in
the general equilibrium approach. Stockman rejects the direct effect of nominal
exchange rate on real exchange rate, but regards nominal exchange rate as part of
the monetary equilibrium. The real exchange rate is then represented by the terms
of trade, defined as the relative price of foreign to domestic goods. Fluctuations
of real exchange rate hence are responses to the disequilibrium in output mar-
kets raised by real variables such as productivity, labour supply and government
spending. Neary (1988) further adds the optimising behaviour of consumers and
producers to Stockman’s model with regard to an objective function. In the spirit
of this, Edwards (1991) developed a dynamic intertemporal general equilibrium
model to capture the behaviour of real exchange rate. The real exchange rate
in his model was defined as the relative price of tradables to nontradables. In
the empirical analysis, he estimated the dynamic equations using the pooled data
for twelve developing countries, showing that real exchange rate in the short run
responded to both nominal and real disturbances. Moreover, expansive policies
tended to bring about real overvaluation.
Jang (1995) extended Edwards’s optimising intertemporal general equilibrium
model by including the analysis of a duality theory as in Ka¨hko¨nen (1987). In
this model, three types of goods were incorporated, i.e. exportables, importables
and nontradables, and financial repression in the domestic market, for example,
was reflected by lowering the domestic interest rate on deposit. Jang built the in-
tertemporal general equilibrium model by optimising the behaviour of households,
firms, banking sector and the government, and undertook the comparative static
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analysis to explore the reaction of the real exchange rates to financial repression
and other governmental policies. One conclusion from the theoretical analysis was
that financial repression would contribute to a real exchange rate appreciation in
the short run, provided that there was no initial distortion. Also, under financial
repression, trade liberalisation might not result in a real depreciation.
2.4.2.3 Structural vector autoregression approach
Policy-makers have long expressed concern about the sources of nominal and real
exchange rate fluctuations in order to stabilise exchange rates. The structural vec-
tor autoregression (VAR) model treats exchange rates, together with some other
variables, as endogenous variables so that movements of exchange rate can be de-
composed into parts due to various types of shocks in the economy. Also, shocks
need to be identified in the structural VAR model, and most empirical research
works have followed the pioneering work of Blanchard & Quah (1989) where struc-
tural shocks are identified by applying the long-run relationships from the theory
to the model estimation procedure. Lastrapes (1992) employed the bivariate VAR
model to have nominal and real exchange rates included as endogenous variables,
and the structural shocks were defined as nominal shocks (money supply) and
real shocks (technology, preferences and resource endowments, etc.). Following
Blanchard & Quah (1989) and assuming nominal shocks have no persistent effect
on the real exchange rate, Lastrapes found that fluctuations of both nominal and
real exchange rates during 1973 to 1989 were dominated by real shocks in five
developed countries with flexible exchange rate regimes. Enders & Lee (1997)
also looked at the real and nominal exchange rates, and confirmed the role of real
shocks in dominating movements of exchange rates in Japan, Canada and Ger-
many during the post-Bretton Woods period. An investigation in real exchange
rate fluctuations in the Euro between 1999 and 2006 was conducted by Hamori
& Hamori (2007), and various methods to measure prices and nominal exchange
rates were compared for the purpose of robustness checks. The results suggested
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that real shocks played a key rule in the variation of real exchange rate in the
long run. Nominal shocks, however, showed no long-run effects on real exchange
rate because of the restriction imposed, but reduced nominal exchange rate at a
significant level. In addition, several studies look at transition economies and less
developed economies. For example, Dibooglu & Kutan (2001) investigated the
sources of real exchange rate movements in Hungary and Poland, both of which
were considered as transition economies during the sample period, i.e. January
1990 to March 1999. Hungary, with low-inflation, had similar results to advanced
economies that real shocks dominated in the long run. However, the sources of
real exchange rate fluctuations in Poland were mainly caused by nominal shocks in
the short horizon. Morales-Zumaquero (2006) also obtained mixed results among
transition economies in the Europe, but suggested different results in advanced
economies. According to Morales-Zumaquero, real shocks were the predominant
sources of real exchange rate fluctuations between 1973 and 1990, whilst nominal
shocks took the rule during 1991 and 2000. Moreover, nominal shocks dominate
among Euro-zone countries between 1991 and 2000. Moore & Pentecost (2006)
examined the rules of two shocks in India since its financial liberalisation in 1990s,
and the results suggested that real shocks dominate variations in real exchange
rate, which is consistent with most advanced economies.
Clarida & Gali (1994) constructed a trivariate structural VARmodel where output,
price level and real exchange rate are considered as endogenous. The model can
be interpreted as a stochastic model of Obstfeld et al. (1985). Three types of
structural shocks, namely demand shocks, supply shocks and nominal shocks, are
introduced into the model. The first two shocks are real shocks in Lastrapes
(1992), whilst the nominal shocks capture exogenous changes of monetary policy
as well as money demand. The identification of three shocks is motivated by
imposing long-run restrictions following Blanchard & Quah (1989). To be specific,
it is assumed that long-run level of real exchange rate is not driven by nominal
shocks, and that long-run level of output is not driven by both nominal shocks
44
and real demand shocks. Detken et al. (2002) applied the model proposed by
Clarida & Gali (1994) to the Euro area, and found that real demand shocks were
the main factor to drive exchange rate fluctuations in the long run. A study
on the transition economies among Central and Eastern Europe during 1995 and
2005 by Stazka (2006) provided mixed results. According to Stazka, the results
were dependent of whether a country had joined Exchange Rate Mechanism II
(ERM II). For example, nominal shocks overall accounted for most of exchange
rate movements for those economies who had not jointed ERM II, whilst real
demand shocks dominated for others. Besides, a number of empirical literature
have looked at less developed countries following the approach proposed by Clarida
& Gali (1994). Wang (2005), for example, showed that real demand shocks were
the main sources of real exchange rate fluctuations in China between 1980 and
2003. However, nominal shocks reported unusual results where real exchange
rate initially depreciates in response of a positive nominal shock. One possible
defect of Wang (2005) is that annual data should be avoided, as Faust & Leeper
(1997) argued that the estimates are likely to be unreliable in finite samples. The
number of observations when using annual data in this model was only 24, making
the results much questionable. However, due to the scarcity of data among most
less developed countries, it is far difficult or even impossible to obtain monthly
data. Ahmad & Pentecost (2009) chose quarterly data between 1980 and 2005 to
examine the sources of real exchange rate fluctuations in nine African countries,
and found that nominal shocks accounted for a small part of real exchange rate
movements, but real demand shocks were the main sources driving real exchange
rate fluctuations in the long run. Inoue & Hamori (2009) also found a persistent
effect of real demand shocks in India the long run, which is in favour of Moore
& Pentecost (2006) during the similar sample periods. The result from Pakistan,
however, provided contrary results. According to Khan et al. (2010) and based
on quarterly data from 1982 to 2007, nominal shocks played a significant role in
the short run, and supply shocks were predominant sources over the long horizon.
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Similarly, Apergis & Karfakis (1996) showed that supply shocks accounted for
most of real exchange rate variations in Greece since 1975, when Greece adopted a
managed floating regime. Their results were robust by repeatedly choosing foreign
price levels from six different industrial and developed countries.
In addition to a bivariate or trivariate structural VAR model, multivariate struc-
tural VAR model is adopted with general equilibrium models to incorporate more
shocks in the estimation, and the results varies from countries. Huang & Guo
(2007) used a four-dimensional structural VAR model with an additional oil shock,
and suggested that the oil shocks accounted for a little degree of long-run real
exchange rate fluctuations in China, and real shocks accounted for most of the
variation. According to a two-sector two-factor small open economy model with a
multivariate structural VAR approach, Jakab & Kova´cs (2000) found a real supply
shock dominated for Hungary during 1991 to 1998, whilst nominal policy shock
made little effect. However, nominal shocks in Australia played a key role in real
exchange rate movements, based on a model containing nine endogenous variables
constructed by Dennis (2003).
As mentioned above, Faust & Leeper (1997) criticised the credibility of the long-
run restrictions imposed in the structural VAR model in terms of finite samples.
Recently, an alternative method was used to impose sign restrictions, rather than
long-run restrictions, to identify shocks in the structural VAR model (see Uhlig,
2005; Peersman, 2005; Fry & Pagan, 2007 and Mountford & Uhlig, 2009). Ju-
venal (2011) imposes the sign restrictions in the structural VAR model, and the
result based on the U.S. data during 1976 until 2007 was in favour of most pre-
vious empirical work on developed economies, i.e. it is demand shocks that drove
about 37% of real exchange rate fluctuations in a 20-quarter horizon, and monet-
ary shocks played a limited role. Enders et al. (2011) considered a quantitative
business cycle model with sign restrictions, and their results from the U.S. data
suggested that real exchange rate appreciates in response to a negative shock of
government expenditure and a positive technology shock. Huh & Kwon (2015)
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looked at real exchange rate fluctuations as well as trade balances in the G7 coun-
try groups. He imposed long-run restrictions on relative output level, but a set of
sign restrictions on real exchange rate and trade balances, and found that nominal
shocks account for 20% to 50% of real exchange rate fluctuations in the long run
among these countries, and demand shocks are less important in five countries
except Germany and Italy. This finding is in sharp contrast with many results
based on pure long-run restrictions, where demand shocks are main sources of real
exchange rate variations. The empirical results using sign restrictions on struc-
tural VAR models for transition or less developed economies, however, are still
scarce.
2.5 Conclusion
To summarise, empirical literature holds different perspectives on the credibility
of McKinnon’s complementary hypothesis. Moreover, there is no consensus with
respect to the impacts of the real interest rate on savings as well as investment.
Although recent years have witnessed smooth development in financial liberal-
isation in China, it is believed that financial repression still exists within China.
Nonetheless, it is noted that very few empirical papers have studied this potential
financial repression. The credibility of the complementarity hypothesis in China,
however, needs to be tested by empirical work. To test the cointegration relation-
ships between money and physical capital, the maximum likelihood based reduced
rank regression test by Johansen & Juselius (1990), Johansen (1991) and Johansen
(1995) rests on the assumption that all the underlying variables are integrated of
order one, I (1), which is sometimes unlikely in practical analysis. In order to solve
this potential problem, Pesaran et al. (2001) then proposed the bound testing ap-
proach to the cointegration analysis where the variables can be a group of I (0)
and I (1). This study employs the bound testing method using the autoregression
distributed lag (ARDL) model to investigate the complementary hypothesis. Also,
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savings equation is considered so as to assess the argument by Fry (1978), who
suggested that the investment function be replaced by the savings function.
In addition to the analysis based on the partial equilibrium above, this thesis
considers alternative DSGE model specification to investigate the effects of fin-
ancial repression and deregulation. Firstly, deposit rate deregulation is measured
by gradually increasing the long-run deposit rate. Also, as the control of money
supply in China has long been a vital instrument of monetary policy to meet in-
flation targets and stabilise economy, but it is far more difficult to control the
money supply, it is believed that an interest rate rule has been more frequently
used. This study then compares the efficiency of the two monetary policy instru-
ments during financial liberalisation process. Following that, a new Keynesian
model with patient and impatient households and commercial banks sector is con-
structed following Iacoviello (2005) and Gerali et al. (2010), with several types of
repressive financial policies proposed by Chen et al. (2012) and Funke & Paetz
(2012). This model considers the effect of the window guidance for bank loans
on the process of deposit and loan rate deregulation. Another typical repressive
policy, high required reserve ratio in China, is also captured in the model.
Lastly, fluctuations of real exchange rate have generated increasing interest in
policy-makers aiming to maintain the stability of exchange rate, especially for
those transition countries experiencing financial liberalisation. The empirical
literature on detecting the sources of real exchange rates based on structural
VAR models yield mixed results, though the argument that real shocks are main
sources to drive movements of real exchange rate is preferred in most cases. The
sources of real exchange rate variations in China, however, call for an empirical
re-examination, especially for recent decades.
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Chapter 3
Testing McKinnon’s
complementarity hypothesis
3.1 Introduction
According to Keynesians, reducing interest rates lowers the cost of capital, which
induces more capital formation, but inhibits savings. McKinnon (1973) also sug-
gests a negative effect on savings from lowering the interest rate. However, re-
ducing the real interest rate on deposits in China is not related to a decrease in
the savings to income ratio, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Data for some years even
suggest a possible negative link between them. One possible reason that the sav-
ing ratio is not sensitive to the real interest rate is the limitation of investment
opportunities. In addition, households tend to save more to guarantee their basic
living due to the absence of the well developed social welfare system.
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) suggest that raising the level of interest rates
induces more savings, and hence increases the quantity and quality of investment.
The effect can be partly reflected by the bank’s ability to transform savings into
investment. Figure 3.2 shows the difference between bank loans and bank savings
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Figure 3.1: Real deposit rates and savings to income ratio in China
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Figure 3.2: Bank loans and deposits relative to GDP in China
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relative to GDP in China since 1978. The ratio of deposits to GDP started to
take the lead after 1995, indicating potential difficulties banks are confronted with
when transforming deposits into loans. The difference became even larger in recent
years. In addition, the imperfect bank supervision mechanism may also work to
reduce the bank’s ability of transforming savings. Finally, the profitability of
financial intermediation in one country can be measured by the spread between
the interest rates on bank loans and bank deposits. The spread remained at around
3% in the interest rate reform period after 1996, as illustrated in Figure 1.1.
This chapter conducts an empirical study to examine the credibility of the com-
plementarity hypothesis between money and physical capital in China. Due to
the availability of quarterly data, the period considered covers 1987 until 2013
when China started a transformation from a centrally planned economy to a mar-
ket oriented economy. The bounds testing with ARDL modelling approaches are
employed in the study to allow all the underlying variables to be integrated of dif-
ferent orders. Moreover, the unit root test developed by Perron (1997) is used in
addition to the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, as the latter has low power
in the presence of a structural break in the data. The empirical results from
the money and investment models following Pentecost & Moore (2006) offer weak
evidence to support the hypothesis, as the real interest rate on bank deposits has
no effects on capital formation. The result, however, turns out to be in favour
of McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis by indicating a significant positive re-
lationship when extending the investment model with variables such as income
growth, real exchange rates and the terms of trade, and when the domestic credit
to income ratio is removed. Finally, following Fry (1978), the savings equation
enters the complementarity hypothesis testing model framework to replace the
investment equation. The negative relationship between money and savings is in
sharp contrast to the complementarity hypothesis.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 briefly outlines McKinnon’s com-
plementarity hypothesis and the theoretical framework of the model. The empir-
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ical models, methodology of cointegration analysis and data selections are illus-
trated in Section 3.3. Following that, Section 3.4 shows the main empirical results.
Lastly, Section 3.5 concludes and proposes future research work.
3.2 The complementarity hypothesis and frame-
work
McKinnon’s model rests on some vital assumptions, i.e. household firms and
small enterprises in less developed countries are limited to self-finance and have
no access to credit. Also, investment is indivisible. Money balances have to
be accumulated before investment can be undertaken. The more alluring the
procedure to accumulate money balances, the stronger the motivation to invest.
This leads to the core content of McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis, in
which real money balances and physical capital are complementary to each other.
The complementarity hypothesis between money and physical capital among less
developed countries suggests that the real money demand relies directly, inter alia,
on the real capital return, while the ratio of investment to income increases with
the real deposit rate. It postulates the money demand and investment functions
as follows:
M/P = f (Y, r, R) ; fY > 0, fr > 0, fR > 0 (3.1)
I/Y = g (r, R) ; gr > 0, gR > 0 (3.2)
whereM/P is the real money balances, Y is the real income, I/Y is the investment
to income ratio, r is the real average return on capital, R is the real rate of interest
on bank deposits and f∗ (or g∗) denote partial derivative of f (or g) with respect
to each variable, Y , r or R.
McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis is therefore reflected by fr > 0 and gR >
0 in equation (3.1) and (3.4). Practically, it is difficult to find an appropriate
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variable to represent the real capital return, r. McKinnon (1973) suggested the
investment to income ratio, I/Y , to replace r in equation (3.1), which varies in
the same direction as r. The real money demand equation thus becomes:
M/P = f (Y, I/Y, R) ; fY > 0, fI/Y > 0, fR > 0 (3.3)
An impressive number of empirical studies have been carried out to test the com-
plementarity hypothesis in developing countries, as discussed in Section 2.3 in
Chapter 2. However, Fry (1978) argued that the investment function must be
replaced by the savings function, as the demand for investment is plentiful and it
is the supply of savings that contributes to the binding constraint. I/Y in equa-
tion (3.3) is replaced by the ratio of domestic savings to GNP, thus opting out the
investment financed from foreign savings as well. Pentecost & Moore (2006) kept
McKinnon’s initial money demand function, and replaced the real capital return,
r, by the domestic credit relative to income, DC/Y , in equation (3.2). They argue
that McKinnon’s initial model overlooked the progress of financial liberalisation.
As domestic credit becomes available, investment will increase independently of
money demand. The investment equation thus becomes:
I/Y = g (DC/Y, R) ; gDC/Y > 0, gR > 0 (3.4)
The link between the two equations above is derived from goods market and money
market equilibrium conditions as described in Pentecost & Ramlogan (2000) and
Pentecost & Moore (2006). To be specific, goods market equilibrium indicates
that:
S − I = G− T + CA (3.5)
where S and I are aggregated private savings and investment, respectively, G
denotes government expenditure, T is tax income and CA is the current account
on the balance of payments at current price level, and is known as foreign savings.
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On the other hand, money market equilibrium yields:
Ms = DC + F (3.6)
Md = P × f (Y, r, R) (3.7)
Md = Ms (3.8)
where DC is domestic credit, F denotes the foreign exchange reserve kept by the
central bank, Md and Ms are money demand and supply, respectively, and P
denotes price level.
As Pentecost & Moore (2006) suggest, if there is no net international lending
outstanding, and the capital is prevented from international mobility, then ∆F =
CA. Furthermore, assuming a balanced budget constraint of the government,
T = G, yields the following relationship:
S − I (r, R) = ∆f (Y, r, R)−∆(DC/P ) (3.9)
which means that the real excess supply of private savings without banks equals to
the excess real money demand. In the presence of money market equilibrium, i.e.
∆f (Y, r, R) = ∆ (DC/P ), the stock equilibrium can be defined as S = I (r, R).
3.3 Methodologies and data
3.3.1 Models
This section starts from the model developed by Pentecost & Moore (2006), as
indicated in equation (3.3) and equation (3.4). The investment to income ratio
enters the money demand function to be a proxy of the real return on capital,
whilst the domestic credit to income ratio is included in the investment equation.
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McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis between money and physical capital is
tested by specifying the real money demand equation and the investment equation
respectively:
m = f (y, i, R) (3.10)
i = g (dc, R) (3.11)
where m = ln (M/P ) is the log of real money demand, y = ln (Y ) is the log of
real income level, i = I/Y is the investment to income ratio, R is the real interest
rate on bank deposits, and dc = DC/Y is the domestic credit relative to income.
McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis hence indicates fi > 0 and gR > 0.
The investment equation (3.11) can be conditioned by some additional variables
(see Agrawal, 2004; Shrestha & Chowdhury, 2007; Moore, 2010). The following
augmented investment model is constructed:
i = g (dc, R, ν) (3.12)
where ν is a vector of variables that are considered to affect the investment to
income ratio. For example, the real growth rate of income, GR, is expected to
positively affect the investment ratio, since higher economic growth rate induces
more requirements for capital formation, and hence raising the investment to in-
come ratio. The terms of trade, TOT , calculated as the ratio between export and
import price index, denotes the relative export price in terms of import price. An
improvement of TOT therefore would expect a decrease in the relative price of the
importable goods, i.e. usually capital goods in developing countries, and hence
increasing the investment. Also, TOT would influence investment by affecting real
income (Cardoso, 1993). Additionally, the real exchange rate, RER, can also be
included in ν.
Fry (1978) has argued that the investment equation must be taken over by the
savings equation due to the shortage of savings as the supply of loanable funds,
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as illustrated in Figure 2.1, so here the following equations are tested as well:
m = f (y, sd, R) (3.13)
sd = h (R, y, sf) (3.14)
where sd, the domestic savings to income ratio, is included in the money demand
equation to replace the investment to income ratio. sf is the foreign savings
to income ratio, which is considered as substitutes for domestic savings. The
complementarity hypothesis thus suggests fsd > 0 and hR > 0.
3.3.2 Bounds testing approach
To test the cointegration relationships in time series analysis, several approaches
are used in the empirical studies. Engle & Granger (1987) developed a two-step
test based on the OLS residual for the null of no cointegration. Johansen &
Juselius (1990), Johansen (1991) and Johansen (1995) introduced the maximum
likelihood based reduced rank regression test for cointegration. All of the tests
rest on the assumption that all the underlying variables are integrated of order
one, i.e. I (1) which is sometimes unlikely in practical analysis. Pesaran et al.
(2001) then proposed the bounds testing approach to the cointegration analysis
where the variables can be a mix of I(0) and I(1). This test reduces the degree
of pre-testing problems by allowing sufficient numbers of lags to describe the data
generating process (Shrestha & Chowdhury, 2007). This paper thus considers
using the bounds testing approach in the empirical studies.
The bounds testing approach is based on the conditional error correction model
(ECM) taking the following specification:
∆st = c+ bssst−1 + bsxxt−1 +
p∑
j=1
δ
′
j∆zt−j +ϕ
′
∆xt + εt (3.15)
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where zt =
(
st,x
′
t
)′
is a vector of underlying variables, which can be either I (0)
or I (1). The error term, εt, is assumed to be serially uncorrelated.
The null hypothesis of no cointegration for the bounds testing approach is there-
fore, H0 : bss = 0 and bsx = 0
′
. The long-run level model and the short-run
dynamic error correction model then can be specified given that H0 is rejected.
For example, to test the cointegration relationships in equation (3.10) and equa-
tion (3.11), the bounds testing frameworks are as follows:
∆mt =c0 + bmmmt−1 + bmyyt−1 + bmiit−1 + bmrrt−1 +
p∑
j=1
δm,j∆mt−j
+
p∑
j=0
δy,j∆yt−j +
p∑
j=0
δi,j∆it−j +
p∑
j=0
δr,j∆rt−j + εm,t (3.16)
∆it =c1 + biiit−1 + bidcdct−1 + birrt−1 +
p∑
k=1
δi,k∆it−k
+
p∑
k=0
δdc,k∆dct−k +
p∑
k=0
δr,k∆rt−k + εi,t (3.17)
The null hypotheses in equation (3.16) and equation (3.17) are H0 : bmm = bmy =
bmi = bmr = 0 and H0 : bii = bidc = bir = 0, respectively. To conduct the bounds
test, OLS technique is used to estimate equation (3.16) and equation (3.17), re-
spectively. Following that, given each H0, compare the conventional F statistics
with the critical values, as reported in Pesaran et al. (2001). It is noted that two
critical values are provided. The lower bound is obtained when xt is purely I (0),
whilst the upper bound is calculated under the condition that the underlying vari-
ables are all I (1). The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at certain
significance level provided that F exceeds the upper-bound critical value, and it
cannot be rejected when F is below the lower-bound critical value. However, if F
falls within the interval between the lower and upper bounds, the bounds testing
result is inconclusive.
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The coefficients, bs, indicate the long-run level effects whilst δs are the short-run
dynamic coefficients. Shrestha & Chowdhury (2007), Kargbo (2010) and Ogwu-
mike & Ofoegbu (2012) also employed the bounds testing approach, but they
estimated the appropriate ARDL models for the bounds testing procedure, rather
than using the unrestricted models such as equation (3.16) and equation (3.17).
Pesaran et al. (2001) content that the coefficients of δs should remain unrestrained
when conducting the bounds tests, otherwise the tests are likely to be subject to
the pre-testing problem. Given that the null hypothesis is rejected at certain sig-
nificance level, the ARDL model is considered to estimate the long-run effects and
the short-run dynamics, as is a more parsimonious specification. This means that
the ARDL model is selected by looking at q ∗ (q + 1)k models in equation (3.15),
where k is the number of the variables in x, and q is the maximum order of p.
3.3.3 Data selection
The quarterly data used in this study cover the period starting from Quarter
1, 1987 until Quarter 2, 2013 in China. This is a remarkable period in China’s
economic and financial reform, as it started a transformation from a centrally
planned economy to a market oriented one in 1987. The nominal money demand,
M , is the M2 end-period stock including cash and time deposits. The income
level, Y , is nominal GDP. The real money stock and real GDP are both obtained
by deflating the CPI. The investment variable, I, given the availability of data, is
indicated by the gross fixed capital formation. DC is measured by the domestic
credit to private non-financial sector. Inflation rate is calculated as the annual
difference of CPI, i.e. log (CPIt/CPIt−4) ∗ 100. The real deposit rate, R, is the
the nominal 1-year deposit rate less the expected inflation rate.
Additional variables in equation (3.12) include the growth of income level, GR,
the terms of trade, TOT , and the real exchange rate RER. GR is calculated
as the growth of real GDP at the annual rate, i.e. GR = log (GDPt/GDPt−4) ∗
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100. TOT is defined as the export to import price index ratio, and the real
exchange rate is specified as RER = e·P
∗
P
, where e is the exchange rate and is
defined as the domestic price per U.S. dollar; P ∗ is the foreign price level, which is
represented by the U.S. CPI; the price level of domestic country, P is the CPI data
in China. As to the savings model, domestic savings are nominal GDP less the
final consumption expenditure, whilst foreign savings are defined as the balance
on current account with the sign reversed. The foreign savings to GDP ratio, sf ,
during the period reports negative results, which means that net foreign savings
were negative accordingly.
The Chinese data are obtained from the People’s Bank of China, the National
Bureau of Statistics of China and the Oxford Economics database. The U.S. CPI
data is from the Bureau of Labour Statistics, U.S.. All the data are seasonally
adjusted where applicable. The trends in the three dependent variables, m, i, and
sd, are plotted in Figure 3.3. All these variables show an upward trend during the
27 years.
3.4 Empirical findings
3.4.1 Unit root tests
Although the bounds testing procedure allows the underlying variables to be in-
tegrated of a mix of I (0) and I (1), it is vital that no series is I (2) or integrated
of higher orders. The ADF test is widely employed to test the stationarity of the
data. However, the ADF test is criticised to have poor power when structural
breaks are present, and the non-stationary data suggested by the ADF may be
actually stationary given that a structural break exists in the series. Perron (1989)
proposed a new stationary test by considering the structural break as known in
the series, and Perron (1997) developed this test by allowing the structural break
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Figure 3.3: Real money in logarithms, investment to income ratio and domestic
savings to income ratio
to be endogenously determined. This section also reports the results of the Perron
test of unit roots, of which the null hypothesis is that a unit root is found with
a structural break in the series. Table 3.1 outlines the results of unit root tests
from the ADF as well as the Perron test. The two approaches yield inconsistent
results. m and y, according to the ADF, are integrated of order two. i and r in
the ADF test are considered as stationary variables and the remaining six vari-
ables are I (1). The Perron results show a mixture of I (0) and I (1) variables. In
particular m is stationary in the presence of a structural break in the spring of
1993. The test results from Perron meet the requirement of the bounds testing
approach.
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Table 3.1: Unit root tests
Variable
ADF Perron
Level 1st Diff Result Break Level 1st Diff Result
m -2.110 -1.860 I(2) 1993Q1 -7.049* I(0)
y -2.364 -1.313 I(2) 1998Q4 -5.279 -9.201* I(1)
i -4.947* I(0) 1996Q3 -4.730 -6.177* I(1)
R -4.401* I(0) 1996Q2 -5.402* I(0)
dc -0.592 -7.699* I(1) 2006Q3 -3.026 -9.796* I(1)
GR -2.937 -9.084* I(1) 2005Q3 -4.801 -6.504* I(1)
TOT -3.043 -9.917* I(1) 2005Q2 -2.565 -12.265* I(1)
RER -1.580 -10.034* I(1) 2001Q3 -3.228 -14.744* I(1)
sd -2.825 -13.872* I(1) 1994Q1 -2.551 -14.923* I(1)
sf -2.471 -4.550* I(1) 2006Q1 -4.774 -13.732* I(1)
Note: A superscript * hereafter in this chapter indicates statistically significant at the 5% level.
The t-statistics in the ADF test for the second difference of m and y are -10.033 and -8.163,
respectively, both significant at the 5% level.
3.4.2 Cointegration analysis
3.4.2.1 Money and investment model
The bounds testing approach is conducted on equation (3.10) and equation (3.11)
respectively to descry the long-run relationships. The choice of the lag order p
in equation (3.16) and equation (3.17) is subject to the requirement of non-serial
correlation, as well as the need to avoid the problem of over parametrization. The
maximum lag is set to be 8 based on the nature of quarterly data. The test results
are outlined in Table 3.2. The lag order is chosen to be 1 in the money demand
equation and is 4 in the investment equation. F statistics in both equations are
greater than the upper-bound critical values at the 10% level, thus confirming the
existence the cointegration.1
Once the cointegration relationship is confirmed, it is advisable to employ a more
1In the investment equation, F is slightly less than the upper-bound critical value at the 5%
level, resulting the cointegration testing result inconclusive. However this section considers a
cointegration relationship at this stage, at the 10% level, and will check F again in the following
ARDL models. In addition, Narayan (2005) has argued that the critical values reported above
are based on large sample sizes and produced the adjusted critical values when the sample size
is between 30 and 80. The F statistics here in fact are greater than Narayan’s upper-bound
critical values as well, which are 3.885 and 4.247 (when n = 80) for the two equations above.
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Table 3.2: Bounds testing results for money and investment model
Equation Lag p F Stat. C.V. I(0) C.V. I(1) χ2SC (1) χ
2
SC (4)
(3.10) 1 6.571 3.23 (5%) 4.35 (5%) 0.062 2.788
2.72 (10%) 3.77 (10%)
(3.11) 4 4.511 3.79 (5%) 4.85 (5%) 0.105 10.975
3.17 (10%) 4.14 (10%)
Note: The lag order, p, is selected by AIC or SBC depending on the presence of serial correlation.
The numbers in the parentheses after the C.V., the critical values, represent the significance level.
χ2SC (1) and χ
2
SC (4) are the LM statistics for testing the null hypothesis of no serial correlation
against the orders 1 and 4, respectively, and are insignificant at the 1% level.
Table 3.3: Long-run estimation results for money and investment model
Money Equation: ARDL(1,0,0,0) Investment Equation: ARDL(4,4,0)
Constant 0.965 (1.048) 0.141* (3.343)
y 0.760* (2.205)
i 7.967** (1.780)
dc 0.058* (5.559)
R 0.119* (2.270) 0.004 (0.892)
Note: t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. A superscript ** hereafter in this chapter
indicates statistically significant at the 10% level. The method used by Shrestha & Chowdhury
(2007), Kargbo (2010) and Ogwumike & Ofoegbu (2012) also suggests the existence of cointeg-
ration, as the F statistic is 8.123 for ARDL(1,0,0,0), and 5.495 for ARDL(4,4,0), both of which
are beyond the upper bounds of the critical values at the 5% level.
parsimonious ARDL specification to estimate both long-run and short-run dy-
namic equations. For a maximum lag order p = 8, 8× (8 + 1)3 = 5832 regressions
of the ARDL model in equation (3.16) are looked at to select the most appropri-
ate specification based on SBC or AIC. Similarly, 648 regressions are considered
for the investment equation (3.17). Finally, the model selected is ARDL(1,0,0,0)
for the money demand equation, and ARDL(4,4,0) for the investment equation.
The long-run estimation results for both equations are outlined in Table 3.3. The
coefficient of i in the money equation is 7.967, positive but only significant at the
10% level, whilst the coefficient of the real interest rate, R, is small and positive
but statistically insignificant in the investment equation. The results show weak
evidence to endorse McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis in the long run.
The results of short-run dynamic error correction models are outlined in Table 3.4
and Table 3.5. The lagged error correction terms in both equations show the
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Table 3.4: Short-run ECM results for money equation ARDL(1,0,0,0)
Regressor Coefficient t-Stat Regressor Coefficient t-Stat
ecmt−1 -0.033* -8.179 ∆it 0.519* 4.394
∆mt−1 -0.064 -0.679 ∆Rt 0.007* 7.271
∆yt 0.152** 1.732
R¯2 = 0.519, SBC = −5.295, AIC = −5.422, LL = 286.943
χ2SC (4) = 3.491[0.479], χ
2
H (4) = 8.035[0.090]
FFF (1, 98) = 0.379[0.540], JB = 20.367[0.000]
Note: ecm is the error correction term and ecm = m−0.965−0.760∗y−7.967∗i−0.119∗R in this
case. The dependent variable is ∆mt. Some diagnostic statistics are also reported in the table.
χ2SC , χ
2
H , FFF and JB are the test statistics for no residual serial correction, heteroscedasticity,
function misspecification and normal errors. The associated p values are in [*].
expected negative sign, and are significant as well. The coefficient of ecmt−1 in the
investment ECM equation is -0.101, implying a somewhat high speed of recovering
to equilibrium compared to that in the money ECM equation. Table 3.4 indicates
that the effect of the lagged variable of investment to income ratio is positive and
statistically significant. Given one shot increase in the investment to income ratio
brings about 0.519% increase in the real money demand, suggesting a positive
relationship between money and investment in the short run. The effect of the
first-difference real deposit rate, ∆Rt, as indicated in Table 3.5, has a positive
effect on ∆it, but insignificant, offering weak evidence to support McKinnon’s
complementarity hypothesis.
3.4.2.2 Augmented investment model
The investment equation discussed above can be conditioned by some other vari-
ables which may affect fixed capital formation. The augmented investment model
is outlined in equation (3.12), i.e. i = g (dc, R, ν), where ν is a vector of underly-
ing variables in addition to dc andR. This section considers ν = (GR, TOT, RER)
in the investment model. Moreover, Agrawal (2004) argued that the domestic
credit to income ratio, dc, has already captured the effect of raising interest rate,
because an increase in the availability of the domestic credit is partly due to a
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Table 3.5: Short-run ECM results for investment equation ARDL(4,4,0)
Regressor Coefficient t-Stat Regressor Coefficient t-Stat
ecmt−1 -0.101* -4.138 ∆dct−1 -0.005 -0.582
∆it−1 0.024 0.309 ∆dct−2 -0.013 -1.516
∆it−2 0.012 0.158 ∆dct−3 -0.022* -2.626
∆it−3 0.002 0.026 ∆dct−4 -0.015* -1.769
∆it−4 0.654* 8.388 ∆Rt 0.001 0.993
∆dct 0.029* 3.855
R¯2 = 0.574, SBC = −6.198, AIC = −6.483, LL = 338.370
χ2SC (4) = 10.201[0.037], χ
2
H (4) = 8.975[0.062]
FFF (1, 89) = 1.428[0.235], JB = 56.913[0.000]
Note: ecm is the error correction term and ecm = i − 0.141 − 0.058 ∗ dc + 0.004 ∗ R in this
case. The dependent variable is ∆it. Some diagnostic statistics are also reported in the table.
χ2SC , χ
2
H , FFF and JB are the test statistics for no residual serial correction, heteroscedasticity,
function misspecification and normal errors. The associated p values are in [*].
rise of real deposit rate. Therefore it is not surprised that the coefficient of R in
equation (3.11) is insignificant given that domestic credit is the main constraint
on investment, which was shown in Table 3.3 as well. Therefore, the following
empirical analysis drops dc in the investment model:
i = g (R, GR, TOT, RER) (3.18)
The conventional F test in the bounds testing approach is 4.198 in terms of p = 8,
which surpasses the upper-bound critical value, 4.01. Therefore the bounds testing
result confirms the existence of the cointegration relationships in equation (3.18).
The ARDL(4,0,0,0,0) model is then selected among 8 × (8 + 1)4 = 52488 models
based on SBC. The long-run level effects and short-run ECM dynamics are both
reported in Table 3.6. The real interest rate positively affects the investment to
income ratio in the long run, as the coefficient of R is positive and significant
at the 10% level. In addition, improving the growth rate of GDP brings more
opportunities to invest in the long run, as the coefficient of GR is positive. The
real exchange rate turns out to be negatively related to investment, though it is
insignificant. A real appreciation of exchange rates indicates a depreciation of
Chinese RMB, and produces a negative effect of importing capital goods from
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Table 3.6: Long-run and short-run ECM results for augmented investment model
Long-run level effect (Dependent variable: i)
Regressor Coefficient t-Stat
Constant 0.299 0.465
R 0.017** 1.793
GR 0.018* 2.908
TOT 0.109 0.172
RER -0.026 -1.341
Short-run ECM effect (Dependent variable: ∆it)
Regressor Coefficient t-Stat Regressor Coefficient t-Stat
ecmt−1 -0.054* -5.450 ∆Rt 0.004* 5.234
∆it−1 -0.007 -0.107 ∆GRt -0.001* -3.311
∆it−2 -0.068 -0.992 ∆TOTt 0.015 0.250
∆it−3 -0.080 -1.169 ∆RERt -0.003 -1.086
∆it−4 0.710* 9.612
R¯2 = 0.575, SBC = −6.268, AIC = −6.501, LL = 337.317
χ2SC (4) = 5.863[0.210], χ
2
H (4) = 11.435[0.022]
FFF (1, 91) = 0.236[0.628], JB = 39.308[0.000]
Note: ecm is the error correction term and ecm = i − 0.299− 0.017 ∗ R− 0.018 ∗GR − 0.109 ∗
TOT + 0.026 ∗ RER in this case. The dependent variable is ∆it. Some diagnostic statistics
are also reported in the table. χ2SC , χ
2
H , FFF and JB are the test statistics for no residual
serial correction, heteroscedasticity, function misspecification and normal errors. The associated
p values are in [*].
abroad. The terms of trade variable is not significant as well, which is partly
because of the presence of RER in the model. As to the ECM in the short
run, the speed of adjustment is 5.4%, and the lagged real interest rate yields a
significantly positive effect on the dependent variable, ∆it, and the coefficient is
0.004. Compared to equation (3.11), the augmented investment model is slightly
improved according to the adjusted R-square. Moreover, the results are in favour
of McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis in both the long period and short run.
3.4.2.3 Money and savings model
Fry (1978) proposed the model indicated by equation (3.13) and equation (3.14).
According to Fry, the domestic savings variable is the key constraint for the capital
formation and therefore should be included to replace the investment variable.
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Table 3.7: Bounds testing results for money and savings model
Equation Lag p F Stat. C.V. I(0) C.V. I(1) χ2SC (1) χ
2
SC (4)
(3.13) 1 7.146 3.23 4.35 0.857 4.126
(3.14) 1 5.340 3.23 4.35 3.289 5.755
Note: The critical values at the 5% level are reported above.
Table 3.8: Long-run estimation results for money and savings model
Money Equation: ARDL(1,1,8,0) Savings Equation: ARDL(1,6,0,0)
Constant 0.851 (0.558) 0.003 (0.095)
y 1.245* (2.257) 0.067* (13.443)
sd 0.383 (0.062)
R 0.072 (1.189) -0.005* (-4.239)
sf -0.262* (-2.075)
Note: t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. The bounds testing statistic F is 6.233 in the
money equation and 5.069 in the savings equation.
McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis is thus tested by fsd > 0 and hR > 0.
In addition, the financial liberalisation theory suggests hR > 0 as well. The
bounds tests indicate the existence of long-run cointegration relationships in both
equations at the 5% level, as both of the F statistics in Table 3.7 are greater than
the critical values of the upper bounds, 4.35.
To estimate the long-run relationships, ARDL modelling specifications are selected
respectively among the 8×(8 + 1)3 = 5832 models based on SBC after considering
no serial correlation in the model, respectively. Table 3.8 outlines the long-run
level effects. The domestic savings to income ratio in the money equation is
insignificantly positively associated with the real money demand, while the real
interest rate in the savings model shows a significant and negative sign. The result,
however, suggests a strong evidence to reject the complementarity hypothesis in
the long run.
The error correction model captures the short-run dynamics and the estimation
results are shown in Table 3.9 and 3.10, together with some diagnostic checks.
The speed of adjustment in the savings equation is 31.4%, which means that the
disequilibrium occurring due to a shock is corrected at 31.4% each quarter, whilst
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Table 3.9: Short-run ECM results for money equation ARDL(1,1,8,0)
Regressor Coefficient t-Stat Regressor Coefficient t-Stat
ecmt−1 -0.042* -7.482 ∆sdt−3 0.371* 2.667
∆mt−1 0.011 0.109 ∆sdt−4 0.056 0.380
∆yt 0.092 0.698 ∆sdt−5 0.196 1.397
∆yt−1 -0.238** -1.957 ∆sdt−6 0.275* 2.011
∆sdt -0.156 -0.939 ∆sdt−7 0.153 1.154
∆sdt−1 0.042 0.249 ∆sdt−8 0.127 0.989
∆sdt−2 0.115 0.786 ∆Rt 0.005* 4.062
R¯2 = 0.366, SBC = −4.998, AIC = −5.369, LL = 274.407
χ2SC (4) = 6.351[0.174], χ
2
H (4) = 1.432[0.839]
FFF (1, 82) = 0.253[0.616], JB = 24.480[0.000]
Note: ecm is the error correction term and ecm = m−0.851−1.245∗y−0.383∗sd−0.072∗R in this
case. The dependent variable is ∆mt. Some diagnostic statistics are also reported in the table.
χ2SC , χ
2
H , FFF and JB are the test statistics for no residual serial correction, heteroscedasticity,
function misspecification and normal errors. The associated p values are in [*].
the speed is slower in the money equation, which is 4.2% per quarter. In the money
equation, all the lagged variables of ∆sd show the positive sign, except that ∆sdt
itself is negative, though insignificant, meaning a change in the domestic savings
is weakly negatively related to a variation of the money demand. The negative
sign is also found in the coefficient of ∆Rt in the savings equation. The result
overall fails to support the complementarity hypothesis in the short run.
3.5 Conclusion
Recent years have witnessed rapid financial development and fast economic growth
in China, but repressive financial policies still exist. The People’s Bank of China
removed the floors for loan rates of interest in the third quarter of 2013, whilst the
ceilings of the interest rates on bank deposits were remained under control until
October 2015. This study employed the bounds testing approach and construc-
ted ARDL models to verify the complementarity hypothesis between money and
physical capital in China during a 27-year period from 1987 to 2013, and found
some evidence to endorse the hypothesis. In the long run, money demand is posit-
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Table 3.10: Short-run ECM results for savings equation ARDL(1,6,0,0)
Regressor Coefficient t-Stat Regressor Coefficient t-Stat
ecmt−1 -0.314* -6.389 ∆Rt−4 -0.003* -3.612
∆sdt−1 -0.220* -3.025 ∆Rt−5 0.001 0.925
∆Rt -0.002* -2.442 ∆Rt−6 0.002* 2.100
∆Rt−1 0.002** 1.690 ∆yt 0.417* 8.919
∆Rt−2 0.002* 2.184 ∆sft -0.122* -2.562
∆Rt−3 0.001 1.429
R¯2 = 0.571, SBC = −6.192, AIC = −6.480, LL = 331.755
χ2SC (4) = 8.215[0.084], χ
2
H (4) = 3.072[0.546]
FFF (1, 87) = 2.937[0.090], JB = 2.760[0.252]
Note: ecm is the error correction term and ecm = sd−0.003+0.005∗R−0.067∗y+0.262∗sf in this
case. The dependent variable is ∆sdt. Some diagnostic statistics are also reported in the table.
χ2SC , χ
2
H , FFF and JB are the test statistics for no residual serial correction, heteroscedasticity,
function misspecification and normal errors. The associated p values are in [*].
ively associated with the investment to income ratio and the long-run relationship
between fixed capital formation and the real deposit rate is positive but insigni-
ficant. Following Agrawal’s (2004) argument that the real interest rate may be
insignificant in the presence of the domestic credit to income ratio, and that the
investment ratio is affected by some additional variables besides the interest rate,
this study also considers the augmented investment model and the results tend to
be in favour of the complementarity hypothesis. Additionally, Fry (1978) replaced
the investment ratio by the domestic savings ratio when conducting the empirical
studies. The model following this suggestion in this study yields an insignificantly
positive relationship between money and savings, and improving the real deposit
rate inhibits savings, which is in contradiction with McKinnon’s complementarity
hypothesis and McKinnon-Shaw financial liberalisation theory. The result of a
negative relationship between the real deposit rate and the savings ratio in China
is captured in Figure 3.1 at the beginning, indicating that domestic savings are
not sensitive to the real deposit rate.
The result that there is no strong evidence to support the complementarity hy-
pothesis in China in the long run may be partly due to the certain degree of
financial liberalisation in China, which is consistent with the suggestion by Fry
68
(1978) that McKinnon’s hypothesis was valid only when a country is yet to start
the progress of financial reform. Further study should also consider the effects
from additional financial repression variables, such as reserve requirements, cap-
ital account controls and managed exchange rates, on the financial development
in China.
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Chapter 4
Evaluating interest rate
liberalisation and two monetary
policy rules
4.1 Introduction
Interest rate adjustment has long been one of the most commonly used monetary
policies by central banks. In China, for example, interest rate adjustment has be-
come one of the most important tools to restrict inflation and deflation since 1996.
For example, the 1-year deposit rate has been adjusted 45 times since 1978. Addi-
tionally, the objective of the PBoC when considering various monetary policy tools
appears more complicated than that in some developed countries, as it does not
only aim to maintain price stability, but also to help create job opportunities and
maintain balance of international payments (Zhang, 2009). Consequently, interest
rate adjustment is often employed to maintain the stability of the domestic stock
market, so as to maintain social stability and promote economic development.
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) have argued that interest rates in developing
countries under financial repression like China are below the market equilibrium
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level and investment is subject to the shortage of savings. In order to capture
the degree of interest rate liberalisation, Jin et al. (2013) assumed different steady
state levels of interest rates, and the interest rate liberalisation process was repres-
ented by gradually raising the steady state levels. Using this method, this chapter
constructs several variations of DSGE models and investigates the effects of raising
interest rates under financial liberalisation.
In addition to interest rate adjustment, China imposes controls on broad money
supply growth due to the imperfect monetary policy transmission mechanism.
However, it is well known that controlling money supply has become far more
challenging given that the velocity of money does not remain stable in China.
Nevertheless, China announces the target of M2 growth every year and the target
in 2016, for example, is set to be around 13%. In order to evaluate the effect-
iveness of the money growth rule and the interest rate rule, this chapter then
compares them in the new Keynesian DSGE model with a cash-in-advance con-
straint, and check the robustness in terms of a money-in-utility DSGE model.
Calibration method and Bayesian estimation method are both employed and the
results suggest the interest rate rule to be more effective and powerful.
The DSGE model has become widely used in the mainstream macroeconomic
analysis for the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy (see Monacelli, 2005;
Gal´ı & Monacelli, 2005; Zhang, 2009; Gerali et al., 2010; Justiniano & Preston,
2010), and even for fiscal policy in recent years (Gal´ı & Monacelli, 2008). DSGE
was initially proposed by Kydland & Prescott (1982) to be used in the Real Busi-
ness Cycle (RBC) analysis. The RBC model is built in the context of neoclassical
framework of micro-founded optimising problem with flexible prices. Fluctuations
of real variables in the RBC model, according to the neoclassical assumptions, are
caused by real shocks only, such as government spending shocks and technology
shocks. However, new-Keynesian economists have introduced nominal rigidities in
the DSGE model. For example, Taylor (1980) considered staggered wage contacts
as the source of rigidity and Calvo (1983) developed a model with staggered prices
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in the price setting behaviour. This allows for a number of short-run macroeco-
nomic frictions to be present in the DSGE model (see Smets & Wouters, 2003,
2005).
The transmission channels of monetary policy, according to Mishkin (1996), can be
classified as traditional interest rate channels, money growth channels, credit chan-
nels and exchange rate channels. A large number of investigators have undertaken
empirical studies on China’s monetary policy in the framework of DSGE models.
Jin et al. (2013) used a simple closed economy neoclassical Cash-in-Advance model
with the money growth rule only, whilst Carlstrom & Fuerst (1995) compared two
main monetary policy rules, namely the money growth rule and the interest rate
rule, in terms of welfare gains in the Cash-in-Advance model and they concluded
that according to the simulations, the interest rate rule was preferable as there
was a more efficient response of households to real supply and demand shocks.
Bhattacharjee & Thoenissen (2007) also studied the two rules above in the DSGE
model, but the models they used were a money-in-utility model and a cash-in-
advance model. Their results based on the U.S. data suggested that the money
supply rule with Cash-in-Advance model best matched the real data. Zhang (2009)
compared the two monetary policy rules for China in a new-Keynesian DSGE
model with sticky wages and staggered prices. Zhang adopted nominal money
growth to be linked to output gap and inflation for the money supply rule, and
computed a modified Taylor rule to capture China’s interest rates in the interest
rate rule. The method of undetermined coefficients developed by Uhlig (1999)
was employed to solve the model after calibration. The result suggested that the
interest rate rule was more effective than the money supply rule. Liu & Zhang
(2010) built a new-Keynesian model containing four equations from the DSGE
model regarding to the Phillips curve, the IS curve, the interest rate Taylor rule
and the money growth rule, respectively. Their results suggested using two mon-
etary policy rules together would be superior to the use of one single rule.
This chapter first investigates the effects of interest rate liberalisation on China’s
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economy in the DSGE model. It starts from introducing a simple neoclassical
Real Business Cycle (RBC) model with a cash-in-advance constraint proposed by
Stockman (1981) to simulate China’s money growth rule. The model is solved
by the method of undetermined coefficients proposed and developed by Uhlig
(1999). In the spirit of Jin et al. (2013), the liberalisation process in this model is
reflected by raising the steady state levels of deposit rates. Then, a new Keynesian
closed economy model with a cash-in-advance constraint is built to compare two
monetary policy rules, i.e. the interest rate rule and the money growth rule.
To check the robustness of the results, the chapter also validates Zhang’s (2009)
results based on the money-in-utility DSGE model. The result suggests that the
interest rate rule is more efficient and powerful. Zhang (2009) and Liu & Zhang
(2010) compared the money supply rule and the interest rate rule for China, but
few have compared them in terms of the interest rate liberalisation process. It
is therefore vital to understand which rule is more effective when implementing
the liberalisation process in China. Following that and assuming the interest rate
rule is used by the PBoC, it investigates the effects of interest rate liberalisation
on China’s economy. As a result, interest rate liberalisation contributes to a
thorough and efficient transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Moreover, to
check the robustness of the results from the DSGE model with a cash-in-advance
constraint, this chapter also constructs a money-in-utility DSGE model where the
variable referring to real money balances enters the utility function of households.
Bayesian estimation method is employed to estimate the parameters of the central
bank’s monetary policy and the results are in favour of that in the DSGE model
with a cash-in-advance constraint.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the neoclassical model
with a cash-in-advance constraint, together with data, calibration, solving method
and the impulse response functions. The new Keynesian model with a cash-in-
advance constraint is interpreted in Section 4.3, where two monetary policy rules
are also compared. Section 4.4 presents the robustness check in terms of a money-
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in-utility model with Bayesian estimation methods, and presents the impulse re-
sponses results. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 A neoclassical model with a cash-in-advance
constraint
4.2.1 Model structure
The neoclassical school holds the idea that money is neutral based on the assump-
tions of rational expectations and market clearing. However, this argument is
interrupted by imposing a cash-in-advance constraint in the simple RBC model.
a variable reflecting nominal money balances affects real variables in the economy,
resulting in the non-neutrality of money. Households in this model deposit and
hold money balances to consume and invest. In addition, a money variable is in-
cluded in the cash-in-advance constraint faced by the households. Firms produce
goods in line with a Cobb-Douglas production function for a given technology.
The central bank uses nominal money growth as the monetary policy tool. Unlike
Baharumshah et al. (2009) and Jin et al. (2013) who assume that money growth
follows an AR (1) process, this section adopts endogenous money growth lag also
taking inflation and output gap into consideration.
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4.2.1.1 Households
The representative household chooses real consumption, Ct, and labour supply,
Nt, to maximise her utility function:
1
maxE0
{
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
1
1− σ
C1−σt − ψ
N 1
1 + φ
N1+φt
)}
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the intertemporal discount factor, σ is the coefficient of relative
risk aversion of households, φ denotes the inverse of wage elasticity of labour sup-
ply, also known as the inverse of Frisch elasticity, and ψN captures the substitution
between labour supply and consumption.
The representative patient household’s choice is subject to the following budget
constraint (in real terms hereafter):
Ct +Dt +Mt + It =
Rt−1Dt−1
Πt
+WtNt +
Mt−1
Πt
+ r˜Kt Kt−1 + F
R
t (4.1)
whereDt is the private deposits held in the commercial banks,Mt is the real money
balances held at the end of period t, Rt is the gross interest rate on deposits
2,
Πt =
Pt
Pt−1
is the gross inflation where Pt is the price level denoted by the Consumer
Price Index, Wt denotes the real wage rate, r˜
K
t is the real rental rate of capital
and FRt is the lump-sum profits received from firms. It is investment defined as
It = Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1, where δ is the deprecation rate for capital.
The cash-in-advance constraint imposed in households reads:
Ct ≤
Mt−1
Πt
(4.2)
1Recent studies with DSGE models have seen a household utility function that is compat-
ible with a balanced-growth steady state, hence the utility function is non-separable (Smets &
Wouters, 2007; Cantore et al., 2015) and the growth of population is considered. Nevertheless,
a separable utility function, as in this chapter, is still widely used by, for example, Smets &
Wouters (2003), Smets & Wouters (2005) and Gerali et al. (2010).
2In this chapter, Rt refers to nominal interest rate as well, as there is no lending rate in the
model.
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As in Svensson (1985), the timing assumption in this model is that households have
available for consumption only the cash carried over from the previous period, so
that cash balances must be chosen before they know how much spending they will
wish to undertake.
In equilibrium, the dynamics of consumption, bank deposits, real money balances,
labour supply and capital are determined by equation (4.1) and equation (4.2).
The first order conditions (FOCs) are outlined below:
C−σt = λ˜t + µ˜t (4.3)
λ˜t = βRtEt
λ˜t+1
Πt+1
(4.4)
λ˜tWt = ψ
NNφt (4.5)
λ˜t = βEt
(
λ˜t+1 + µ˜t+1
Πt+1
)
(4.6)
λ˜t = βEt
(
λ˜t+1
(
1− δ + r˜Kt+1
))
(4.7)
where λ˜t and µ˜t denote the Lagrange multipliers with respect to the budget con-
straint (4.1) and the cash in advance constraint (4.2), respectively.
4.2.1.2 Firms
Firms produce goods according to the Cobb-Douglas function:
Yt = AtK
α
t−1N
1−α
t , 0 < α < 1 (4.8)
where At = exp (u
a
t ) is the total factor productivity with u
a
t representing the
productivity shock, and α is the output elasticity of capital.
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Firms minimise the cost WtNt + r˜
K
t Kt−1, and it yields the following conditions:
Wt = (1− α)
Yt
Nt
(4.9)
r˜Kt = α
Yt
Kt−1
(4.10)
4.2.1.3 Central bank
Every year at the National People’s Congress, China’s Prime Minister releases
the target growth of M2. Also, this target is published at the People’s Bank of
China Annual Report. The money growth rule, therefore, remains dominant when
implementing monetary policy in China. The nominal money growth gross rate,
Gt = 1 + g˜t, is defined as Mt = (1 + g˜t)Mt−1, where Mt = PtMt is the nominal
money supply. Therefore,
Mt = (1 + g˜t)
Mt−1
Πt
(4.11)
Bhattacharjee & Thoenissen (2007) assume that the growth rate follows an AR (1)
process and Burdekin & Siklos (2008) suggest a McCallum rule where the target
growth of nominal GDP is taken into consideration. Following Zhang (2009) and
considering that money supply is used to constrain inflation in China, this model
sets the money growth rule to be a Taylor-type equation that is similar to the
interest rate rule:
Gt = G
φgg
t−1
(
G
(
Π¯
Πt
)φπg (Y
Yt
)φyg)(1−φgg)
exp (ugt ) (4.12)
where G is the target gross growth rate, ugt denotes the external shock, and φs,
again, reflect the preferences of the central bank.
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4.2.1.4 Shocks
To close the model, the productivity shock and the money-growth shock, are set
to follow AR (1) processes as described below:
uat = ρau
a
t−1 + ǫ
a
t (4.13)
ugt = ρgu
g
t−1 + ǫ
g
t (4.14)
where ǫat and ǫ
g
t are exogenous driving forces that are assumed to be identically
independently distributed with zero means and standard deviations, σa and σg.
4.2.1.5 Log linearised equations
With goods market clearing condition Yt = Ct + It, general equilibrium dynamics
around the steady state levels can be derived from the equations above. The
cash-in-advance constraint must be binding. Assuming inflation in the steady
state equals the inflation target, Π = Π¯, the steady states of the variables can
be computed. For example, the steady state from equation (4.4) yields R =
Π¯
β
.
Also, the lower-case variables except interest rate, inflation and money growth
rate, hereafter denote the percentage derivations from the steady states. For
interest rate, inflation and money growth, the lower-case letters represent absolute
derivations. Assuming the upper-case variables without a time subscript t refer
to the levels of steady states, one could log-linearise the model around the steady
states.
Firstly, the capital formation of households is log-linearised:
kt = (1− δ) kt−1 + δit (4.15)
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An approximation of the binding cash-in-advance constraint yields:
mt−1 − πt = ct (4.16)
Then, the FOCs of households are log-linearised as follows:
− σct =
β
Π
λt +
(
1−
β
Π
)
µt (4.17)
λt = Etλt+1 − Etπt+1 + rt (4.18)
λt + wt = φnt (4.19)
λt + σEtct+1 + Etπt+1 = 0 (4.20)
λt = Etλt+1 + [1− β (1− δ)] r
K
t+1 (4.21)
Production function of firms is log-linearised as:
yt = u
a
t + αkt−1 + (1− α)nt (4.22)
The real wage and real return on capital in equations (4.9) and (4.10) are log-
linearised as follows:
wt = yt − nt (4.23)
r˜Kt = yt − kt−1 (4.24)
Money growth function and the Taylor-type rule are log-linearised as:
mt = mt−1 − πt +
gt
Π
(4.25)
gt = φ
g
ggt−1 −
(
1− φgg
) (
φπgπt + φ
y
gyt
)
+ ugt (4.26)
In addition, the productivity shock and the money-growth shock mentioned above
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are outlined again as follows:
uat = ρau
a
t−1 + ǫ
a
t (4.27)
ugt = ρgu
g
t−1 + ǫ
g
t (4.28)
Equations (4.15) to (4.28) constitute a system of linear rational expectations dif-
ference equations containing 15 endogenous variables, plus 2 exogenous driving
forces.
4.2.2 Calibration
Parameters of DSGE models are determined using different estimation approaches.
For example, pure calibration is used by Kydland & Prescott (1982) in the neo-
classical model. Numerous research works employ this method due to its strong
robustness (see Monacelli, 2005; Zhang, 2009; Chen et al., 2012; Funke & Paetz,
2012; Jin et al., 2013; Funke et al., 2015), but it is also criticised for the absence of
theory foundation. Calibration is widely used as the estimation method of DSGE
models for China. Zhang (2009) argues that estimating DSGE models for China
is difficult and challenging due to the absence of detailed datasets and potential
structural changes since 1978. Jin et al. (2013) also note that the calibration
method makes little difference from other methods like maximum likelihood es-
timation and Bayesian estimation, as long as the data are stable. Therefore, in
this section, a calibrated model is considered. To be specific, some parameters
are set following the related model in the literature or according to the steady
state equations with the mean of real data, whilst others are estimated in separate
equations, depending on the availability of data. Table 4.1 summarises all the
parameters used in this section. The period this chapter focuses covers 1996Q1
until 2015Q43, which has seen the progress of interest rate liberalisation as well as
3In case that only annual data are available, quarterly data are generated in EViews using
’quadratic-match sum’ method based on annual data.
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Table 4.1: Model calibration
Description Calibrated value
Annual inflation rate 2.07%
Annual deposit rate 3.28%
Intertemporal discount factor β =
Π
R
= 0.997
Capital depreciation rate δ = 4%
Output elasticity of capital α = 0.53
Inverse of Frisch elasticity φ = 1/3
Relative risk aversion of households σ = 2
Money growth rule φgg = 0.88, φ
π
g = 0.5, φ
y
g = 1.33
Productivity shock ρa = 0.8, σ
a = 2.5%
money-growth shock ρg = 0.8, σ
g = 0.4%
sustainable economic growth in China.
The depreciation rate of capital, δ, in China is set to be 0.04 according to Zhang
(2009). The average annual net deposit rate during this period is 3.28%, and the
average quarterly inflation rate is 2.07% at the annual rate. Hence, the intertem-
poral discount factor, β, is 0.997 according to β =
Π
R
in the steady state4. The
data for the income approach of GDP are not available in China at national level,
but provincial levels of GDP using the income approach are published every year.
Summing up the data of individual provinces yields the approximation of national
level of GDP, where labour income accounts for 47% of total income, meaning
α = 1 − 0.47 = 0.53. This value is consistent with the model estimation result of
equation (4.22), which yields 0.58. The inverse of Frisch elasticity, φ, is set to be
1/3, following Chen et al. (2012). σ = 2 according to Xiao et al. (2015).
The steady state equations of (4.4)(4.7)(4.8)(4.9)(4.10) indicate that
I
Y
=
δα(
1
β
− 1 + δ
)
which means that the share of investment in total output,
I
Y
, is 0.49 given α, β
4Note that β = (1− 2.07%/400%)/ (1− 3.28%/400%).
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Figure 4.1: Actual and simulated nominal money growth deviations
and δ. Hence, the consumption to income ratio
C
Y
= 1−
I
Y
, is equal to 0.51, which
is consistent with the data.
The reaction parameters from the money growth rule in equation (4.26) are taken
from Liu & Zhang (2010) with φgg = 0.88, φ
π
g = 0.5 and φ
y
g = 1.33. The simu-
lated money growth deviation seems to capture the data at a satisfactory level, as
shown in Figure 4.1. The differential between actual and simulated money growth
deviations is 1.6% at most, and the simulated result captures the huge increase
after 2008, when the government decided to release a 4-trillion yuan (approx. 570
billion U.S. dollars) stimulus package to boost economy.
Lastly, measuring the residuals from the equation of the money growth rule gives
the AR (1) parameter ρg = 0.8, with the standard deviation σ
g = 0.4%. Also,
the AR (1) parameter of total productivity is estimated from the Cobb-Douglas
equation, with ρa = 0.8 and σ
a = 2.5%.
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4.2.3 Method of undetermined coefficients
To solve the log-linearised model above, this section employs the method of un-
determined coefficients proposed by Uhlig (1999). To use this method, the vari-
ables in the model are written as linear functions of a vector of endogenous vari-
ables (or state variables) Xt−1 and exogenous variables Zt which are determined
at time t. In the model above, Xt = [kt, mt, gt]
′ is a vector containing three state
variables and Zt = [u
a
t , u
g
t ]
′
contains the stochastic processes. In fact, all the other
endogenous variables in the model can be “eliminated” after simplification. How-
ever, Uhlig (1999) keeps those variables in the linear functions and defines them
as “jump variables”. In this case, Yt =
[
rt, it, ct, πt, λt, µt, wt, nt, r
K
t , yt
]′
is a list
of jump variables. Uhlig (1999) then constructed the following equations for the
three vectors:
0 = A ·Xt +B ·Xt−1 +C ·Yt +D · Zt (4.29)
0 = Et [F ·Xt+1 +G ·Xt +H ·Xt−1 + J ·Yt+1 +K ·Yt + L · Zt+1 +M · Zt]
(4.30)
Zt+1 = N · Zt + ǫz,t+1 (4.31)
where matrices A, B, ..., N contain the coefficients of the model.
In general, suppose that the endogenous state vector Xt is of size m×1, the vector
containing jump variables Yt is of size n×1 and the vector of exogenous stochastic
processes Zt is of size k × 1, this method thus requires l ≥ n for the coefficient
matrix C, size l × n, and the rank of C is n. However, in the model above, l = 9
and n = 10 and the rank of C is 9, which fails to meet the requirements to use the
method. Nonetheless, Uhlig (1999) proposes that the case l < n can be treated
by simply “redeclare” some other endogenous variables (or jump variables) to be
state variables instead, i.e. to reduce n and thus increase m until l = n. This does
not affect the results. Following this idea, the interest rate variable rt in Yt is
taken out and redeclared to be state variables in Xt so that m = 4 and n = l = 9.
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Given those equations above, one could compute the following relationships:
Xt = S1 ·Xt−1 + S2 · Zt (4.32)
Yt = S3 ·Yt−1 + S4 · Zt (4.33)
where Si are response coefficients to the endogenous state and jump variables. De-
tails of how to calculate the solution can be found in Uhlig (1999). In this chapter,
the Matlab programmes performing this method are used and the programmes are
provided by Uhlig (1999)5.
4.2.4 Impulse response analysis
The impulse responses of output, consumption, investment and interest rate to
one-standard-deviation sized positive shocks6 in productivity are outlined in Fig-
ure 4.2. Output increases by approximately 1.5% due to a productivity shock,
with a 2.8% point upturn in investment. Consumption increases continuously by
0.4% in the first 4 years, whilst inflation declines by 0.6% due to the increase of
supply in terms of an improvement in productivity. Those responses are in line
with economic theory. Figure 4.3 outlines the impulse responses of output, con-
sumption, investment and interest rate to shocks in money growth, and it indicates
that a money-growth shock leads to a 2.2% increase in inflation in the first year
because of money expansion, with a decline in consumption by 1% in the first
year. Investment sees a decline at the beginning, but increases by 0.7% during
the first two years. Consequently, output initially drops by 0.2% in response to
a money-growth shock, and then increases around its steady path. Those effects
will last for 7 or 8 years.
5The Matlab toolkit programme, with the latest version 4.1, is available at
https://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/de/professuren/vwl/wipo/research/MATLAB Toolkit
6Impulse responses analysis hereafter in this chapter, unless otherwise specified, indicates the
impulse responses to positive shocks with the size of one standard deviation.
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Figure 4.2: Impulse responses to a productivity shock
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Figure 4.3: Impulse responses to a money-growth shock
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4.2.5 Steady state analysis of interest rate liberalisation
Jin et al. (2013) interpret the potential effects of interest rate liberalisation in the
steady state model, in which interest rate liberalisation is reflected by raising the
level of nominal interest rate on deposits in the steady state. To begin with, the
steady state of equation (4.11) is 1+ g˜ = Π, indicating that nominal money growth
in the steady state is equal to inflation. The steady state equations of (4.4) and
(4.7) read β =
Π
R
and rK =
1
β
− 1 + δ. The intertemporal discount factor, β,
goes down due to increasing R, and the real return on capital stock, rK increases.
Moreover, the representative firm’s equations of (4.8)(4.9) and (4.10), together
with I = δK, produce the following steady state equations:
W = (1− α)
(
rK
α
)− α
1−α
(4.34)
K =
α
1− α
WN
rK
(4.35)
Y =
rKK
α
(4.36)
Equation (4.34) shows a negative relationship between real wage W and capital
return rK in the steady state. Interest rate liberalisation, hence reduces real wage
through raising rK and loweringW would reduce capital stock, K, and investment,
I, as well. However, as to output, Y , the positive effects from increasing rK
would be offset by the negative effects of lowering K, which stabilises the real
output level in the steady state. Consequently, the investment to income ratio
falls, which is consistent with the equation
I
Y
=
δα(
1
β
− 1 + δ
) , where lowering β
reduces the ratio. The consumption to income ratio,
C
Y
= 1−
I
Y
, would increase
accordingly. Therefore, raising nominal interest rate in the steady state readjusts
the investment-consumption structure in an economy. To illustrate the process
of interest rate liberalisation, Jin et al. (2013) simulated various situations with
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Table 4.2: Different steady state levels under different nominal interest rates, R
Nominal Interest Rate Level β I/Y C/Y
R = 1% 1.011 0.568 0.432
R = 3.28% 0.988 0.492 0.508
R = 6% 0.960 0.420 0.580
R = 9% 0.929 0.359 0.641
Note: β in this table denotes the annualised discount factor.
different levels of R, where interest rate and inflation rate were transformed into
the annual rates, hence β denoted the annualised parameter. This section follows
this method and chooses the steady state levels of interest rate, R, to be 1%, 6%
and 9% in addition to the current level, 3.28%. The steady state levels of I/Y and
C/Y , together with the annualised discount factor, β, is summarised in Table 4.2.
According to the table, the discount factor can be greater than 1 when the nominal
interest rate is smaller than the inflation level, indicating a negative real interest
rate. Annualised inflation and interest rate are adopted to calculate the discount
factor, β.
The impulse responses to shocks in productivity and money growth are presented
in Figure 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. The numbers on the horizontal axis indicate
quarters after each shock. With different levels of R, output shows little difference,
according to Figure 4.4, but the initial response of output is slightly lower when
R = 9%, this is due to the decline of the investment to income ratio and the
increase of the consumption to income ratio in the steady state level. The initial
responses of consumption and investment are stronger with higher level of R, but
the responses converge more quickly. Consumption increases in the first several
years, and declines afterwards due to income and substitution effects, which are
contrary to each other. Inflation responses almost identically, with an upturn
following a decline in the first few years. Therefore, on the completion of interest
rate liberalisation, raising the steady state levels of nominal interest rate helps
to adjust the structure of the economy between consumption and investment,
whilst maintaining output at a stable stage. Figure 4.5 describes the impulse
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Figure 4.4: Impulse responses to a productivity shock with different R
responses to a money-growth shock. Similar to Figure 4.3, the initial response
of output decreases by 0.3% to 0.5% with different levels of R. In other words,
increasing the steady state levels of interest rate contributes to stronger response
of output, and the effect remains longer than that with lower degree of interest
rate liberalisation, i.e. lower R. The longer effects can be observed in investment
as well. The initial response of consumption remains little different given different
levels of R. Lastly, inflation yields almost identical responses to a money-growth
shock at the beginning, and not many differences afterwards. Above all, it can
be concluded that interest rate liberalisation, when measured by increasing the
steady state levels of nominal interest rate, contributes to a more powerful and
efficient transmission channel of monetary policy in presence of a money-growth
shock.
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4.3 A new Keynesian closed economymodel with
a cash-in-advance constraint
4.3.1 Model structure
In order to compare the efficiency between the interest rate rule and the money
growth rule, this section constructs a standard new Keynesian model with mono-
polistic competition and sticky prices, as is widely used in most empirical work.
Households deposit at financial intermediates and hold money balances to con-
sume, invest during her unlimited lifetime. The money variable is included in the
model by imposing a cash-in-advance constraint, as suggested by Bhattacharjee &
Thoenissen (2007). Firms employ labour and utilise capital to produce intermedi-
ate goods and retailers buy intermediate goods from firms in a competitive mar-
ket, and differentiate them at no costs. Retailers then sell them in a monopolistic
competitive market and therefore have some monopoly power when setting prices.
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Figure 4.6: M2 velocity in China: 1978-2015
The prices are set in a Calvo-type fashion. Lastly, timing is vital in the presence
of a cash-in-advance constraint. Unlike Bhattacharjee & Thoenissen (2007), this
model follows the timing assumption of Svensson (1985), assuming that goods
market open before asset market, so that consumers have to decide the amount of
cash to hold before they are aware of the real state of the world, hence the velo-
city of money is allowed to be non-constant. This assumption is more appropriate
because the velocity of money in China, defined as nominal GDP to money supply
ratio, has been far from invariable, as depicted in Figure 4.6. The velocity was
above 4 in 1978 but saw a sharp decline to less than 0.5 in 2015. Although the
velocity has become less volatile since 1996 (after the vertical dash line), it is still
more appropriate to assume that the velocity of money is non-constant.
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4.3.1.1 Households
The representative household behaves identically as in previous neoclassical model,
by choosing Ct and Nt to maximise her utility subject to the budget constraint in
equation (4.1), where FRt indicates the lump-sum profits received from retailers.
Also, a cash-in-advance constraint is included, as in equation (4.2). The FOCs are
same as previous, and are outlined in equations (4.3) to (4.7).
4.3.1.2 Firms
Firms produce intermediate goods that are assumed to follow the Cobb-Douglas
function:
Yt = AtK
α
t−1N
1−α
t , 0 < α < 1 (4.37)
where At = exp (u
a
t ) is the total factor productivity with u
a
t representing the
productivity shock.
Firms minimise the cost function WtNt + r˜
K
t Kt−1 and the FOCs with respect to
Nt and Kt−1 yield the optimal labour and capital inputs. The real marginal cost,
MCt, is then derived as follow:
MCt =
1
At
(
r˜Kt
α
)α(
Wt
1− α
)1−α
(4.38)
In addition,
Wt =
1− α
α
Kt−1
Nt
r˜Kt (4.39)
4.3.1.3 Retailers
In the presence of sticky prices, Bernanke et al. (1999) and Iacoviello (2005) as-
sume that retailers have some monopoly power and set the price in a Calvo-type
staggered fashion. A continuum of retailers of mass 1, indexed by j, purchase inter-
mediate goods from firms and differentiate the goods into Yt (j) at no cost and sell
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them at Pt (j). Final goods, Y
f
t is assumed to follow Y
f
t =
(´ 1
0
Yt (j)
ǫ−1
ǫ dj
) ǫ
ǫ−1
,
where ǫ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods. The
price index is defined as Pt =
(´ 1
0
Pt (j)
1−ǫ dj
) 1
1−ǫ
. Therefore, the demand curve
of each retailer at time t follows a CES function and reads Yt (j) =
(
Pt (j)
Pt
)−ǫ
Y ft .
Each retailer chooses a sale price Pt (j). In this chapter, following Ba¨urle & Menz
(2008) and Justiniano & Preston (2010), it is assumed that (1− θ) of retailers
can reset their price optimally in every period, whilst the remaining θ of retail-
ers cannot, but adjust the price according to the indexation rule in the following
manner:
Pt (j) = Pt−1 (j) (Πt−1)
τ (4.40)
where Πt−1 =
Pt−1
Pt−2
is gross inflation of last period, and τ captures the degree of
indexation to previous inflation.
Retailers in this chapter are assumed to behave identically and therefore the index
j can be omitted in what follows. Let P nt denote the price set by the retailers that
are able to reset their price optimally in period t, the aggregate price index can
then be defined as:
Pt =
[
(1− θ) (P nt )
1−ǫ + θ
(
Pt−1
(
Pt−1
Pt−2
)τ)1−ǫ] 11−ǫ
(4.41)
For the (1− θ) of retailers who re-optimise their price in period t, the following
present discount value of profits is maximised with respect to P nt :
maxEt
∞∑
k=0
θk
{
Λt,t+k
(
P nt
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)τ
− Pt+kMCt+k
)
Yt+k|t
}
(4.42)
where Λt,t+k = β
k
(
Ct+k
Ct
)−σ
Pt
Pt+k
is the discount factor retrieved from households.
Accordingly, the demand function in period t + k for retailers who reset their
price at time t and adjust the price according to the indexation rule henceforth is
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specified as follows:
Yt+k|t =
(
P nt
Pt+k
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)τ)−ǫ
Yt+k (4.43)
The first order condition takes the form:
0 =
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Λt,t+kYt+k|t
(
P nt
Pt−1
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)τ
−
ǫ
ǫ− 1
MCt+k
(
Pt+k
Pt−1
))}
(4.44)
Lastly, the lump-sum profits, FRt = (1−MCt) Yt, are rebated to households.
4.3.1.4 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is implemented by the PBoC. The control of money supply (or
nominal money growth) by the PBoC has long been an important tool of mon-
etary policy to meet inflation targets and stabilise the economy. However, as the
velocity of money in China has been increasing significantly in the past years, it
is far more difficult to control the money supply, which further weakens the link
between money growth and inflation. Recently, the interest rate rule has been
more frequently used by the PBoC. This model aims to compare the efficiency of
the two monetary policy instruments during the financial liberalisation process,
therefore both the interest rate rule and the money growth rule are outlined below.
Interest rate rule The central bank sets the benchmark interest rate following
a standard Taylor-type rule:
Rt = R
φr
t−1
(
R
(
Πt
Π¯
)φπ (Yt
Y
)φy)(1−φr)
exp (urt ) (4.45)
where Rt is the policy interest rate set by the central bank, Π¯ denotes the inflation
target and urt captures the interest-rate shock. The parameters, φs, measure the
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preferences with respect to lagged policy rate, inflation and output gap, respect-
ively.
Money growth rule The rule is same as that in the neoclassical RBC model.
The nominal money growth gross rate,Gt = 1+g˜t, is defined asMt = (1 + g˜t)Mt−1,
where Mt = PtMt is the nominal money supply. Therefore,
Mt = (1 + g˜t)
Mt−1
Πt
(4.46)
As in previous section, the central bank sets money growth according to a Taylor-
type equation that is similar to the interest rate rule:
Gt = G
φgg
t−1
(
G
(
Π¯
Πt
)φπg (Y
Yt
)φyg)(1−φgg)
exp (ugt ) (4.47)
where G is the target gross growth rate, ugt denotes the external shock, and φs,
again, reflect the preferences of the central bank.
4.3.1.5 Shocks
To close the model, a productivity shock, an interest-rate shock and a money-
growth shock, are all set to follow an AR (1) process and are described below:
uat = ρau
a
t−1 + ǫ
a
t (4.48)
urt = ρru
r
t−1 + ǫ
r
t (4.49)
ugt = ρgu
g
t−1 + ǫ
g
t (4.50)
where the autoregressive parameters 0 < ρj < 1. ǫ
a
t , ǫ
r
t and ǫ
g
t are exogenous
driving forces that are assumed to be identically independently distributed with
zero means and specific standard deviations.
94
4.3.1.6 Log-linearised equations
With the goods market clearing condition Yt = Ct + It, general equilibrium dy-
namics around the steady state levels can be derived from the equations above.
Assuming inflation in the steady state equals the inflation target, Π = Π¯, the
steady states of the variables can be computed. For example, the steady state
from equation (4.4) yields R =
Π¯
β
. The model is then log-linearised around the
steady state, as shown in the Appendix.
4.3.2 Calibration
The calibration process is same as before. All the parameters in previous neo-
classical model will be used in this model, as outlined in Table 4.1. In addition,
assuming retailers adjust prices once a year indicates that θ = 0.75. τ is con-
sidered to be equal to θ, i.e. τ = 0.75, as the Phillips curve in the long run is
vertical in the presence of full employment. Also, the elasticity of substitution
between differentiated goods, ǫ, is set to be 11, indicating a 10% net markup of
final over intermediate goods. The investment to income share in steady state,
I
Y
,
is calculated as
I
Y
=
ǫ− 1
ǫ
δα
1
β
− 1 + δ
.
The log-linearised equation of the interest rate rule, equation (4.67), are estimated
by the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) using quarterly data from 1996Q1
to 2015Q4. The result is shown as below, with standard errors in the parentheses7.
rt = 0.93
(0.02)
rt−1 + 0.18
(0.03)
πt + 0.003
(0.01)
yt + ǫ
r
t
where three variables, rt, πt and yt are deviations from individual steady states.
yt is also defined as the output gap. The result shows that φr = 0.93, φπ =
7The instrument variables used in the GMM estimation are lagged variables of interest rate,
inflation and output gap.
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Figure 4.7: Actual and simulated interest rate deviations
0.18/ (1− 0.93) = 2.57, and φy = 0.05, though φy is not significant in the model,
meaning the PBoC does not care much about output gap when implementing the
interest rate rule. Also, φπ > 1 means the interest rate responses more aggressively
with respect to inflation, which is the case in China, as one of the objectives that
the PBoC sets interest rates is to secure low inflation. The actual and simulated
rt is plotted in Figure 4.7. However, when measuring the error term in the above
equation, the AR (1) parameter in the interest rate rule, ρr, is insignificant, i.e.
ρr = 0, thus resulting u
r
t = ǫ
r
t , which is a white-noise error with a standard
deviation σr = 0.14%.
4.3.3 Impulse response analysis and simulations
The model is solved by the method of undetermined coefficients for the recursive
equilibrium law of motion in general. The impulse responses to one standard
deviation productivity shock and money-growth shock under the money growth
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rule are outlined in Figure 4.8. The numbers on the horizontal axis represent
quarters after each shock. The result from the new Keynesian model with the
cash-in-advance constraint is similar to that in previous neoclassical model. To be
specific, the impulse responses to a productivity shock, as in Figure 4.8a, remain
the same as in Figure 4.4. Following this shock, output goes up by 1.6% and
declines to the steady state in more than 10 years. Consumption increases by less
than 0.5% during the first 2 years, and declines afterwards. Investment lifts more
than 3% at the beginning, and is gradually reduced to its steady state. Inflation
enters the period with 0.15% below the steady state level, and decreases to 0.55%
within 2 years before returning to the steady state. The impulse responses to a
money-growth shock in Figure 4.8b suggest a decline of 1.4% in output, but with
a quick 1.2% point upturn in the next 2 or 3 quarters. A similar response is found
in investment, with an initial 2.5% decrease, followed by a 0.4% increase within
the first half year. Also, inflation is raised to 0.3% above the steady state due to
a money-growth shock, and increases by 2% before declining in about one year.
Consumption declines at first, and grows rapidly over the next 5 years.
To compare the effects of the two monetary policy instruments, Figure 4.9 plots
the impulse responses to productivity shocks and interest-rate shocks when the
interest rate rule takes effect in the model. It shows that when facing identical
productivity shocks, the economy experiences smaller fluctuations when using the
interest rate rule. For example, inflation in Figure 4.9a faces smaller fluctuations,
and converges to its steady state more quickly than that in Figure 4.8a. Consump-
tion also experiences 0.5% smaller fluctuations, whilst the responses of output and
investment tend to be weaker as well in terms of the interest rate rule, and con-
verges to the steady states as quickly as in the money growth rule. Thus, the
interest rate rule is more favourable when considering the desire to restrict infla-
tion and stabilise economy along with the development of productivity. Moreover,
comparing Figure 4.8b and 4.9b suggests that the interest rate rule is more power-
ful and effective. For example, an interest-rate shock reduces output by nearly
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8%, whilst a money-growth shock leads to a decline of output of only 1.4%. Also,
inflation declines by 5% in response of an interest-rate shock, but with an initial
increase of 0.3% in terms of a money-growth shock. Similar results can be found in
the paths of consumption and investment as well. The economy tends to converge
to steady state more quickly when implementing the interest rate rule.
To further evaluate the interest rate and the money growth rules, the model is
simulated corresponding to a random draw of shocks. In this case, the model is
simulated for 1200 periods and the simulation paths of output and inflation for
1000 quarters after dropping the first 200 periods is plotted in Figure 4.10. The left
figure indicates the similar dynamics of output under two rules, and the interest
rate rule is more powerful with slightly higher volatility of output. The dynamics
of inflation on the right differ substantially, with smaller fluctuations in presence
of the interest rate rule. These findings are consistent with the impulse responses
analysis above.
The results above are in favour of Zhang (2009), where two monetary policy rules
are compared in a new Keynesian framework with money-in-utility model. Follow-
ing the method of Jin et al. (2013) using a neoclassical model and assuming that
the interest rate rule is adopted by the PBoC, the process of interest rate liberal-
isation is measured by raising the steady state levels of annualised nominal interest
rates, R. The discount factor, β, is obtained by annualised inflation and interest
rate. Figure 4.11 and 4.12 plot the impulse responses to productivity shocks and
interest-rate shocks when the steady state level of interest rate, R, is selected to be
1%, 3.28%, 6% or 9%. In terms of a productivity shock, as in Figure 4.11, output
initially increases less when facing higher R, whilst consumption responses with no
difference at the beginning, but peaks at 0.58% when R = 9%, compared to 0.5%
or so when R = 3.28%. Investment increases by more in response to the interest
rate liberalisation, whilst inflation responses more strongly negative at first, and
increases more afterwards, and converges to steady state more quickly in presence
of higher R. Thus, increasing R boosts consumption and investment in the short
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Figure 4.8: Impulse responses to shocks under money growth rule
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Figure 4.9: Impulse responses to shocks under interest rate rule
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Figure 4.10: Model simulations of output and inflation
run when there is a productivity shock and the economy experiences more volat-
ility. However, increasing R seems indifferent when experiencing an interest-rate
shock, as plotted in Figure 4.12, the response of output is less stronger at first,
and converges to the steady state a bit more quickly. Investment shows very little
difference with different R. Inflation drops less when R is higher, but remains
identical afterwards when converging to the steady state. Thus, increasing the
steady state levels of R will not alter the effects to the economy from an interest-
rate shock, which is different from the result when the money growth rule is in use.
It indicates that the transmission mechanism through interest rate is not changed
by increasing nominal interest rate in the long run, and the economy remains
stable when experiencing an interest-rate shock during financial liberalisation.
4.4 Robustness check
To check the robustness and compare the result with the new Keynesian DSGE
model with cash-in-advance in the last section, this section uses a money-in-utility
model where the variable referring to real money balances enters the utility func-
tion of households. As before, households choose to deposit at financial inter-
mediates and hold money balances to consume and invest during her unlimited
lifetime. Firms employ labour and utilise capital to produce intermediate goods
whilst retailers buy intermediate goods from firms in a competitive market, and
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differentiate them at no costs. Retailers then sell them in a monopolistic competit-
ive market and therefore have some monopoly power and set prices in a Calvo-type
manner. The model structure follows Zhang (2009) without taking wage rigidity
into consideration. In addition, this section employs Bayesian estimation methods
to estimate the parameters of the central bank’s monetary policy. Following that,
the money growth rule and the interest rate rule are compared.
4.4.1 Model structure
The representative household maximises her lifetime utility which depends on real
consumption, Ct, labour supply, Nt, and real money balances, Mt:
maxE0
{
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
1
1− σ
C1−σt − ψ
N 1
1 + φ
N1+φt +
1
1− γ
M1−γt
)}
subject to
Ct +Dt +Mt + It =
Rt−1Dt−1
Πt
+WtNt + r˜
K
t Kt−1 +
Mt−1
Πt
+ FRt
where It = Kt− (1− δ)Kt−1. γ is the inverse of elasticity of real money holdings.
All the variables and parameters above remain as same as in the previous section.
Solving the problem above yields the FOCs with respect to consumption and
deposits:
1
Rt
= βEt
[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
1
Πt+1
]
The FOC with respect to Nt reads the optimal choice of labour supply:
Wt = (Ct)
σ ψNNφt
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Also, the FOC with respect to capital, Kt, gives:
1 = βEt
[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ (
r˜Kt+1 + 1− δ
)]
Lastly, the FOC with respect to real money balances, Mt, reads:
M−γt C
σ
t =
Rt − 1
Rt
The log-linearised equations of above FOCs are outlined as below, with lowercase
letters referring to the percentage deviations from the steady state, and absolute
deviations for inflation, interest rate and money growth rate.
ct = Etct+1 − σ
−1 (rt − Etπt+1) (4.51)
wt = σct + φnt (4.52)
rKt+1 =
σ
1− β (1− δ)
(ct+1 − ct) (4.53)
mt =
σ
γ
ct +
β
γ (β − Π)
rt (4.54)
The behaviour of firms is as same as in the last section, which produces inter-
mediate goods following the Cobb-Douglas function in equation (4.37). The real
marginal cost and wage level are provided in equations (4.38) and (4.39), respect-
ively. Retailers purchase intermediate goods from firms and differentiate them
at no cost. Retailers, as before, set prices in a Calvo-type fashion. The FOC is
given in equation (4.44). Real marginal cost in steady state equals to the markup,
ǫ
ǫ− 1
. The log-linearised equation yields the Phillips curve. In addition, a cost-
push shock, uct , is augmented in the curve.
πt = τπt−1 + β (Etπt+1 − τπt) +
(1− θ) (1− θβ)
θ
mct + u
c
t (4.55)
This section compares the two monetary policy rules, i.e. the money growth rule
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and the interest rate rule, and the monetary policy equations of the central bank
are as same as in the last section. Following the GMM estimation results in the last
section, the money-growth shock is assumed to follow the AR (1) process whilst
the interest-rate shock is a white-noise error.
4.4.2 Model estimation
According to DeJong et al. (2000), model structure, model parameterisation and
the data together constitute the main potential sources of unknown in the empir-
ical work. Given the model structure, the parameters in conventional approach of
estimation are regarded as fixed ones. However, in Bayesian estimation, paramet-
ers are treated as random variables so that prior distributions are introduced when
estimating the posterior distribution based on the data. To begin with, consider
a model with parameter matrix ϑ to be estimated using the sample data Y , then
a joint distribution p (Y , ϑ) can be factored into a prior distribution of parameter,
p (ϑ), and a distribution of the data given ϑ, i.e. p (Y | ϑ). The latter, when
interpreted as a function of ϑ, is the likelihood function, L (ϑ | Y). According to
Bayesian theorem,
p (ϑ | Y) =
L (ϑ | Y) p (ϑ)
p (Y)
where p (ϑ | Y) is the posterior distribution of parameters, and p (Y) =
´
p (Y | ϑ) p (ϑ) dϑ
is the marginal density that is independent of ϑ.
Therefore, the posterior probability is proportional to the product of the likelihood
and the prior probability, i.e. p (ϑ | Y) ∝ L (ϑ | Y) p (ϑ). Following that, the
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method can be employed to optimise the
posterior with respect to the parameters.
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4.4.2.1 Data
To estimate the model, four macroeconomic variables are selected as observables
for the period of 1996Q1 to 2015Q4. Table 4.3 describes the construction and
source of the data. Data are seasonally adjusted. In addition, as log-linearised
model is used in this chapter, all the variables thus represent the percentage devi-
ations (or absolute deviations) from the steady state. Consequently, the original
non-stationary output data are detrended using the one-sided Hodrick–Prescott
filter (λ = 1600)8, whist stationary data are subtracted by their mean, such as
inflation, money growth rate and interest rates.
4.4.2.2 Calibrated parameters and priors
Table 4.4 reports the values of calibrated parameters set in this model. All the
values were set in the last section. For example, the discount factor β = 0.997
is set according to the average annual inflation rate and deposit rate, whilst the
depreciation ratio of capital is calibrated to be 4%, which is consistent from the
annual data. The aggregated provincial-level data in China suggest that the labour
income accounts for 47% of total income, meaning α = 1− 0.47 = 0.53. Also, the
inverse of Frisch elasticity is set to be 1/3 according to Chen et al. (2012).
Other parameters are estimated using the Bayesian estimation technique. The
choice of prior distributions in this model follows current literature or is relatively
uninformative. For example, Smets & Wouters (2003) and Gerali et al. (2010)
suggest a Beta distribution for smoothing parameters such as φr and φ
g
g, where the
domain is [0, 1). The parameters measuring the responses of policy rate deviations
to inflation and output, φπ and φy, are assumed to have priors of gamma or normal
distribution, so are those in the money growth rule. The coefficient of relative risk
8Pfeifer (2014) discussed the advantage of the backward-looking one-sided HP filter against
the two-sided one for DSGE estimation. This one-sided HP filter method is proposed and used
by Stock & Watson (1999).
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Table 4.3: Description of data
Name Description
Policy interest rate, Rt 7-day Shibor from 2007 to 2015, while Chibor was used between 1996 and 2006. Daily gross rates are taken
arithmetic average to construct quarterly data.
Source: the PBoC website and shibor.org.
Inflation, Πt Consumer Price Index (CPI) is used to represent the price level. Inflation is defined as the quarterly
difference at the annual rate.
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators via Datastream
Output, Yt Real quarterly GDP is obtained by deflating nominal GDP by the CPI.
Source: Oxford economics via Datastream and National Bureau of Statistics of China website.
Money growth, g˜t Growth rate of nominal broad money M2, which is calculated as quarterly difference of M2 at the annual
rate.
Source: the PBoC website and Oxford economics via Datastream.
Note: Data of inflation, output and money growth are seasonally adjusted. All the interest rates and inflation data are transformed into the quarterly gross rates
before entering the model.
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Table 4.4: Model calibration
Description Calibrated value
Annual inflation rate 2.07%
Annual deposit rate 3.28%
Intertemporal discount factor β =
Π
R
= 0.997
Capital depreciation rate δ = 4%
Output elasticity of capital α = 0.53
Inverse of Frisch elasticity φ = 1/3
aversion of households, σ, is assumed to adhere to a gamma distribution with the
mean of 2 and the standard deviation of 0.5. Smets & Wouters (2003) suggest θ
and τ to be Beta distributed, therefore this section sets both to have a mean of 0.5
and a standard deviation of 0.1. Autoregressive parameters of exogenous shocks
of productivity ratio are assumed to have a strict prior beta distribution with a
mean of 0.8 and a standard deviation of 0.1, respectively. The standard deviation
of each driving force is equipped with the inverse Gamma distribution with the
mean of 0.01 and the standard deviation of 0.05. Table 4.5 summaries the prior
distributions with means and standard deviations for all the parameters and the
standard deviations of exogenous driving forces.
4.4.2.3 Posterior estimates
The Bayesian rule gives p (ϑ | Y) ∝ L (ϑ | Y) p (ϑ) and hence the likelihood cal-
culated using the Kalman filter and the prior density of parameters are together
used to obtain the posterior distribution of the estimated parameters. An es-
sential requirement for the estimation is that the number of observed variables
must be smaller or equal to that of shocks and measurement errors, otherwise
the stochastic singularity arises in the model9. In this simple DSGE model, the
number of observables is equal to the number of exogenous shocks.
9Smets & Wouters (2007) use as many exogenous shocks as observables, whilst Schmitt-Grohe
& Uribe (2012) add measurement errors of observables into estimation, and proposed that this
method is a way to avoid stochastic singularity of the model.
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Table 4.5: Prior and posterior distribution of parameters and shocks
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Parameter Distribution Mean Standard deviation Mean 90% HPD interval Median
Money growth rule
σ Gamma 2.00 0.5 2.385 [1.499,3.264] 2.345
τ Beta 0.50 0.1 0.351 [0.190,0.511] 0.345
θ Beta 0.50 0.1 0.406 [0.319,0.494] 0.407
φgg Beta 0.75 0.1 0.198 [0.126,0.267] 0.195
φπg Normal 0.50 0.5 1.004 [0.800,1.207] 1.003
φyg Gamma 1.50 0.5 0.420 [0.284,0.552] 0.410
ρa Beta 0.80 0.1 0.986 [0.976,0.998] 0.988
ρc Beta 0.80 0.1 0.675 [0.591,0.758] 0.678
ρg Beta 0.80 0.1 0.184 [0.113,0.248] 0.180
σg Inv.Gamma 0.01 0.05 0.015 [0.013,0.017] 0.015
σa Inv.Gamma 0.01 0.05 0.004 [0.003,0.005] 0.004
σc Inv.Gamma 0.01 0.05 0.020 [0.011,0.029] 0.019
Interest rate rule
σ Gamma 2.00 0.5 2.540 [1.682,3.380] 2.500
τ Beta 0.50 0.1 0.445 [0.278,0.606] 0.443
θ Beta 0.50 0.1 0.286 [0.215,0.357] 0.286
φr Beta 0.75 0.10 0.617 [0.520,0.717] 0.624
φπ Gamma 2.00 0.5 1.104 [1.013,1.185] 1.100
φy Normal 0.20 0.15 0.024 [-0.004,0.051] 0.024
ρa Beta 0.8 0.1 0.948 [0.905,0.990] 0.955
ρc Beta 0.8 0.1 0.969 [0.944,0.994] 0.972
σr Inv.Gamma 0.01 0.05 0.004 [0.003,0.005] 0.004
σa Inv.Gamma 0.01 0.05 0.007 [0.006,0.009] 0.007
σc Inv.Gamma 0.01 0.05 0.016 [0.006,0.025] 0.015
Note: 1. Results of posterior means are obtained by running 10 chains of Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm, each with 100,000 draws, of which the first 20% are dropped; 2. The average accept-
ance rates for 10 chains are 0.244 and 0.235 for the money growth rule and the interest rate rule,
respectively; 3. HPD interval refers to the highest posterior density credible interval, which is
the shortest interval among all intervals that are 90% credible.
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Table 4.5 reports the results of posterior estimates. The statistics of posterior
probability of parameters reported in the table are obtained using the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm to generate 10 chains, each of which contains 100,000 draws.
The average acceptance rates for 10 chains are 24.4% for the model with the money
growth rule, and 23.5% for that with the interest rate rule, both of which are close
to the suggested rate of 23.4% (Roberts et al., 1997). The first 20% of draws were
dropped when computing the statistics. Figure 4.13a and 4.13b plot the kernel
estimates of prior and posterior marginal densities for parameters and standard
deviations of shocks under two different monetary policy rules.
According to Gerali et al. (2010), deviations of the mean of posteriors from that of
priors indicate that a parameter is identified. The estimation results of the model
with the money growth rule indicate that all the parameters are well identified
except for σ, according to Figure 4.13a. Productivity and cost-push shocks are
persistent whilst the AR (1) parameter of money-growth shock, ugt is 0.184 only.
The posterior mean of θ, which refers to the probability that firms do not adjust
prices, is 0.406 and is lower than the calibrated result in the last section. It
suggests that firms adjust prices frequently within a quarter of period. The degree
of indexation to previous inflation, τ , is estimated to be 0.351 according to the
posterior mean, which is significantly different from 0.5, or 0.75 used in the last
section. The indexation with a relatively lower value is consistent with Smets
& Wouters (2007) and Gerali et al. (2010) for the estimation of the U.S. and
the Euro area. The monetary policy functions based on the money growth rule
yield very different result from Liu & Zhang (2010), which was used in previous
sections. The smoothing parameter of money growth, φgg, is 0.198 only, whilst
parameters measuring the responses of money growth deviations to inflation and
output, φπg and φ
y
g, are 1.004 and 0.420, respectively. The results suggest that
money growth responds more aggressively to inflation, as φπg is slightly above 1,
and less aggressively to output, confirming that one of the central bank’s main
objectives is to curb inflation in China.
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(a) Prior and Posterior marginal distributions: Money growth rule
(b) Prior and Posterior marginal distributions: Interest rate rule
Figure 4.13: Prior and Posterior marginal distributions
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The results from the model with the interest rate rule, however, show weak iden-
tification of τ and σ, and the degree of price stickiness, θ, which is around 0.3
only according to Figure 4.13b. Similarly, productivity and cost-push shocks are
both very persistent with the AR (1) parameters greater than 0.9. The interest
rate Taylor rule is consistent with previous analysis, with φπ > 1 confirming the
aggressive approach to inflation, and a small φy = 0.024 indicating the little at-
tention to output when the PBoC adjusts policy interest rate. The parameter
of last-period interest rate, φr = 0.617, showing smaller degree of interest rate
smoothing. Comparing the results from the two models indicates that most para-
meters are robust, and the results of sensitivity analysis using the built-in global
sensitivity analysis toolbox in Dynare based on 20,000 Monte-Carlo samples con-
firm that nearly all the parameters give unique saddle-path solution. Besides, the
results are examined by means of convergence statistics proposed by Brooks &
Gelman (1998), as reported in the appendix. The results confirm convergence and
relative stability of the parameter moments.
4.4.3 Impulse response analysis
Given the mean of posteriors as well as values of calibrated parameters above, this
model is solved using the methods of undetermined coefficients proposed by Uhlig
(1999). Details of this method were discussed in Section 2. Similar to Section 3, a
productivity shock and a monetary-policy shock are selected to study the impulse
responses of output and inflation to exogenous shocks. The impulse responses to
a productivity shock under the money growth rule and the interest rate rule are
plotted in Figure 4.14. The left panel reflects the impulse responses under the
money growth rule. Output enters the period with a negative value due to high
persistence of the productivity shock, and leaps to the peak of 1.5% above the
steady state in the following period. Also, this effect lasts longer than 10 years.
Inflation, however, initially drops 3% below the steady state level, and recovers
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Figure 4.14: Impulse responses to a productivity shock under two rules
soon. To compare with the responses under the interest rate rule in the right
panel, far smaller variations of the economy can be observed. Output initially
grows to around 1.1% above the steady state, and recovers gradually, faster than
that under the money growth rule. Inflation decreases at 0.3% only, and grows
to the steady state as quickly as that in the money growth rule. According to
Zhang (2009), fluctuations to a productivity shock can be regarded as the loss of
the central bank. Therefore, the interest rate rule is more favourable when the
central bank aims to reduce the magnitude of volatility of the economy.
Figure 4.15 plots the impulse responses to monetary-policy shocks under two dif-
ferent rules. Both cases see a quick recovery, but the interest-rate shock is more
powerful compared to the money-growth shock. As shown in the right panel, a
positive shock in interest rate reduces output at 1% at the beginning, and output
jumps to 0.2% above the steady state before a decline. However, output in the
left panel, when money-growth shock enters, increases to 0.5% only at first, and
shrinks to -0.1% before recovering. Similarly, inflation plunges 2.2% in response
to an interest-rate shock, whilst it increases by 0.6% only when facing a money-
growth shock. Therefore, the results from Bayesian estimation are in favour of
Zhang (2009), which suggests that the interest rate rule is more powerful monet-
ary policy response, and helps to stabilise the economy when a productivity shock
hits the model.
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Figure 4.15: Impulse responses to a monetary-policy shock under two rules
4.5 Conclusion
The central bank of China has been using nominal money growth as an important
monetary policy tool for decades. The central government and the PBoC set a
M2 growth target every year to stabilise the price level and promote the growth
of economy. A simple neoclassical RBC model is used in this chapter to capture
China’s money growth rule. In addition, a cash-in-advance constraint is included
so that money is non-neutral in this model. Interest rate liberalisation in this case
is known as raising the steady state levels of the nominal deposit rate, as it has long
been argued to be artificially low. The main conclusion from this model is that
raising deposit rate helps reorganise the economic structure between consumption
and investment in China, and improves the efficiency of transmission channel of
monetary policy.
In the latest 13th national five-year plan, China will reduce the use of quantity
based monetary policy tools like money growth, as it has become more difficult
to measure. Instead, price-based policy tools such as the interest rate policy will
be used more frequently. Therefore, it is vital to compare both of the monetary
policy tools. The results from a new Keynesian DSGE model with a cash-in-
advance constraint show that the interest rate rule is more efficient than the money
growth rule. To be more specific, inflation lasts shorter period when facing a
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productivity shock in terms of the interest rate rule, meaning smaller fluctuations
in the economy. Also, the money growth rule is less powerful than the interest rate
rule in response of a monetary policy shock. Lastly, a new Keynesian DSGE model
with money-in-utility is introduced as well, together with two different monetary
policies, so as to check the robustness of the results in the cash-in-advance model.
This model follows Zhang (2009) except for describing the retailer’s behaviours,
and uses a Bayesian estimation approach rather than calibration to estimate some
key parameters in the model. The results are in favour of Zhang (2009) and
the cash-in-advance model, suggesting the interest rate rule is more powerful and
effective, and it is preferable when considering stabilising the economy.
In fact, the method used by Jin et al. (2013) to reflect the interest rate liberalisa-
tion process is limited to the rough illustration of the economy when experiencing
interest rate liberalisation and it is difficult to suggest a proper nominal interest
rate. Nevertheless, the result indicates that, given a productivity shock, consump-
tion and investment yield a stronger response when the steady state level of annual
interest rate is raised. Besides, as the nominal money growth rule is less efficient
and it becomes more difficult to control money supply due to the variability of ve-
locity, the PBoC has actively used required reserve ratio to adjust money supply.
The next chapter looks at market-based and nonmarket-based monetary policy
tools used simultaneously by the PBoC, together with a more accurate measure
of interest rate liberalisation.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Model log-linearisation: cash-in-advance model
In the following log-linearised equations, the lower-case variables except interest
rate, inflation and money growth rate, hereafter denote the percentage derivations
from the steady states. For interest rate, inflation and money growth, the lower-
case letters represent absolute derivations. Assuming the upper-case variables
without a time subscript t refer to the levels of steady states, one could log-linearise
the model around the steady states.
Firstly, the capital formation of households is log-linearised:
kt = (1− δ) kt−1 + δit (4.56)
An approximation of the binding cash-in-advance constraint yields:
mt−1 − πt = ct (4.57)
Then, the FOCs of households are log-linearised as follows:
− σct =
β
Π
λt +
(
1−
β
Π
)
µt (4.58)
λt = Etλt+1 − Etπt+1 + rt (4.59)
λt + wt = φnt (4.60)
λt + σEtct+1 + Etπt+1 = 0 (4.61)
λt = Etλt+1 + [1− β (1− δ)] r
K
t+1 (4.62)
Production function of firms is log-linearised as:
yt = u
a
t + αkt−1 + (1− α)nt (4.63)
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Similarly, the FOCs of a representative cost-minimising firm yield the relationship
between real cost of labour and capital, as well as the marginal cost:
wt = kt−1 − nt + r
K
t (4.64)
mct = αr
K
t + (1− α)wt − u
a
t (4.65)
Solving the FOC of retailers yields the Phillips curve
πt = τπt−1 + β (Etπt+1 − τπt) +
(1− θ) (1− θβ)
θ
mct (4.66)
Next, in terms of the interest rate rule, the log-linearised equation of (4.45) reads:
rt = φrrt−1 + (1− φr) (φππt + φyyt) + u
r
t (4.67)
Alternatively, the log-linearised equations are outlined when the central bank ad-
opts the money growth rule:
mt = mt−1 − πt +
gt
Π
(4.68)
gt = φ
g
ggt−1 −
(
1− φgg
) (
φπgπt + φ
y
gyt
)
+ ugt (4.69)
Lastly, the log-linearised market clearing condition is:
yt =
C
Y
ct +
I
Y
it (4.70)
In addition, the productivity shock, the interest-rate shock and the money-growth
shock mentioned above are outlined again as follows:
uat = ρau
a
t−1 + ǫ
a
t (4.71)
urt = ρru
r
t−1 + ǫ
r
t (4.72)
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ugt = ρgu
g
t−1 + ǫ
g
t (4.73)
When the interest rate rule takes effect, Equations (4.56) to (4.66), together with
(4.67), (4.70), (4.71) and (4.72) constitute a system of linear rational expectations
differences equations containing 15 endogenous variables, plus 2 exogenous driving
forces. Similarly, when using the money growth rule, the system contains 16
endogenous variables and 2 exogenous driving forces, as summarised in equations
(4.56) to (4.66), as well as (4.68), (4.69), (4.70), (4.71) and (4.73).
4.6.2 Monte Carlo Markov Chains multivariate diagnostics
The Monte Carlo Markov Chains (MCMC) multivariate diagnostics are plotted in
Figure 4.16, generated by Dynare. The red lines represent the specific measures
of the parameter vectors within the chains, whilst the blue lines plot the measures
between chains. Three measures are used in Dynare, and the first block ”interval”
in both figures are constructed from an 80% confidence interval of the mean of
parameter. “m2” and “m3” in the second and last blocks refer to measures based
on variance and third moments. The results reflect an aggregate measure based
on the eigenvalues of the variance-covariance matrix of each parameter, and the
horizontal axis indicates the number of Metropolis-Hastings iterations. The blue
line should be closed to the red line, whilst the red line should be relatively con-
stant, which is the case here, as the red and blue lines are relatively stable after
the first 20,000 iterations.
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Figure 4.16: MCMC multivariate convergence diagnostics
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Chapter 5
Financial repression in China’s
monetary policy
5.1 Introduction
Unlike the central banks in developed economies that control benchmark interest
rates alone, the PBoC sets both benchmark loan rates and deposit rates. In
addition to the interest rate adjustments, the PBoC sets targets of nominal broad
money growth and sets high required reserve ratios due to the imperfect monetary
policy transmission mechanisms. Moreover, the objective of China’s central bank
when considering various monetary policy tools appears more complicated than
that in developed countries, as it does not only maintain inflation stability, but
also helps create job opportunities and maintains the balance of international
payments. Interest rate adjustment, together with the adjustment of the required
reserve ratio, is often employed to maintain the stability of domestic stock market,
so as to maintain social stability and promote economic development.
The PBoC sets benchmark deposit and lending rates that most commercial banks
are willing to follow due to the absence of full independence in the financial market.
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The adjustments to interest rates on deposits and loans are actively used by the
PBoC. To capture these two interest rates in a DSGE model, Chen et al. (2012)
built a closed economy new Keynesian DSGE model containing patient and im-
patient households in the spirit of Kiyotaki & Moore (1997), Iacoviello (2005) and
Gerali et al. (2010). A private banking sector was included in their model and the
loan target and the required reserve ratio are also considered when complement-
ing the monetary policy. Moreover, as loan and deposit rates are restricted by the
guidance of China’s central bank before 2013 and 2015, respectively, Chen et al.
(2012) proposed an interest rate corridor to capture this restriction. For example,
actual loan rates, due to the floor set by the central bank, would be restricted
to be equal to policy loan rates provided that market loan rates are lower than
policy rates. Similarly, actual deposit rates cannot exceed the ceiling set by the
central bank. The method developed by Holden & Paetz (2012) to solve DSGE
models with inequality constrains was used to solve the corridors in their model.
Following the work of Chen et al. (2012), Funke & Paetz (2012) augmented the
framework with a domestic bond market, and Funke et al. (2015) further included
shadow banks in the model. Sinclair & Sun (2015) also suggested that the market
interest rates are connected with the policy rates by positive time-varying para-
meters. In addition, the loan-to-value ratio was included in their model to act as
a macroprudential policy instrument, together with the required reserve ratio in
China.
In order to capture the repressive financial policies in the DSGE model or on the
contrary, the financial liberalisation process, several methods have been imple-
mented in the literature. For example, as mentioned in the last chapter, Jin et al.
(2013) measured interest rate liberalisation process by increasing its steady state
level. In addition, Funke & Paetz (2012) looked into the liberalisation by allowing
the PBoC to set benchmark deposit and loan rates to be a weighted average of
original policy rates and market rates. The degree of interest rate liberalisation
was reflected by changing the weighted parameters in the model. Funke et al.
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(2015) then considered two scenarios of liberalisation process. The first scenario,
named as partial liberalisation, assumes that the central bank stops controlling
interest rates but imposes the window guidance on loan quotas remains, whilst
the second one looks at a full liberalisation scenario where the window guidance
is turned off and so is the interest rate control. Xiao et al. (2015) also used the
weighted average of policy rates and market rates proposed by Funke & Paetz
(2012), and further captured the degree of exchange rate reform by changing the
parameter on the exchange rate variable in the Taylor rule. Thus both interest
rate and exchange rate liberalisation processes can be monitored in the DSGE
model. Other repressive financial policies like high required reserve ratios are also
included. In fact, the PBoC actively adjusts this ratio in order to control money
growth, as the control on M2 through the money growth rule is challenging and
impossible due to the unstable velocity of money. Moreover, Chen et al. (2012)
proposed that the PBoC imposes the administrative window guidance on bank
lending, which is another possible repressive financial policies to be considered in
the model.
Although China has witnessed a number of economic and financial reforms since
1978, it is acknowledged that repressive financial policies are still present in China
during 1978 until now. It is important to understand the impact of financial re-
pression in China. This chapter therefore has some typical repressive financial
policies included in the new Keynesian DSGE model, and investigates the effects
on China’s economy when removing one or all of these policies to achieve fin-
ancial liberalisation. To be specific, it builds a new Keynesian closed economy
DSGE model following Gerali et al. (2010), Chen et al. (2012) and Funke & Paetz
(2012), with patient and impatient households to capture both deposit and loan
rates, and a commercial bank sector is included. Commercial banks are further
decomposed by wholesale and retail sectors. Unlike Funke et al. (2015) where the
wholesale loan and deposit rates in equilibrium are dependent of the parameters
in the management cost function, this model introduces a stochastic elasticity of
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demand for loans and deposits in the retailing commercial bank section, which is
in spirit of Gerali et al. (2010). Furthermore, actual deposit and loan rates are
represented by a geometric weighted average between market and central bank
rates, so that interest rate liberalisation process can be captured by changing the
weighted parameters accordingly. Required reserve ratio and the window guid-
ance on bank loans are included in the model. This chapter removes the interest
rate corridor, as the model constructed by Chen et al. (2012) and Funke & Paetz
(2012) was used before the floor of loan rate and the ceiling of deposit rate were
removed. The results show that both deposit and lending rates are more sensitive
to exogenous shocks after deregulation, and the deregulation process reduces the
volatility of inflation. However, the effects of deregulation are significantly affected
by the window guidance rule. The interest rate rule adopted by the central bank
works to maintain the stability of the economy, and it is more powerful in terms
of reducing the volatility of inflation without the window guidance rule. Also, the
result provides little evidence of inflation control by introducing a positive shock
in the required reserve ratio. Following that, this model further differs from their
DSGE models by considering nominal money growth variable in the interest rate
Taylor rule. This is important as the PBoC and the central government announce
and monitor broad money growth target every year. The modified rule brings
about more volatility of inflation, but maintains output at a stable level.
Parameters of DSGE models are determined using numerous different approaches.
Pure calibration is used by Kydland & Prescott (1982) and numerous research
works due to its strong robustness (see Monacelli, 2005; Zhang, 2009; Chen et al.,
2012; Funke & Paetz, 2012; Jin et al., 2013; Funke et al., 2015), but is also criticised
for the absence of theory foundation. The Bayesian estimation, however, provides
perfect information of observed variables, and therefore has been widely adopted
in recent decades (see Smets & Wouters, 2003, 2005; Gerali et al., 2010; Xiao et al.,
2015). This chapter, therefore, chooses Bayesian estimation methods to estimate
some parameters in the model, with other parameters to be calibrated.
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 interprets the structure
of the new Keynesian closed economy DSGE model and the log-linearised process,
together with the model estimation. The properties of the model in terms of the
impulse response analysis are interpreted in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 considers the
model with a modified interest rate Taylor rule augmented with nominal money
growth. The conclusions are drawn in Section 5.5.
5.2 Model structure
The previous analysis in the last chapter compares the interest rate rule and the
money growth rule in a closed economy model, where interest rate liberalisation
process is measured by raising the steady state levels of the benchmark interest
rates. It shows that the interest rate rule is more effective in terms of transmission
mechanisms of monetary policy. Also, the national 13th five-year plan proposes the
reform of monetary policy by gradually replacing the quantity-based instruments
(i.e. the money growth rule) by the price-based tools (i.e. the interest rate rule).
In this chapter, a two-household closed economy model is developed in the spirits
of Iacoviello (2005), Gerali et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2012). Households are
divided into two groups. i.e. patient households and impatient households. Pa-
tient households deposit at commercial banks and provide labour supply during
the lifetime, whilst impatient households take loans from banks and hire labours
from patient households. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs in the impatient households
invest and produce homogeneous intermediate goods. Retailers in the model buy
intermediate goods from impatient households in a competitive market, differen-
tiate the goods at no extra costs, and sell them in a monopolistically competitive
market. The prices are set by retailers in a Calvo-type staggered manner. Com-
mercial banks consist of two sectors, namely a wholesale sector and a retail sector.
The wholesale sector is responsible of managing the bank’s assets and distributing
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deposits and loans to the retail sector. The retail sector are further formed of a
loan branch and a deposit branch. The loan branch offers bank loans to impatient
households, whilst the deposit branch raises deposits from patient households.
The wholesale sector is assumed to operate in a perfectly competitive market
while loan and deposit retail branches are under monopolistic competition and
have some market power when determining the market deposit and loan rates.
The central bank employs an interest rate (Taylor) rule which closes the model.
The central bank also uses a Taylor-type rule to offer the window guidance for
bank lending and to set the required reserve ratio. In our model, following Gerali
et al. (2010), patient households are denoted with the superscript P , whilst im-
patient households with E. Actual deposit and loan rates are geometric-weighted
averages of the benchmark rates and market-determined rates, respectively. In-
terest rate liberalisation, in this way, can be illustrated by changing the weights
of benchmark and market deposit and loan rates.
5.2.1 Patient households
The representative patient household maximises her utility function1 which de-
pends on real consumption, CPt , and real labour supply, Nt:
maxE0
{
∞∑
t=0
(
βP
)t
Uht
(
1
1− σP
(
CPt
)1−σP
−
1
1 + φ
(Nt)
1+φ
)}
(5.1)
where βP ∈ (0, 1) is the intertemporal discount factor, σP is the coefficient of
relative risk aversion of patient households, or the inverse of the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution in consumption. φ denotes the inverse of wage elasticity of
labour supply. Uht = exp
(
uht
)
captures shifts in the marginal utility of consump-
1Similar to Chapter 4, this chapter uses a separable utility function for patient and impatient
households. Recent studies with DSGE models have seen a household utility function that is
compatible with a balanced-growth steady state, hence the utility function is non-separable
(Smets & Wouters, 2007; Cantore et al., 2015) and the growth of population is considered.
Nevertheless, a separable utility function is widely used by, for example, Smets & Wouters
(2003), Smets & Wouters (2005) and Gerali et al. (2010).
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tion and is often referred to as the preference shock of households.
The representative patient household’s choice is subject to the following budget
constraint (in real terms hereafter):
CPt +Dt =
RDt−1Dt−1
Πt
+WtNt + F
R
t + F
C
t (5.2)
where Dt is the private deposits held in the commercial banks. R
D
t−1 is the gross
interest rate on deposits during t−1 and t. Πt =
Pt
Pt−1
is the gross inflation where
Pt is the price level denoted by the Consumer Price Index. Wt denotes the real
wage rate and FRt and F
C
t is the lump-sum profits received from retailers and
commercial banks.
In equilibrium, the dynamics of consumption, deposits and labour supply are
determined by equation (5.2). The first order conditions (FOC) with respect to
Ct and Dt yield the Euler equation for patient households:
1
RDt
= βPEt
[(
CPt+1
CPt
)−σP
1
Πt+1
Uht+1
Uht
]
(5.3)
The FOC with respect to Nt reads the optimal choice of labour supply:
Wt =
(
CPt
)σP
Nφt (5.4)
5.2.2 Impatient households
The representative impatient household maximises her utility function of current
consumption, CEt :
maxE0
{
∞∑
t=0
(
βE
)t
Uht
(
1
1− σE
(
CEt
)1−σE)}
(5.5)
where βE ∈ (0, 1) is the intertemporal discount factor and σE denotes the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution with respect to consumption, CEt .
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Also, the household’s choice is subject to the following budget constraints:
CEt +WtNt +
RLt−1Lt−1
Πt
+ It + C
K
t =
Yt
Xt
+ Lt (5.6)
and
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + It (5.7)
where RLt−1 denotes the gross interest rate on loans during t − 1 and t, Lt is
the loan taken by impatient households from commercial banks and It is invest-
ment in current period. Kt is the capital stock and δ is the deprecation rate for
capital. The adjustment cost for installing new capital goods is represented by
CKt = ψ
K
(
ItU
k
t
Kt−1
− δ
)2
Kt−1
2δ
, where ψK is a parameter of adjustment cost and
Ukt = exp
(
ukt
)
measures a shock of increasing the adjustment cost. The convex
adjustment cost function, according to Chen et al. (2012), is vital when sticky
prices are considered so as to avoid large shifts of capital stock in response to
external shocks. Yt takes the form of Cobb-Douglas function and denotes the real
output for intermediate goods,
Yt = AtK
α
t−1N
1−α
t (5.8)
where At = exp (u
a
t ) is the total factor productivity with u
a
t representing the
productivity shock. Xt represents the mark-up of final over intermediate goods.
The dynamics of CEt , Lt, It, Kt and Nt are determined in equations (5.6) and (5.7).
The FOCs with respect to CEt and Lt, similar to patient households, produce the
following Euler equation:
1
RLt
= βEEt
[(
CEt+1
CEt
)−σE
1
Πt+1
Uht+1
Uht
]
(5.9)
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Again, the FOC with respect to Nt yields the conventional labour demand curve:
Wt = (1− α)
Yt
NtXt
(5.10)
Lastly, the FOCs with respect to investment and capital read:
Uht µt = β
E
EtU
h
t+1
(
CEt+1
)−σE [ αYt+1
KtXt+1
−
ψK
2δ
(
Ukt+1It+1
Kt
− δ
)2]
(5.11)
+βEEtU
h
t+1
(
CEt+1
)−σE [ψK
δ
(
Ukt+1It+1
Kt
− δ
)
Ukt+1It+1
Kt
]
+ (1− δ) βEEtU
h
t+1µt+1
where µt is the Lagrangian multiplier of equation (5.7), and also denotes the
shadow price of capital, µt =
(
CEt
)−σE (
1 +
ψK
δ
(
ItU
k
t
Kt−1
− δ
))
Ukt .
5.2.3 Retailers
In the presence of sticky prices, Bernanke et al. (1999) and Iacoviello (2005) as-
sume that retailers have some monopoly power and set the price in a Calvo-type
staggered fashion. A continuum of retailers of mass 1, indexed by j, purchase
intermediate goods from entrepreneurs in the impatient households and differ-
entiate the goods into Yt (j) at no cost and sell them at Pt (j). Final goods,
Y ft is assumed to follow Y
f
t =
(´ 1
0
Yt (j)
ǫt−1
ǫt dj
) ǫt
ǫt−1
, where ǫt > 1 is the elasti-
city of substitution between differentiated goods. The price index is defined as
Pt =
(´ 1
0
Pt (j)
1−ǫt dj
) 1
1−ǫt . Therefore, the demand curve of each retailer at time
t reads Yt (j) =
(
Pt (j)
Pt
)−ǫt
Y ft . Each retailer chooses a sale price Pt (j). In this
chapter, following Ba¨urle & Menz (2008) and Justiniano & Preston (2010), it is
assumed that (1− θ) of retailers can reset their price optimally in every period,
whilst the remaining θ of retailers cannot, but adjust the price according to the
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indexation rule in the following manner:
Pt (j) = Pt−1 (j) (Πt−1)
τ (5.12)
where Πt−1 =
Pt−1
Pt−2
is gross inflation of last period, and τ captures the degree
of indexation to previous inflation. Although Gal´ı & Gertler (1999) further di-
vided the (1− θ) of retailers into two subsets containing forward-looking and
backward-looking retailers respectively, it showed eventually that compared to
forward-looking retailers alone, the result including backward-looking retailers,
though statistically significant, is not quantitatively important.
Retailers in this chapter are assumed to behave identically and therefore the index
j can be omitted in what follows. Let P nt denote the price set by the retailers that
are able to reset their price optimally in period t, the aggregate price index can
then be defined as:
Pt =
[
(1− θ) (P nt )
1−ǫt + θ
(
Pt−1
(
Pt−1
Pt−2
)τ)1−ǫt] 11−ǫt
(5.13)
For the (1− θ) of retailers who re-optimise their price in period t, the following
present discount value of profits is maximised with respect to P nt :
maxEt
∞∑
k=0
θk
{
Λt,t+k
(
P nt
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)τ
−
Pt+k
Xt+k
)
Yt+k|t
}
(5.14)
where Λt,t+k =
(
βP
)k (CPt+k
CPt
)−σp
Pt
Pt+k
is the discount factor retrieved from the
patient households, and Xt+k is equal to the markup
ǫt
ǫt − 1
.
Accordingly, the demand function in period t + k for retailers who reset their
price at time t and adjust the price according to the indexation rule henceforth is
specified as follows:
Yt+k|t =
(
P nt
Pt+k
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)τ)−ǫt
Yt+k (5.15)
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The first order condition takes the form:
0 =
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Λt,t+kYt+k|t
(
P nt
Pt−1
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)τ
−
ǫt
ǫt − 1
1
Xt+k
(
Pt+k
Pt−1
))}
(5.16)
A cost-push shock, uct is introduced in the Phillips curve by allowing the elasticity
of substitution between differentiated goods to be time-varying, i.e. ǫt, in the
above equation. Lastly, the lump-sum profits, FRt =
(
1−
1
Xt
)
Yt, are rebated to
patient households.
5.2.4 Commercial banks
The commercial bank sector is based on the partial equilibrium framework of He
& Wang (2012). Suppose an economy without financial regulations where banks
determine the demand for the amount of deposits and central bank bills, and the
supply of bank loans, the deposit and loan rates thus are not regulated and are
determined by the market forces. In this model, a continuum of commercial banks
of mass 1, indexed by j, consist of two sectors, namely a wholesale sector and a
retail sector. The wholesale sector manages bank assets in a perfectly competitive
market by generating deposits and offering loans to retail sectors. The retail
sector is composed of loan and deposit branches, which offer loans to impatient
households and deal with deposits from patient households, respectively.
5.2.4.1 Wholesale sector
A representative wholesale sector in the commercial bank at time t, as in Chen
et al. (2012), takes the amount of wholesale deposits, DWt , at the gross wholesale
deposit rate of RD,Wt , makes wholesale loans, L
W
t , at the gross interest rate of
RL,Wt and borrows from the interbank market. Additionally, some market and
non-market based monetary policy instruments are included in the model. For ex-
ample, the PBoC takes the required reserves from commercial banks according to
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the published required reserve ratio, η˜t. Also, the non-market based instrument of
administrative window guidance for bank loans imposed by the PBoC and the cent-
ral government is measured by the quadratic cost2 CWt =
ψW
2
(
LWt
LCBt
− 1
)2
LCBt ,
i.e. deviations from the central bank’s guided loan amount, LCBt induce costs,
with ψW being a cost parameter. Assuming a market of perfect competition one
could maximise the representative bank’s cash of flows:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
(
βB
)t


RL,Wt L
W
t +R
B
t Bt + η˜tR
R
t D
W
t −R
D,W
t D
W
t −R
IB
t IBt − L
W
t+1
−Bt+1 + (1− η˜t+1)D
W
t+1 + IBt+1 − C
W
t


(5.17)
subject to the balance sheet of the commercial bank:
IBt +D
W
t = η˜tD
W
t + L
W
t (5.18)
where βB is the discount factor for the commercial bank, RRt denotes the interest
rate of required reserves deposited at the central bank, RIBt is the interbank interest
rate, or “Shibor” in China, and IBt is net borrowing in the non-regulated interbank
market such that in equilibrium IB = 0. The problem can be solved by maximising
a one-period profit that is obtained by substituting equation (5.18) into (5.17):
FCt ≡
(
RL,Wt −R
IB
t
)
LWt −
(
RD,Wt − η˜tR
R
t − (1− η˜t)R
IB
t
)
DWt − C
W
t (5.19)
which are rebated to patient households in equation (5.2).
The FOCs with respect to Lt and Dt read:
RL,Wt = R
IB
t + ψ
W
(
LWt
LCBt
− 1
)
(5.20)
RD,Wt = η˜tR
R
t + (1− η˜t)R
IB
t (5.21)
Commercial banks are assumed to be able to have unlimited access to the lending
2It is considered that L = LCB in the steady state, so that the cost is zero.
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facility operated by the central bank, therefore interbank interest rate, known as
Shibor in China, is equal to the benchmark interest rate, RIBt = Rt.
5.2.4.2 Retail sector
Retail sector consists of a representative loan branch and deposit branch. The
loan branch receives wholesale loans, LWt , at the rate, R
L,W
t , from the wholesale
sector, differentiates them at no costs and makes them to impatient households.
Each loan branch, j, has some monopoly power and sets the market aggregated
loan rate, RL,Mt , by maximising the present discount value of profits:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
Λt
{(
RL,Mt (j)− 1
)
Lt (j)−
(
RL,Wt − 1
)
LWt (j)
}
s.t. Lt (j) =
(
RL,Mt (j)− 1
RL,Mt − 1
)−ǫ˜Lt
Lt (5.22)
where equation (5.22) is the demand function for bank loans to impatient house-
holds, according to Gerali et al. (2010). ǫ˜Lt > 1 is the stochastic interest elasticity
of demand for loans, and determines the interest spreads between market and
policy rates. Allowing the elasticity to be a time-varying parameter reflects the
degree of bank’s independence of central bank’s monetary policy. This is consist-
ent with the situation in China where the central bank has removed the control on
the retail loan rates. Given Lt (j) = L
W
t (j) and imposing symmetry equilibrium,
the FOC yields the following:
RL.Mt − 1 =
ǫ˜Lt
ǫ˜Lt − 1
(
RL,Wt − 1
)
(5.23)
The deposit branch is similar to the loan branch. A representative deposit branch
of a commercial bank, j, collects deposits Dt (j) from patient households and
transfers them to the wholesale sector as DWt (j) at the aggregate rate, R
D,W
t .
Also, the deposit branch operates at a monopolistically competitive market and
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sets the market deposit rates at RD,Mt . The present discount value of profits for
deposit branch is maximised as below:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
Λt
{(
RD,Wt − 1
)
DWt (j)−
(
RD,Mt (j)− 1
)
Dt (j)
}
s.t. Dt (j) =
(
RD,Mt (j)− 1
RD,Mt − 1
)−ǫ˜Dt
Dt (5.24)
where equation (5.24) is the CES-form demand function for deposits, and ǫ˜Dt < −1
is the interest elasticity of demand for deposits. Similar to ǫ˜Lt , it is assumed to be
stochastic to describe China’s economy after freeing the control of deposit rates in
late 2015. The FOC given Dt (j) = D
W
t (j) and after imposing symmetry reads:
RD,Mt − 1 =
ǫ˜Dt
ǫ˜Dt − 1
(
RD,Wt − 1
)
(5.25)
The equations above regarding to commercial banks determine the market interest
rates on loans and deposits. Although the PBoC has been freeing the controls on
both rates, it still publishes the benchmark deposit and loan rates which banks
are all likely to follow. Therefore, there are still some deviations between actual
and market-determined deposit and loan rates, which is discussed as below.
5.2.5 Monetary policy
The market and non-market based monetary policies instruments adopted in this
model are described and used in Chen et al. (2012) and Funke & Paetz (2012).
As was pointed out in the national 13-th five-year plan, the central bank and the
central government are phasing out the quantity-based monetary policy instru-
ments. Macroeconomic regulations and controls in future tend to rely more on the
price-based methods. The PBoC sets the benchmark interest rate based on the
interest rate in past period, inflation and output. Suppose that the PBoC sets the
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benchmark interest rate following a Taylor-type rule:
Rt = R
φr
t−1
(
R
(
Πt
Π¯
)φπ (Yt
Y
)φy)(1−φr)
exp (ǫrt ) (5.26)
where Rt is the policy interest rate set by the central bank, Π¯ denotes the inflation
target and ǫrt captures the interest-rate shock. The parameters, φs, measure the
preferences with respect to lagged policy rate, inflation, output gap, respectively.
However, the PBoC does not publish the benchmark interest rate, but the bench-
mark deposit and loan rates respectively. The benchmark deposit and loan rates
are assumed to follow the modified forms of the Taylor rule above:
RD,CBt =
(
RD,CBt−1
)φdr (
RD,CB
Rt
R
)(1−φdr)
(5.27)
RL,CBt =
(
RL,CBt−1
)φlr (
RL,CB
Rt
R
)(1−φlr)
(5.28)
To distinguish between the deposit and loan rates set by the central bank and
those by the market forces in the commercial banks sector, a subscript of CB
is interpreted as the central-bank rates. RD,CBt and R
L,CB
t therefore, denote and
central-bank benchmark deposit and loan rates, respectively.
As stated earlier, although China has removed the control of interest rates on loans
and deposits, the PBoC keeps publishing the benchmark deposit and loan rates
which banks tend to follow in order to minimise the potential risk. Commercial
banks in China, have not set interest rates independently. In line of this, the actual
interest rates of deposits and loans faced by patient and impatient households, are
defined as a weighted geometric average between the central-bank rates and the
market-determined rates:
RDt =
(
RD,Mt
)φD (
RD,CBt
)1−φD
(5.29)
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RLt =
(
RL,Mt
)φL (
RL,CBt
)1−φL
(5.30)
where the weight parameters, 0 < φD, φL < 1, measure the degree of interest
rate deregulation. For example, φD = 0 means a fully controlled deposit rates set
by the central bank, whilst actual deposit rates are determined by market forces
when φD = 1. The floor of loan rates and the ceiling of deposit rates were removed
in 2013 and 2015, respectively. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to set φD and φL to be
equal to 1, as commercial banks still tend to follow current policy rates in order
to minimise risks.
In addition, the PBoC imposes the administrative window guidance for bank loans.
Credit supply is controlled by setting the target, LCBt , to guide the amount and
direction of bank loans. Assume the credit supply target follows a Taylor-type
rule used by Funke & Paetz (2012):
LCBt =
(
LCBt−1
)φcb
l

LCB (Lt
L
)φl
l
[(
Πt
Π¯
)φπ
l
(
Yt
Y
)φy
l
]1−φl
l


1−φcb
l
(5.31)
where φs are parameters capturing the preferences of the central bank. Note that
φπl and φ
y
l are negative as inflation and output over the target and potential levels
would reduce the growth of credit supply in order to cool down the economy.
φcbl > 0 smooths the fluctuations of the loan targets. The window guidance is also
known as one of macroprudential policy tools to maintain financial stability.
In addition to the regulated deposit and loan rates and the window guidance, the
PBoC employs the market-based monetary policy tool, the required reserve ratio
for example, to manage the amount of money supply. The required reserve ratio,
according to Chen et al. (2012) and Gerali et al. (2010), is considered to follow
the rule:
η˜t = η˜
φηη
t−1
(
η˜
(
Πt
Π¯
)φπη)1−φηη
exp (uηt ) (5.32)
where φs, as before, denote the parameters reflecting central bank’s preferences,
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and uηt captures the required-reserve-ratio shock. Required reserve ratio, according
to the above rule, is set based on inflation and the lagged ratio on its own.
Lastly, the interest rate of required reserves deposited at the central bank, RRt , is
assumed to passively follow the benchmark rate.
5.2.5.1 Shocks
To close the model, all the shocks except the interest-rate shock are set to follow
the AR (1) process, i.e. ujt = ρju
j
t−1+ ǫ
j
j. The interest-rate shock is assumed to be
a white-noise process.
5.2.5.2 Log-linearised equations
With goods market clearing condition Yt = Ct + It, where Ct ≡ C
P
t + C
E
t , gen-
eral equilibrium dynamics around the steady state levels can be derived from the
equations above. Assuming inflation in the steady state equals the inflation tar-
get, Π = Π¯, the steady states of the variables can be computed. For example, the
steady state from equation (5.3) yields RD =
Π¯
βP
. The model is then log-linearised
around the steady state, as shown in the Appendix.
5.2.6 Model estimation
Estimating the DSGE models regarding to China can be challenging due to the
absence of some key data as well as structural changes. In the previous chapter,
calibration method is adopted, which is used by numerous DSGE papers focusing
on China. However, the availability of China’s quarterly data since 1996 has
improved a lot, therefore a Bayesian approach to estimate some parameters of
the central bank’s policy is possible, and even necessary to yield more reliable
results. In this chapter, some well-known parameters are calibrated following the
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related model in the literature or according to the steady state equations with
the mean of real data, whilst others are estimated using Bayesian methods. As
this chapter aims to analyse China’s economy in terms of financial repression and
liberalisation, the period selected covers 1996Q1 until 2015Q4, when progress of
financial liberalisation as well as sustainable economic growth is witnessed.
5.2.6.1 Calibration
Some well-known parameters are calibrated according to the similar model in
existing research work, as well as the steady state equations. The calibrated para-
meters are summarised in Table 5.1. All the variables without a time subscript
t refer to the steady state levels. Some parameters have same values as in the
last chapter. For example, the parameters measuring the relative risk aversion of
patient and impatient households are both equal to 2, i.e. σP = σE = 2. The
inverse of wage elasticity of labour supply, or the inverse of Frisch elasticity is cal-
ibrated as φ =
1
3
as in the previous chapter. Funke & Paetz (2012) suggest the net
mark-up of final over intermediate goods to be 10%, indicating that X = 1.1, and
set the parameter measuring the adjustment cost for installing new capital goods
to be 2, i.e. ψK = 2. The cost parameter measuring the window guidance for loan
targets, ψW , is set to be 1, according to Funke & Paetz (2012). Similar to previous
chapter, the depreciation rate of capital, δ = 0.04, is set following Zhang (2009).
Also, summing up the data of individual provinces yields the approximation of
national level of GDP, where labour income accounts for 47% of total income,
meaning α = 1 − 0.47 = 0.53. In addition, the central bank’s policy parameters
measuring the central bank’s window guidance for bank loans are obtained from
Funke & Paetz (2012), due to the unavailability of the data for target loans, LCBt ,
which suggests that φcbl = 0.5, φ
l
l = 0.3, φ
π
l = −50 and φ
y
l = −5. The weighted
parameters measuring the degree of deposit and loan rates deregulation, φD and
φL, are initially set to be 0.6.
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Table 5.1: Calibrated parameters
Description Calibrated value
Relative risk aversion of household σP = σE = 2
Inverse of Frisch elasticity φ = 1/3
Mark-up of final over intermediate goods X = 1.1
Adjustment cost parameter for new investment ψK = 2
Adjustment cost parameter for window guidance ψW = 1
Capital depreciation rate δ = 4%
Output elasticity of capital α = 0.53
Weights measuring interest rate liberalisation φD = 0.6, φL = 0.6
Window guidance rule φcbl = 0.5, φ
l
l = 0.3
φπl = −50, φ
y
l = −5
The policy interest rate is often referred to as the 7-day interbank offered rate
in China. In this model, the 7-day Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (Shibor) is
selected. However, as the Shibor was established in late 2006, the 7-day China
Interbank Offered Rate (Chibor) is used for the period from 1996 to 2006. The
equilibrium level of net annual policy rate is set according to the mean of the
interbank offered rate, which is 3.76%, meaning that RIB = R =
3.76%
400%
+ 1 =
1.0094, which is the aggregate quarterly level. The net annual interest rate on
required reserves is lower than the policy rate in China, with the mean of 2.65%
during this period. The average quarterly inflation rate is 2.07% at the annual rate,
whilst the deposit and lending rates published by the central bank in equilibrium
is 3.28% and 6.39%, respectively. Also, the required reserve ratio in equilibrium
is 12%, according to the data published by the PBoC.
The steady state equations of (5.20) and (5.21) give the steady state levels of
wholesale loan and deposit rates, i.e. RL,W = RIB and RD,W = η˜RR+(1− η˜)RIB.
The interest elasticity of demand for bank loans in equilibrium, ǫ˜L, is calibrated to
be 2.8, indicating the steady-sate expressions for mark-up over the policy interest
rate to be around 1.56. In fact, since the PBoC eventually removed the control on
loan rates in July 2013, the Loan Prime Rate (LPR) has started to be published
every day where the price quotation group consists of nine main commercial banks
in China, and is to some extent considered as the market determined loan rate. The
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Table 5.2: Calibrated steady state levels
Description Calibrated steady state value
Annual inflation rate 2.07%
Annual interbank offered rate (policy rate) 3.76%
Annual interest rate on required reserves 2.65%
Central bank annual lending rate 6.39%
Central bank annual deposit rate 3.28%
Interest elasticity of demand for bank loans ǫ˜L = 2.8
Interest elasticity of demand for bank deposits ǫ˜D = −20
Required reserve ratio η˜ = 12%
Loan to income ratio L/Y = 1.08
mark-up of 1.56 is consistent with the relationship between LPR and the interbank
rate during this period. The deposit rate control was removed in late 2015, and
no market determined rate is available at present. Nevertheless, it is believed that
actual deposit rate will increase in response of the removal of deposit rate ceilings.
In spirit of this, ǫ˜D in this chapter is set to be -20, meaning a 0.17% interest rate
spread between the wholesale deposit rate and the market retail deposit rate3.
Thus, the market determined interest rates on loans and deposits in steady state
can be computed according to equations (5.23) and (5.25). Furthermore, as actual
deposit and loan rates are considered in equations (5.29) and (5.30) as a geometric
weighted average between the central bank rate and the market rate, their steady
state levels, RD and RL, can be obtained accordingly. The weighted parameters,
φD and φL, are initially set to be 0.6, which yields the intertemporal discount
factors of patient and impatient households to be βP =
Π
RD
= 0.997 and βE =
Π
RL
= 0.990. The loan to income ratio,
L
Y
, in equilibrium is 1.08 based on the data
of bank loans and GDP. Calibrated steady state levels are provided in Table 5.2
and 5.3.
The steady state equations of the model also give the consumption to income
3Since RD,W = η˜RR + (1− η˜)RIB = 1.009067 and the markdown
ǫ˜D
ǫ˜D − 1
in the steady
state are known, RD,M is therefore equal to
(
RD,W − 1
) ǫ˜D
ǫ˜D − 1
+ 1 = 1.008635 according to
equation (5.25), indicating that the interest rate spread between the wholesale deposit rate and
the market retail deposit rate is (1.009067− 1.008635)× 400% = 0.17%.
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Table 5.3: Selected levels of steady state variables and key parameters
Description Calibrated value
Mark-up on loan rates
ǫ˜L
ǫ˜L − 1
= 1.56
Mark-down on deposit rates
ǫ˜D
ǫ˜D − 1
= 0.95
Discount factor of patient households βP =
Π
RD
= 0.997
Discount factor of impatient households βE =
Π
RL
= 0.990
Investment to income ratio
I
Y
= 0.385
Consumption of impatient households to income ratio
CE
Y
= 0.086
Consumption of patient households to income ratio
CP
Y
= 0.529
ratio as well as the investment to income ratio, as indicated in Table 5.3. For
impatient households, the consumption to income ratio in equilibrium is obtained
from equations (5.6) and (5.10), which is
CE
Y
=
α
X
+
(
1−
1
βE
)
L
Y
−
I
Y
, where
I
Y
=
δK
Y
=
δα
X
[
1
βE
− (1− δ)
]−1
according to equation (5.11). Thus, the consumption
to income ratio for patient households in equilibrium is
CP
Y
= 1−
CE
Y
−
I
Y
.
5.2.6.2 Bayesian estimation
Data To estimate the remaining parameters in the model, eight macroeconomic
variables are selected as observables for the period of 1996Q1 to 2015Q4. Table 5.4
describes the construction and sources of the data used for estimation. Data
are seasonally adjusted. In addition, as the log-linearised model is used in this
chapter, all the variables thus represent the percentage deviations (or absolute
deviations) from the steady state. Consequently, the original non-stationary data
are detrended using the one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ = 1600)4 developed
by Stock & Watson (1999). Stationary data are subtracted by their mean, such
as inflation, money growth rate and interest rates. The data after transformation
4Chapter 4 uses the same method and Pfeifer (2014) discussed the advantage of the backward-
looking one-sided HP filter against the two-sided one for DSGE estimation.
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Figure 5.1: Observable variables used in estimation
Note: The names of variables in the legends above indicate the percentage deviations
(or absolute deviations) from the HP trend using the one-sided HP filter with λ = 1600.
All the data are demeaned and detrended before entering the estimation process.
are plotted in Figure 5.1.
Prior distributions In addition to the calibrated parameters, the remaining
parameters measuring the central bank’s policy decisions and driving the model
dynamics are estimated using the Bayesian estimation, where priors play a vital
rule. The choice of prior distributions in this model relies on current literature
or they are relatively uninformative. For example, Smets & Wouters (2003) and
Gerali et al. (2010) suggest a Beta distribution for smoothing parameters such
as φr, φ
d
r , φ
l
r and φ
η
η, where the domain is [0, 1). The parameters measuring
the response of policy rate deviations to inflation and output, φπ and φy, are
assumed to have priors of gamma distribution. As to the required-reserved-ratio
rule in the DSGE model for Bayesian estimating, this model follows the idea of
Gerali et al. (2010) and sets prior distribution of the parameter, φπη , to be Gamma
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Table 5.4: Description of data
Name Description
Output, Yt Real quarterly GDP is obtained by deflating nominal GDP by the CPI.
Source: Oxford economics via Datastream and National Bureau of Statistics of China website.
Consumption, Ct Real quarterly consumption is obtained by deflating nominal private consumption by the CPI.
Source: Oxford economics via Datastream and National Bureau of Statistics of China website.
Investment, It Real investment is obtained by deflating gross fixed capital formation by the CPI.
Source: Oxford economics via Datastream and National Bureau of Statistics of China website.
Inflation, Πt Consumer Price Index is used to represent the price level. Inflation is defined as the quarterly difference at
the annual rate.
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators via Datastream
Policy interest rate, Rt 7-day Shibor from 2007 to 2015, while Chibor was used between 1996 and 2006. Daily gross rates are taken
arithmetic average to construct quarterly data.
Source: the PBoC website and shibor.org.
Central bank deposit rate, RD,CBt 1-year deposit rate published by the PBoC. Daily data are taken arithmetic average to construct quarterly
data.
Source: the PBoC website.
Central bank loan rate, RL,CBt 1-year loan rate published by the PBoC. Daily data are taken arithmetic average to construct quarterly
data.
Source: the PBoC website.
Required reserve ratio, η˜t Required reserve ratio on large financial institutions, published by the PBoC.
Source: the PBoC website.
Note: Data of inflation, output and money growth are seasonally adjusted. All the interest rates and inflation data are transformed into the quarterly gross rates.
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Table 5.5: Prior and posterior distribution of structural parameters
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Parameter Distribution Mean Standard deviation Mean 90% HPD interval Median
θ Gamma 0.50 0.10 0.371 [0.283,0.460] 0.373
τ Gamma 0.50 0.10 0.483 [0.320,0.646] 0.483
φr Beta 0.75 0.10 0.915 [0.890,0.941] 0.916
φπ Gamma 2.00 0.50 2.202 [1.597,2.788] 2.163
φy Gamma 0.10 0.02 0.060 [0.040,0.079] 0.059
φdr Beta 0.75 0.10 0.607 [0.474,0.747] 0.607
φlr Beta 0.75 0.10 0.847 [0.780,0.916] 0.850
φηη Beta 0.75 0.10 0.951 [0.929,0.972] 0.951
φπη Gamma 50.00 0.50 49.977 [49.146,50.806] 49.976
Note: 1. Results of posterior means are obtained by running 10 chains of Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm, each with 100,000 draws, of which the first 20% are dropped; 2. The average accept-
ance rate for 10 chains is 23.49%; 3. HPD interval refers to the highest posterior density credible
interval, which is the shortest interval among all intervals that are 90% credible.
distribution with a standard deviation of 0.5, so that it is strictly positive. In
addition, Smets & Wouters (2003) and Gerali et al. (2010) consider the interest-
rate shock to be a white noise, whilst all the other shocks follow the AR(1) process
and the autoregressive parameters have a strict prior distribution with a mean of
0.8 and a standard deviation of 0.1. The standard deviation of each driving force
is equipped with the inverse-Gamma distribution, which is in favour of literature,
with the mean of 0.01 and the standard deviation of 0.05. Table 5.5 and 5.6
summarise the prior distributions with means and standard deviations for all the
structural and autoregressive parameters and the standard deviations of exogenous
driving forces.
Posterior estimates The Bayesian rule suggests that p (ϑ | Y) ∝ L (ϑ | Y) p (ϑ),
where the likelihood function L (∗) is computed using the Kalman filter. Table 5.5
and 5.6 also report the results of posterior estimates. The statistics of posteriors of
the estimated parameters reported in the tables are obtained using the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm to generate 10 chains, each of which contains 100,000 draws.
The average acceptance rate for 10 chains is 23.49%, which is closed to the optimal
ratio of 23.4% suggested by Roberts et al. (1997). The first 20% of draws were
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Table 5.6: Prior and posterior distribution of AR (1) parameters and shocks
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Parameter Distribution Mean Standard deviation Mean 90% HPD interval Median
ρh Beta 0.80 0.10 0.833 [0.680,0.975] 0.856
ρk Beta 0.80 0.10 0.911 [0.846,0.974] 0.919
ρa Beta 0.80 0.10 0.839 [0.698,0.982] 0.858
ρc Beta 0.80 0.10 0.805 [0.654,0.959] 0.818
ρǫL Beta 0.80 0.10 0.871 [0.808,0.941] 0.875
ρǫD Beta 0.80 0.10 0.868 [0.752,0.963] 0.892
ρη Beta 0.80 0.10 0.506 [0.366,0.645] 0.504
Standard deviation of shocks
σh Inv.Gamma 0.01 0.05 0.010 [0.002,0.020] 0.007
σk Inv.Gamma 0.01 0.05 0.105 [0.089,0.119] 0.104
σa Inv.Gamma 0.01 0.05 0.004 [0.002,0.006] 0.004
σc Inv.Gamma 0.01 0.05 0.006 [0.002,0.009] 0.005
σǫ
L
Inv.Gamma 0.01 0.05 0.159 [0.137,0.180] 0.158
σǫ
D
Inv.Gamma 0.01 0.05 0.004 [0.003,0.006] 0.004
σr Inv.Gamma 0.01 0.05 0.002 [0.0015,0.0020] 0.002
ση Inv.Gamma 0.01 0.05 0.044 [0.038,0.050] 0.044
Note: 1. Results of posterior means are obtained by running 10 chains of Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm, each with 100,000 draws, of which the first 20% are dropped; 2. The average accept-
ance rate for 10 chains is 23.49%; 3. HPD interval refers to the highest posterior density credible
interval, which is the shortest interval among all intervals that are 90% credible.
144
dropped when computing the statistics. According to the results, the probabil-
ity of the retailers who do not adjust prices, θ, is 0.371, suggesting that retailers
adjust prices frequently. The degree of indexation to previous inflation, τ , is
0.483. The smoothing parameter of the previous interest rate, φr, is 0.915, whilst
φπ = 2.202 > 1 indicates an aggressive approach to inflation, and the PBoC con-
siders little about the output gap when adjusting the interest rate because of a
small φy of 0.06 only. This estimation result of the Taylor rule is consistent with
that when using the GMM method. Also, all the shocks are very persistent except
for the required-reserve-ratio shock, uηt , with the autoregressive parameter being
0.506. Figure 5.2 plots the kernel estimates of prior and posterior marginal densit-
ies for the structural parameters5. According to Gerali et al. (2010), deviations of
the mean of posteriors from that of priors indicate that a parameter is identified.
All the structural parameters are well defined. The results show weak identifica-
tion of τ and φπη . The results of the required-reserve-ratio rule are in favour of the
GMM estimation result, with the smoothing parameter, φηη, being quite persistent
and φπη = 49.977, confirming the main objective is to restrict inflation. Finally, the
results are relative stable and converged according to the convergence statistics
proposed by Brooks & Gelman (1998).
5.3 Impulse response analysis
5.3.1 Window guidance for bank loans
To illustrate the impact of the window guidance rule for bank loans, Figure 5.3
compares the impulse responses to productivity and cost-push shocks6 in the pres-
5The prior and posterior marginal densities for the autoregressive parameters and the stand-
ard deviations of shocks are presented in the Appendix.
6Impulse responses analysis hereafter in this chapter, unless otherwise specified, indicates the
impulse responses to positive shocks with the size of one standard deviation.
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Figure 5.2: Prior and Posterior marginal distributions of structural parameters
ence of the window guidance (ψW = 1) and when the window guidance rule is
removed (ψW = 0). It shows that overall imposing the window guidance rule re-
duces the fluctuations of inflation, and imposes a significant control on the growth
of bank loans. Also, a positive productivity shock increases the initial response
of output when the window guidance takes effect, and the response lasts longer
as well. Similar results can be obtained from consumption and investment, whilst
interest rate experiences less volatility when considering the window guidance con-
trol. In addition, a positive cost-push shock boosts inflation, leading to a sharp
rise in interest rate as the central bank tightens the monetary policy. As a res-
ult, investment and consumption fall down, and output drops as well. Besides,
an upward deposit rate attracts more household savings, thus resulting in an up-
turn in bank loans as commercial banks convert deposits into loans. However,
this increase is offset by introducing the control of credit quotas, i.e. the window
guidance, as commercial banks have to follow the loan targets set by the central
bank. The window guidance rule also helps reduce the volatility of inflation and
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lowers the increase of interest rate, but brings more volatility in consumption and
investment, as well as output. Consequently, the window guidance rule controls
the loan growth of commercial banks, helps reduce inflation, but gives rise to the
volatility of the economy.
5.3.2 Deposit and loan rates liberalisation
The interest rate liberalisation progress of deposit and loan rates can be reflected
by changing the weighted parameters, φD and φL, in equations (5.29) and (5.30).
In the following analysis, three scenarios are considered, namely strict and mild
controls as well as the full liberalised case. For simplicity, φD and φL are set to be
equal. The results show that the effects of deregulation is affected by the window
guidance rule.
Scenario 1 Strict control of deposit and loan rates : φD = φL = 0.1.
Scenario 2 Mild control of deposit and loan rates: φD = φL = 0.6.
Scenario 3 Full liberalisation of deposit and loan rates: φD = φL = 1.
The impulse responses to productivity and cost-push shocks are presented in Fig-
ure 5.4, in which the central bank does not use the window guidance for bank loans.
When deposit and loan rates are both fully liberalised, output increases higher in
response to a productivity shock, together with an upturn of investment, as shown
in Figure 5.4a. Freeing the controls of deposit and lending rates makes both rates
more sensitive to shocks. Lowering deposit rates reduces the household savings,
thus bank loans increases less after considering the fall of loan rates. Inflation ex-
periences smaller fluctuations given a productivity shock with market-determined
interest rates, and this is also confirmed from a cost-push shock in Figure 5.4b.
However, a cost-push shock leads to a significantly higher volatility of output and
investment when deposit and loan rates are fully determined by markets. Bank
loans climb gradually as investment recovers. Besides, increasing inflation calls
for a higher policy rates due to a more aggressive monetary policy, and results in
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Figure 5.3: Impulse responses to productivity and cost-push shocks
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an uplift in deposit and loan rates. The deregulation of deposit and loan rates
makes both more volatile. Therefore, the policy rate adjusted by the central bank
more actively affects the market-determined deposit and loan rates, making the
transmission channels more effective and powerful.
Figure 5.5 plots the impulse responses to the two shocks under the window guid-
ance. The same effects of deposit and loan rates liberalisation can be detected,
but with small differences. Output and investment response more strongly due
to the liberalisation and inflation decreases less but recovers to the steady state
slightly more slowly. In fact, the window guidance boosts the impact of a pro-
ductivity shock in Figure 5.5a, with the initial response of output lifted by nearly
2% compared to Figure 5.4a. Also, investment has a stronger initial response as
well, whilst inflation is less volatile. Similarly, the impacts of a cost-push shock on
output and investment are strengthened considerably by introducing the window
guidance, as shown in Figure 5.5b. Also, there is little difference between scenarios
2 and 3 when the windows guidance is introduced. Inflation fluctuates smaller in
the presence of the window guidance, and deregulations of loan and deposit rates
yield fewer changes except for loan rates in response to a productivity shock, where
the effectiveness of the monetary policy is improved under the window guidance
rule by amplifying the effect of loan rates. The result suggests that the window
guidance helps, to some degree, stabilise loan and deposit rates and reduce the
volatility of inflation after deregulation.
5.3.3 Monetary policy
This model includes a Taylor-type interest rate rule and the impulse responses to
an interest-rate shock are plotted in Figure 5.6. The interest rate rule plays a role
that is similar to last chapter when the window guidance is turned off. Output
initially reduces in response to an interest-rate shock, and recovers to the steady
state afterwards, according to the solid (red) line in Figure 5.6. Consumption and
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Figure 5.5: Impulse responses to shocks in the presence of window guidance
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Figure 5.6: Impulse responses to an interest-rate shock
investment perform similarly to output, with a decrease at first. Inflation falls
as well, so as to meet the objective of cooling the economy implemented by the
central bank. Commercial banks have more deposits due to an increase in the
deposit rate, as well as a fall in consumption, and bank loans converted from the
deposits shoot up. However, the interest rate rule yields unusual results when
the window guidance is included, as shown in the dashed (blue) lines. Investment
goes up in response to an increase in the policy rate, resulting an upward shift
in output. One possible reason is that a positive policy-rate shock increases the
deposit rate and therefore attracts more deposits to be converted into bank loans.
As a consequence, loan rates at the wholesale level drop in order to meet the loan
target, and actual loan rate falls given that it is mainly determined by the market
(φL = 0.6 in this case). In addition, the interest rate rule still works to contain
inflation as well when the window guidance rule is adopted.
It is acknowledged that the PBoC actively uses the required reserve ratio as an-
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Figure 5.7: Impulse responses to a required-reserve-ratio shock
other monetary policy rule. The impulse responses to a positive shock of required
reserve ratio is plotted in Figure 5.7. A positive shock of required reserve ratio
reduces bank loans and investment, and interest rate goes up as well. However,
the required reserve ratio is not very helpful to stabilise output when the window
guidance is away, due to a surge in consumption, and makes little contribution to
reducing inflation in both cases. Thus the required reserve ratio is a poor instru-
ment to control inflation and output, but is useful to maintain bank loan levels.
Sinclair & Sun (2015) reached a similar conclusion.
5.4 Modified Taylor rule
Now consider that the PBoC sets benchmark interest rate based on the policy
rate in the last period, inflation and output, as well as the nominal money growth.
The nominal money growth rate, g˜t, is defined as Mt = (1 + g˜t)Mt−1, where
153
Mt = PtMt is the nominal money supply. Therefore,
Mt = (1 + g˜t)
Mt−1
Πt
(5.33)
Suppose that the PBoC sets the benchmark interest rate following a modified
Taylor-type rule:
Rt = R
φr
t−1
(
R
(
Πt
Π¯
)φπ (Yt
Y
)φy (1 + g˜t−1
1 + g˜
)φg)(1−φr)
exp (ǫrt ) (5.34)
where Rt is the policy interest rate set by the central bank, Π¯ denotes the inflation
target and ǫrt captures the interest-rate shock. The parameters, φs, measure the
preferences with respect to lagged policy rate, inflation, output gap and last-
period nominal money growth, respectively. Nominal money growth enters the
Taylor rule due to the annual M2 growth target set by the PBoC and the central
government. Also, in case of an increase in the money demand, the central bank
usually adopts an accommodative monetary policy to boost the economy. The
monetary policy equation thus takes it into consideration. φg > 0 measures the
magnetites of money growth control by the PBoC. The GMM estimation suggests
that φg = 0.31, suggesting a 31-base-point increase in policy rate in response to a
1% increase in last-period nominal money growth.
In addition, money variable is introduced into the utility function of patient house-
holds and equation (5.1) now reads:
maxE0
{
∞∑
t=0
(
βP
)t( 1
1− σP
(
CPt
)1−σP
−
1
1 + φ
(Nt)
1+φ +
1
1− γ
(Mt)
1−γ
)}
(5.35)
where Mt is the real money balances, and γ measures the inverse of elasticity of
real money holdings, which is calibrated to be 3 in the following analysis.
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The budget constraint in equation (5.2) is now:
CPt +Dt +Mt =
RDt−1Dt−1
Πt
+WtNt +
Mt−1
Πt
+ FRt + F
C
t (5.36)
The FOC with respect to Mt gives:
M−γt
(
CPt
)σP
=
RDt − 1
RDt
(5.37)
The impulse responses of productivity and cost-push shocks are plotted in Fig-
ure 5.8, by assuming the window guidance is away in the economy. It indicates
that a modified Taylor rule with last-period money growth produces smaller fluc-
tuations in output, with a faster speed to recover to the steady state. However,
using the modified Taylor rule brings about more volatility of inflation, and the
fluctuations last longer as well in both cases.
5.5 Conclusion
It is acknowledged that the PBoC imposes a so-called window guidance rule to con-
trol bank loans. The result shows that the window guidance significantly controls
the commercial bank loans, helps reduce inflation in response of supply shocks,
but brings about more volatility of the economy. Besides, although both loan and
deposit rates were announced to be freely determined by the market, the PBoC
has not announced further steps about interest rate reforms and continues pub-
lishing the benchmark loan and deposit rates, which most commercial banks are
willing to follow. By changing the weighted parameters to reflect different degrees
of deregulation, this analysis shows that both deposit and lending rates are more
sensitive to exogenous shocks, and work to reduce the volatility of inflation. How-
ever, the effects of deregulation are significantly affected by the window guidance
rule. It makes little difference to the liberalisation process when both deposit
155
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
x 10−3 Output
 
 
With g Without g
0 5 10 15 20
−3
−2.5
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
x 10−3 Inflation
(a) Impulse responses to a productivity shock
0 5 10 15 20
−16
−14
−12
−10
−8
−6
−4
−2
x 10−4 Output
 
 
With g Without g
0 5 10 15 20
−5
0
5
10
15
x 10−4 Inflation
(b) Impulse responses to a cost-push shock
Figure 5.8: Impulse responses to productivity and cost-push shocks
156
and loan rates are largely freely determined by the market. Therefore, the PBoC
should gradually relax the control of bank loans and deregulate the deposit and
lending rates, so as to stabilise the economy when facing exogenous shocks.
A Taylor-type interest rate rule is assumed to be used by the PBoC when adjusting
the policy rate, and deposit and lending rates are associated with this rule as
well. Estimation from the data shows an aggressive Taylor rule is adopted by
the PBoC, where the main objective is to contain inflation. Overall the interest
rate rule works to maintain the stability of the economy, and it is more powerful
in terms of reducing the volatility of inflation without the window guidance rule.
In addition, a modified interest rate rule is used in this model to consider the
nominal money growth when the PBoC adjusts the interest rate. In fact, in the
latest 13th national five-year plan, China will reduce the use of quantity based
monetary policy tools like money growth. The modified Taylor rule, though keeps
output at a relatively stable level, brings about more volatility of inflation.
Lastly, unlike many advanced economies where the central bank rarely adjusts
the required reserve ratio, the PBoC actively uses it in order to control the li-
quidity. Bank loans are significantly reduced by raising the required reserve ratio.
However, the results based on this model show little evidence to control inflation
by introducing a positive shock in the required reserve ratio. Moreover, it helps
little to stabilise the economy regardless of the use of the window guidance rule.
The reason why the PBoC actively adjusts the required reserve ratio is to prevent
the money supply and bank credit from expanding excessively, as suggested by
McKinnon & Schnabl (2014). The effectiveness and necessity of the required re-
serve ratio as a macroprudential policy should be examined in an open economy
model in future research work.
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5.6 Appendix
5.6.1 Model log-linearisation
The lower-case variables except interest rates, inflation, required reserve ratio and
nominal money growth rate, hereafter denote the percentage derivations from the
steady states. For interest rates, inflation, required reserve ratio and money growth
rate, the lower-case letters represent absolute derivations.7 Assuming the upper-
case variables without a time subscript t refer to the levels of steady states, one
could log-linearise the model around the steady states.
Firstly, the FOCs of patient households in equations (5.3) and (5.4) can be log-
linearised as follows:
cPt = Etc
P
t+1 − σ
−1
P
(
rDt − Etπt+1 + u
h
t+1 − u
h
t
)
(5.38)
wt = σ
pcPt + φnt (5.39)
The budget constraints of impatient households in equations (5.6) and (5.7) and
the Cobb-Douglas function in equation (5.8), after log-linearisation, read:
CE
Y
cEt =
1
X
(yt − xt) +
L
Y
lt −
1− α
X
(wt + nt)−
L
Y
1
βE
(
rLt−1 + lt−1 − πt
)
−
I
Y
it
(5.40)
kt = (1− δ) kt−1 + δit (5.41)
yt = u
a
t + αkt−1 + (1− α)nt (5.42)
Similarly, a log-linear approximation of the representative impatient houseshold’s
FOCs in equations (5.9) (5.10) and (5.11) gives:
cEt = Etc
E
t+1 − σ
−1
E
(
rLt − Etπt+1 + u
h
t+1 − u
h
t
)
(5.43)
7For the required reserve ratio, η˜t, absolute deviations from the steady state are represented
by ηt = η˜t − η˜, where η˜ is the steady state level.
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it = kt−1 − u
k
t +
1
ψK
(
Etπt+1 − r
L
t
)
+ βE
(
Etu
k
t+1 + Etit+1 − kt
)
(5.44)
+
1− βE + βEδ
ψK
(Etyt+1 − kt − Etxt+1)
wt = yt − nt − xt (5.45)
Then, a log-linear approximation of the FOC of domestic goods retailers in equa-
tion (5.16) yields the Phillips curve. In addition, it allows the elasticity in the
demand function Yt (j) =
(
Pt (j)
Pt
)−ǫt
Y ft to be a time-varying parameter, ǫt, that
fluctuates around the steady state, which introduces a cost-push shock, as de-
scribed in Khan (2005). For simplify and following Chen et al. (2012), a cost-push
shock uct is augmented in the Phillips curve to follow the AR (1) process:
πt = τπt−1 + βP (Etπt+1 − τπt)−
(1− θ)
(
1− θβP
)
θ
xt + u
c
t (5.46)
The budget constraint faced by commercial banks is given by equation (5.18), with
the net position in the interbank market in equilibrium is zero. The constraint is
therefore,
ηt = (1− η˜) dt − (1− η˜) lt (5.47)
where the subscript W in deposits and loans are removed since it assumes that the
loans and deposits in the wholesale sector are equal to those in the retail sector.
In addition, the FOCs of the wholesale sector in equations (5.20) and (5.21) are
log-linearised as:8
rL,Wt = r
IB
t +
ψW
RIB
(
lt − l
CB
t
)
(5.48)
(
(1− η˜)RIB + η˜RR
)
rD,Wt =
(
RR −RIB
)
ηt + η˜R
RrRt + (1− η˜)R
IBrIBt (5.49)
Since banks have unlimited access to the lending facility, the following equation is
8In equation (5.49), a standard Taylor expansion for η˜t is used to calculate the absolute
deviation ηt:
1 + η˜t
1 + η˜
= 1 +
(
1
1 + η˜
)
(η˜t − η˜) = 1 +
ηt
1 + η˜
.
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included:
rIBt = rt (5.50)
The market-determined interest rates on loans and deposits are reflected by the
first order conditions in equations (5.23) and (5.25), with the log-linearised equa-
tions as below:
rL,Mt =
ǫL
ǫL − 1
rL,Wt + u
ǫL
t (5.51)
rD,Mt =
ǫD
ǫD − 1
rD,Wt + u
ǫD
t (5.52)
where
ǫL
ǫL − 1
is the markup on loan rates, and
ǫD
ǫD − 1
is the markdown on deposit
rates. uǫ
L
t and u
ǫD
t , assumed to be exogenous innovations to interest rate spreads,
denote the shocks of the markup on loan rates and the markdown on deposit rates,
respectively.
Central banks sets the benchmark deposit and loan rates, the window guidance
for credit target, as well as the required reserve ratio. Also, actual deposit and
loan rates are reflected by taking a weighted average of the market-determined
rates and the central bank benchmark rates. The rules are summarised from
equation (5.26) to equation (5.32). The log-linearised equations are:
rt = φrrt−1 + (1− φr) (φππt + φyyt) + ǫ
r
t (5.53)
rD,CBt = φ
d
rr
D,CB
t−1 +
(
1− φdr
)
rt (5.54)
rL,CBt = φ
l
rr
L,CB
t−1 +
(
1− φlr
)
rt (5.55)
rDt =
(
1− φD
)
rD,CBt + φ
DrD,Mt (5.56)
rLt =
(
1− φL
)
rL,CBt + φ
LrL,Mt (5.57)
lCBt = φ
cb
l l
CB
t−1 +
(
1− φcbl
) [
φlllt +
(
1− φll
)
(φπl πt + φ
y
l yt)
]
(5.58)
ηt/η˜ =
(
φηη/η˜
)
ηt−1 +
(
1− φηη
)
φπηπt + u
η
t (5.59)
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Next, the interest rate of required reserves deposited at the central bank, RRt , is
assumed to passively follow the benchmark rate:
rRt = rt (5.60)
Lastly, the market clearing condition after log-linearisation is:
yt =
CP
Y
cPt +
CE
Y
cEt +
I
Y
it (5.61)
and the aggregate consumption is outlined as:
ct =
CP
Y
1− I
Y
cPt +
(
1−
CP
Y
1− I
Y
)
cEt (5.62)
All the shocks, except the white-noise interest-rate shock, are assumed to follow
the AR (1) process:
uht = ρhu
h
t−1 + ǫ
h
t (5.63)
ukt = ρku
k
t−1 + ǫ
k
t (5.64)
uat = ρau
a
t−1 + ǫ
a
t (5.65)
uct = ρcu
c
t−1 + ǫ
c
t (5.66)
uǫ
L
t = ρǫLu
ǫL
t−1 + ǫ
ǫL
t (5.67)
uǫ
D
t = ρǫDu
ǫD
t−1 + ǫ
ǫD
t (5.68)
uηt = ρηu
η
t−1 + ǫ
η
t (5.69)
Equations (5.38) to (5.69) constitute a system of linear rational expectations dif-
ferences equations containing 32 endogenous variables, plus 8 exogenous driving
forces.
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5.6.2 Prior and posterior marginal densities
Figure 5.9 plots the kernel estimates of prior and posterior marginal densities for
the autoregressive parameters and the standard deviations of shocks.
Figure 5.9: Prior and Posterior marginal distributions
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Chapter 6
Investigating sources of real
exchange rate fluctuations
6.1 Introduction
One of the main concepts of financial liberalisation is exchange rate reform in
addition to interest rate liberalisation. The exchange rate system in China has
experienced several changes since 1978, each with distinct features. In fact, it is
very difficult to identify the exchange rate regime before 1994. A dual exchange
rate system was adopted between 1979 and 1993. The official exchange rate was
used for nontradable transactions whilst the international settlement rate was
applied to authorised merchandise trade between 1979 and 1984. After that, the
official exchange rate and the international settlement rate determined in swap
centres coexisted until 1994 (Wang, 2005). On 1 January 1994, China officially
announced the decision to implement a managed floating exchange rate system
with reference to the U.S. dollar. However, the exchange rate of RMB to U.S.
dollars was de facto fixed at 8.277 from 1998, as shown in Figure 6.1. On 21 July
2005, China embarked on a managed floating exchange rate system where the
RMB exchange rate is adjustable by referring to a basket of currencies, rather than
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Figure 6.1: Nominal and real exchange rates against U.S. dollars
pegged to U.S. dollars only (Cheng, 2013). The nominal exchange rate against the
dollar appreciated immediately by 2.1% on that day. Meanwhile, the daily range
of fluctuations was allowed to be ±0.3%, and later ±0.5% in May 2007. Although
the details of the basket of currencies remain unknown to the public, a continuous
appreciation of the exchange rate against U.S. dollars to 6.83 has been witnessed
since 2005 up to July 2008. During the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009,
the RMB was pegged to the dollar at 6.83 and started to appreciate gradually
from September 2009. The upward crawling peg against the U.S. dollar persisted
up to 6.12 in July 2015, and a minor depreciation was captured again after that.
Prasad et al. (2005) suggest that a more flexible exchange rate arrangement is
in China’s own interest in that China has been more exposed to various types of
macroeconomic shocks, and the flexibility helps to better adjust to such shocks
and facilitates a more independent monetary policy.
According to Huang & Guo (2007), the Chinese RMB has long been regulated dur-
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ing these years, so that identifying a path of exchange rate is challenging and even
impossible based on historical evidences. Moreover, real exchange rate is usually
related to the export price competitiveness. Therefore, it is vital to examine the
sources of real exchange rate movements and it has important implications for the
PBoC to make decisions about the future exchange rate reform.
The sources of real exchange rate variations have long been debated. Using a
disequilibrium approach, Dornbusch (1976) explains that the interaction of nom-
inal monetary shocks with sticky prices contributes to variations, whilst Stockman
(1987) argued that the fluctuations arise due to output market disequilibrium led
by real variables like productivity, labour supply and government expenditure. In
addition to the development of exchange rate regime, China has witnessed continu-
ous and rapid development during this period, with expected structural changes.
Therefore, supply shocks, i.e. a sudden shift in the supply curve, are expected to
be responsible for real exchange rate fluctuations during this period. Also, nom-
inal shocks, or monetary shocks equivalently, play a role in terms of high inflation.
China has undergone several periods of high inflation since the mid-1990s, with
an average annual inflation of above 10%. In addition, inflation rate surged again
during the subprime crisis in 2007-2008, and remained at 2-3% in recent years.
Lastly, real exchange rate is widely acknowledged to be driven by demand shocks
shifting the demand curve, as demand shocks eventually affect the prices of goods
and services.
In terms of a managed floating exchange rate regime that is currently adopted in
China, what are the main sources of real exchange rate movements and how im-
portant each type of structural shocks is responsible for the fluctuations in China?
This chapter seeks to answer this question by estimating a structural VAR model.
In the spirit of Blanchard & Quah (1989) where real exchange rate movements are
broken down and led by structural shocks in the economy, it follows Clarida &
Gali (1994) by considering three kinds of structural shocks including real relative
supply and demand shocks and nominal monetary shocks, and employs a trivari-
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ate structural VAR model to look into movements of real exchange rate, as well as
relative output and price levels. The model proposed by Clarida & Gali (1994) in
this chapter is modified by replacing the perfect capital mobility assumption, with
a more appropriate assumption that the mobility is not perfect. Technically, this
modification replaces the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition with a
balance of payments equation and introducing a parameter, κ, which denotes the
degree of capital mobility. Although it modifies the expected magnitudes of the
effects of the shocks on the underlying variables, it does not as it turns out, affect
any of the reduced form expected signs. Following that, The long-run restrictions
are imposed following Clarida & Gali (1994) in order to estimate the model us-
ing quarterly data covering 1995 until 2015. The results from impulse responses
analysis and variance decomposition suggest that real relative demand shocks are
the principal sources of real exchange rate fluctuations both temporarily and per-
manently, whilst relative supply and nominal shocks contribute to variations of
real exchange rate at a considerable level. In order to check the robustness of
the result, this chapter also looks at a sub-sample period between 2005Q3 until
2015Q2, during which the exchange rate system is managed floating with reference
of a group of different currencies. The results are overall consistent with the find-
ings from the model with a full sample size. Moreover, as model with quarterly
data is subject to insufficient observations, this chapter then uses monthly data
to estimate the model with long-run restrictions for the period between July 2005
and June 2015. According to the result, relative demand shocks are the principal
sources driving real exchange rate fluctuations, which is in favour of previous res-
ults. However, nominal monetary shocks are less important in driving variations
of real exchange rate than relative supply shocks, which is a different result from
previous findings using quarterly data. Following that, sign restrictions are im-
posed to identify supply and nominal shocks to compare the previous results and
the model with monthly data yields consistent result as that based on quarterly
data with long-run restrictions.
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This chapter is organised as follows. Following the introduction in this section,
Section 6.2 outlines and interprets the modified Clarida & Gali (1994) theoretical
framework, to allow for imperfect capital mobility, and Section 6.3 explains the
methodologies of estimating a structural VAR model. Data selection and some
preliminary analyses are presented in Section 6.4. Following that, Section 6.5 gives
the main empirical results based on quarterly data, together with a sub-sample
analysis. Monthly data are collected and used to compute the empirical results
with the application of both long-run and sign restrictions, as presented in Section
6.6. Section 6.7 concludes.
6.2 Theoretical framework
The model used in this study is a stochastic rational expectations open-economy
Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model developed by Clarida & Gali (1994) following
the work of Obstfeld et al. (1985). In this chapter the model is modified to allow for
the fact that China’s capital market are not fully integrated with the world capital
markets and therefore capital mobility is expected to be imperfect. Price rigidity
is assumed to be present in the short run, whilst money neutrality is posited in
the long run. All the variables except interest rates are in natural logarithms,
defined in terms of home country variable relative to foreign country equivalent.
For example, yt ≡ y
h
t − y
f
t . The open-economy IS equation is then defined as:
ydt = ηqt − σ (it − Et [pt+1 − pt]) + dt (6.1)
where ydt is the relative aggregate demand for output, qt is the real exchange rate, it
is the interest rate difference between home and foreign countries, pt is the relative
price of output, and dt denotes all the exogenous changes in the IS curve such as
fiscal shocks. The relative expected rate of inflation at time t, Et [pt+1 − pt] is to
keep up at time t+1. η, σ > 0 are parameters. The standard LM equation in the
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money market is given by:
mt − pt = yt − λit (6.2)
where mt is the relative demand for money, λ > 0 is a parameter of i.
In addition, the interest rate differential, it, in Clarida & Gali (1994) is determined
by the UIP condition, it = Et [et+1 − et], where the nominal interest rate differ-
ential of home and foreign country levels is equal to the expected changes in the
relative nominal exchange rate. In contrast, this chapter assumes China’s capital
market is less fully integrated with global markets. Thus the UIP relationship
is replaced by an equation of balance of payments. The nominal exchange rate
moves to bring about ex ante balance of payments equilibrium, which is given by:
τqt + κ (it −Et [et+1 − et]) = 0 (6.3)
where τ > 0 is a parameter and the other parameter, κ, denotes the degree of
capital mobility, which is assumed to be strictly greater than zero. When κ→∞
there is perfect capital mobility and the UIP condition holds.
Lastly, the relative price level in period t is described in the price-setting equation:
pt = (1− θ)Et−1p
∗
t + θp
∗
t (6.4)
According to the price-setting equation (6.4), prices are perfectly flexible when
θ = 1 and thus output is purely determined by the supply curve. If θ = 0,
however, prices are inflexible and predestined in the last period. In order to solve
the model, Clarida & Gali (1994) specified three stochastic processes driving the
relative output supply, yst , the exogenous changes in the IS curve, dt, and the
relative money, mt, in the following equations:
yst = y
s
t−1 + u
s
t (6.5)
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mt = mt−1 + u
n
t (6.6)
dt = dt−1 + u
d
t − γu
d
t−1 (6.7)
where ust , u
n
t and u
d
t are relative supply shocks, nominal shocks (or monetary shocks
equivalently) and relative non-monetary demand shocks, respectively. Supply and
nominal shocks are permanent due to the random walk settings in equation (6.5)
and equation (6.6). Demand shocks, however, consist of permanent and transitory
elements, and the transitory component is corrected in the next period, as shown
in equation (6.7).
The model can then be solved in a flexible-price equilibrium with rational expect-
ations where θ = 1. The long-run solutions are summarised in equations (6.8),
(6.9) and (6.10)1:
y∗t = y
s
t (6.8)
q∗t = (η + στ/κ)
−1 (yst − dt) + (η + στ/κ)
−1 (η + σ + στ/κ)−1 σγudt (6.9)
p∗t = mt − y
s
t − β (y
s
t − dt) + αγu
d
t (6.10)
where α = λ (η − (λτ/κ) (η + σ + στ/κ)) (1 + λ)−1 (η + στ/κ)−1 (η + σ + στ/κ)−1
and β = (λτ/κ) (η + στ/κ)−1.
According to the long-run solutions above and noting that the variables with a
superscript * indicate the long-run equilibrium levels, relative output responds
only to supply shocks, whilst demand shocks affect the level of the real exchange
rate and the relative price level. All the three variables in the long run are driven
by supply shocks, whilst nominal shocks are responsible for the variables in the
relative price level only. Clarida & Gali (1994) then considered the short-run
equilibrium when θ < 1, indicating the sluggish price adjustment. The price-
setting equation thus becomes:
pt = p
∗
t − (1− θ)
(
unt − (1 + β)u
s
t + (αγ + β)u
d
t
)
(6.11)
1See Appendix 6.8.1 for the details of both long-run and short-run solutions
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According to equation (6.11), the price level decreases in reaction to positive supply
shocks, but less than p∗t . Similarly, it increases but less than p
∗
t in response to
positive nominal and demand shocks. The real exchange rate under sluggish price
adjustment in the short period is described as:
qt = q
∗
t + ν (1− θ)
(
unt − (1 + β)u
s
t + (αγ + β)u
d
t
)
(6.12)
where ν = (1 + λ) ((λ+ σ) (1 + τ/κ) + η)−1. The real exchange rate under sticky
prices is driven by all the three structural shocks in the short run, with nominal
shocks suggest a positive temporary impact. Lastly, the IS equation in the short
run reads:
yt = y
∗
t + (η + σ + στ/κ) ν (1− θ)
(
unt − (1 + β)u
s
t + (αγ + β)u
d
t
)
(6.13)
where short-run relative output is affected by nominal and demand shocks, in
addition to supply shocks, which is different from the long run.
Equations (6.11), (6.12) and (6.13) summarise the stochastic open macro equilib-
rium where all the three structural shocks influence yt, qt and pt contemporan-
eously. However, as all the three variables are expected to converge to equilibrium
levels with flexible prices in the long run, Clarida & Gali (1994) then imposed three
restrictions on the equilibrium in the long run. To be specific, nominal shocks and
demand shocks have no permanent impacts on the relative output. Besides, nom-
inal shocks have no persistent effects on the real exchange rate, either. All the
short-run dynamics, however, are set to be freely determined.
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6.3 Econometric methodologies
6.3.1 The structural vector autoregression model
This chapter employs the structural vector autoregression (VAR) model that is
widely used to study the sources of real exchange rate fluctuations. Lastrapes
(1992) built a bivariate structural VAR model to study the sources of real ex-
change rate movements in terms of real and nominal shocks, whilst Clarida &
Gali (1994) constructed a trivariate structural VAR model to incorporate real de-
mand and supply shocks, as well as nominal monetary shocks in the analysis. As
was initially proposed by Sims (1980), VAR model serves as an alternative to the
conventional large-scale dynamic simultaneous models. Kilian (2011) discussed
numerous structural VAR models as well as alternative ways for identification of
shocks. To begin with, consider a K-dimensional time series xt, t = 1, 2, ...T , and
xt can be approximated in a VAR model with finite order p, which reads:
B0xt = B1xt−1 +B2xt−2 + ... +Bpxt−p + ut (6.14)
where B′s are parameter matrices and ut is a vector of structural shocks, with zero
mean and uncorrelated with each other. Equivalently, the model can be written
as:
B (L) xt = ut
where B (L) ≡ B0 − B1L − B2L
2 − ... − BpL
p is the autoregressive lag order
polynomial. The variance-covariance matrix of ut is usually normalised such that:
E
(
utu
T
t
)
= Σu = Ik
Therefore, the number of endogenous variables is equal to the number of structural
shocks. To estimate the model, the reduced-form should be derived by expressing
xt as a function of its own lags. To do this, multiply by B
−1
0 on both sides of
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equation (6.14) to get:
B−10 B0xt = B
−1
0 B1xt−1 +B
−1
0 B2xt−2 + ...+B
−1
0 Bpxt−p +B
−1
0 ut
Define Ai = B
−1
0 Bi and εt = B
−1
0 ut, the equation above reads:
xt = A1xt−1 + A2xt−2 + ...+ Apxt−p + εt (6.15)
Or equivalently,
A (L) xt = εt
where A (L) = I−A1L−A2L
2− ...−ApL
p is the lag order polynomial. Therefore,
the parameters, Ai, and the disturbance term, εt, as well as the variance-covariance
matrix of the disturbance term, Σε = E
(
εtε
T
t
)
can be estimated via standard
estimation methods. However, what is concerned here is the responses of xt to
structural shocks, ut, other than to disturbances, εt. To obtain ut, B
−1
0 should be
estimated, as εt = B
−1
0 ut. To solve B
−1
0 , consider the variance-covariance matrix
of the disturbance term, Σε:
Σε = E
(
εtε
T
t
)
= B−10 E
(
utu
T
t
) (
B−10
)T
= B−10
(
B−10
)T
(6.16)
Since Σε can be estimated, this system of nonlinear equations can be solved for the
unknown parameters in B−10 using numerical estimation methods, provided that
the number of unknown parameters in B−10 is less than or equal to the number
of equations in VAR. One common way to meet this condition is to impose zero
restrictions on the selected elements of B−10 .
6.3.2 Long-run restrictions
Alternatively, long-run restrictions can be imposed in the VAR, which is more
feasible in terms of economic theory. To do this, recall B (L) xt = ut and the
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corresponding structural vector moving average (VMA) representation reads
xt = B (L)
−1 ut = C (L) ut (6.17)
where C (L) = B (L)−1. Also, the reduced form of VAR model above, A (L) xt =
εt, gives the corresponding VMA representation:
xt = A (L)
−1 εt = D (L) εt
where D (L) = A (L)−1. Additionally, it is known that A (L) = B−10 B (L), hence
B−10 = A (L)B (L)
−1. The long-run relationships can be reflected by setting L = 1,
meaning B−10 = A (1)B (1)
−1. Therefore the variance-covariance matrix of the
disturbances can be interpreted as
Σε = B
−1
0
(
B−10
)T
=
[
A (1)B (1)−1
] [
A (1)B (1)−1
]
T
Pre-multiply by A (1)−1 and post-multiply by
[
A (1)−1
]T
on both sides yield:
A (1)−1Σε
[
A (1)−1
]T
= A (1)−1A (1)B (1)−1
[
B (1)−1
]T
[A (1)]T
[
A (1)−1
]T
= B (1)−1
[
B (1)−1
]T
Replacing A (1)−1 and B (1)−1 by D (1) and C (1), respectively, one can obtain
the following relationship:
D (1)ΣεD (1)
T = C (1)C (1)T (6.18)
It is known that the LHS of the equation above can be estimated from the data
in terms of long-run relationships. Selected elements in C (1) can be estimated
by imposing
K (K − 1)
2
restrictions on it, where K is the number of endogenous
variables, or equivalently the number of equations in VAR. Once C (1) is able to
be estimated after imposing restrictions, B−10 = A (1)C (1) is obtained in order to
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get the estimate of ut through εt = B
−1
0 ut.
To further study the fluctuations of real exchange rate, this chapter then refers to
the model of Clarida & Gali (1994) by adding three endogenous variables in the
structural VAR model, i.e. K = 3. The three variables, namely the relative out-
put yt, the relative price level pt and the real exchange rate qt are non-stationary
in levels but stationary after taking first-order difference. Therefore, the variables
enter the structural VAR model as xt = [∆yt,∆qt,∆pt]
T , and the long-run repres-
entation of equation (6.17), according to Ahmad & Pentecost (2009), is written as
follows: 

∆yt
∆qt
∆pt

 =


C11 (1) C12 (1) C13 (1)
C21 (1) C22 (1) C23 (1)
C31 (1) C32 (1) C33 (1)




ust
udt
unt

 (6.19)
where ut =
[
ust , u
d
t , u
n
t
]T
captures three kinds of structural shocks, i.e. real relative
supply shocks, ust , real relative demand shocks, u
d
t and nominal monetary policy
shocks, unt .
According to the analysis above, in this case,
K (K − 1)
2
= 3 long-run restrictions
on C (1) are necessary so as to identify the structural shocks. The long-run re-
strictions following the idea of Blanchard & Quah (1989) suggest that monetary
policy shocks are neutral in the long run, thus having no persistent effects on the
output level and the level of real exchange rate, i.e. C13(1) = C23(1) = 0. Besides,
real relative demand shocks have no continuous effects on output in the long run,
indicating C12(1) = 0. In other words, the cumulative impacts of these shocks are
zero in the long run.
6.3.3 Sign restrictions
In addition to the long-run restrictions imposed in the structural VAR, Uhlig
(2005), Peersman (2005) and Fry & Pagan (2007) imposed sign restrictions on
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the matrix, B−10 , where each type of identified structural shocks is associated
with a unique sign pattern. To describe the idea of sign restrictions, recall that
initially one could impose short-run restrictions on the matrix, B−10 , in order to
estimate equation (6.16). One popular way of disentangling the structural shocks
from the reduced-form disturbances is to ’orthogonalise’ the reduced-form errors,
according to Kilian (2011), which makes the shocks uncorrelated. Consequently,
B−10 becomes a lower triangular matrix after imposing
K (K − 1)
2
restrictions.
Mathematically, one can obtain lower triangular Cholesky decomposition, P , that
satisfies Σε = PP
T , but it is appropriate only if the recursive structure embodied
in P is consistent with the economic theory. Now consider B−10 = PQ where Q
is an orthogonal K ×K matrix, so that the relationship in equation (6.16) is still
satisfied. The set of admissible models can then be constructed by repeatedly
drawing at random from the set Q of orthogonal matrices Q, and discarding the
cases where the solutions for B−10 do not satisfy the prior sign restrictions imposed
on B−10 (Kilian, 2011; Rubio-Ramı´rez et al., 2010).
6.4 Data selection
6.4.1 The data
Given the availability of the data, the period involved in this study covers 1995Q1
until 2015Q2, during which China has been officially using a managed floating
exchange rate system with reference to a combination of different currencies. The
relative output level, the real exchange rate and the relative price level are con-
sidered in the trivariate structural VAR model, all of which are computed as the
log difference of the home level from China’s trading partners equivalent. The rel-
ative output level, yt, is measured by the natural log difference between real GDP
in China and foreign country, and the log of real exchange rate, qt, is constructed
from the log of nominal exchange rate, et, interpreted as the domestic price of
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foreign currency. Therefore, the log of real exchange rate can be calculated as
qt = et + p
f
t − p
h
t , where p
h
t and p
f
t are the logs of home and foreign CPI, respect-
ively. The relative price level, pt, is defined as the log difference between home and
foreign price level, pt = p
h
t − p
f
t . In this study, the foreign country is considered
to be a time-varying traded-weighted average of China’s major trading partners.
Specifically, this chapter chooses the U.S., Euro Area, Japan, South of Korea, the
U.K., Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand as China’s important trading partners
and the trade-weights are obtained from the Bank for International Settlements,
which is summarised in the Appendix 6.8.2. The quarterly real GDP data, the
end-period nominal exchange rates and the CPI data in all countries are collected
from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. For China, as the
GDP and the CPI data in some years are unavailable in the IFS, the data are
collected from the Oxford Economics database via Datastream.
6.4.2 Unit root test and cointegration test
Before estimating VAR models, it is necessary to verify the level of integration of
the variables. This chapter adopts various methods of unit root tests including the
widely used augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the Phillips-Perron (PP) test
and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test. In addition, another test
proposed by Perron (1989) and developed by Perron (1997) is considered as well,
of which the null hypothesis is that there is a unit root with a structural break in
the series. This test was also used in Chapter 3. Table 6.1 summarises the unit
root test results from various test methods. The results, overall, indicate that all
the variables are I (1), and the first differences of all the variables are stationary.
Although no economic reason suggests that there is a cointegration relationship, a
cointegration test is conducted so as to make sure the VAR model is appropriately
specified. Since all the variables are I (1), Johansen’s maximum likelihood based
reduced rank regression test for cointegration, proposed by Johansen & Juselius
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Table 6.1: Unit root tests: quarterly sample
Variable
ADF PP
Level 1st Diff Result Level 1st Diff Result
y 0.239 -6.874* I(1) 0.229 -7.012* I(1)
q -0.307 -7.392* I(1) -0.268 -7.405* I(1)
p -1.216 -3.548* I(1) -1.471 -4.989* I(1)
Variable
KPSS Perron
Level 1st Diff Result Level 1st Diff Result
y 1.129* 0.238 I(1) -3.394 -8.383* I(1)
q 0.613* 0.292 I(1) -2.222 -8.569* I(1)
p 0.691* 0.108 I(1) -3.638 -5.884* I(1)
Note: 1. t-statistics are reported in the table. 2. A superscript * hereafter in this chapter
indicates statistically significant at the 5% level. 3. The null hypothesis of KPSS test is that
data is stationary, whilst the null hypothesis of all the other tests indicates a unit root. 4. The
5% critical values for the ADF and PP tests with a constant is -2.898, 0.463 for the KPSS test,
and -5.23 for the Perron test.
Table 6.2: Johansen’s maximum likelihood cointegration test: quarterly sample
Null hypothesis Trace test 5% Critical value Maximal eigenvalue test 5% Critical value
h = 0 21.541 29.797 11.105 21.132
h ≤ 1 10.436 15.495 9.557 14.265
h ≤ 2 0.879 3.841 0.879 3.841
Note: The results from lag length section criteria suggest the lag order is 1 for the VAR model
with levels of each variable and h denotes the number of cointegrating relations under different
hypothesis.
(1990), Johansen (1991) and Johansen (1995), is therefore employed in this sec-
tion. The results are outlined in Table 6.2. Both trace statistic test and maximal
eigenvalue tests suggest no cointegration in the model with levels of each variable.
It is then appropriate to proceed to the VAR model estimation where variables
are in first differences.
Lastly, the lag order of the structural VAR is chosen to be 2, according to the in-
formation criteria and the serial correlation and heteroscedasticity tests. Moreover,
to capture the implicit exogenous shifts and potential structural changes, a dummy
variable is introduced in the VAR to measure the potential regimes change (d = 1
for periods 1998Q1 to 2005Q2, and 0 otherwise), when the nominal RMB exchange
rate was pegged to the U.S. dollar at 8.277 during 1998Q1 and 2005Q2. The like-
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lihood ratio test for the significance of the dummy variable suggests a likelihood
ratio of 12.883, which is significant compared to the null with 7.815 for the 5%
critical value.
6.5 Empirical results
6.5.1 Impulse response analysis
The dynamic effects of structural breaks can be analysed by the impulse response
functions in assessing the directions and magnitude of responses of variables. Fig-
ure 6.2 depicts the impulse responses of the three underlying variables to the
structural shocks with the size of one standard deviation2. The figures represent
the accumulative responses as the variables enter the structural VAR as first dif-
ferences. According to the first row of Figure 6.2, positive real relative supply
shocks exert a strong positive effect on relative output, with an immediate growth
of 0.7%, and it takes more than 8 quarters to achieve the new equilibrium level,
which is consistent with the theoretical priors. Relative demand shocks and nom-
inal shocks contribute to a small short-run increase in relative output, and it dies
out at the 20-quarter horizon due to the long-run restrictions imposed.
Results from the response of real exchange rate to relative supply shocks report
some counter-intuitive results, as plotted in the second row. Real relative supply
shocks trigger a 0.8% real exchange rate appreciation immediately, but result in a
permanent depreciation in the long run. The early-period appreciation is also cap-
tured by Clarida & Gali (1994), Astley & Garratt (2000) and Ahmad & Pentecost
(2009) for some industrial and developing countries. Relative demand shocks are
expected to contribute to an appreciation of real exchange rate, which is not what
2In addition to EViews, Structural VAR source code written by Anders Warne
is used in Matlab to help estimate the model. The source code is available at
http://www.texlips.net/svar/source.html.
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the figure indicates. Astley & Garratt (2000) explained this by pointing out a
limitation of the structural VAR model. To be specific, the structural VAR model
fails to restrict the sign of each shock in the structural impulse responses matrices,
as the method involves solving a quadratic equation. In this case, if C(1) solved in
equation (6.18) is accepted, then C (1)Z should be accepted as well provided that
the elements on the principal diagonal of the diagonal matrix Z are either -1 or 1.
Therefore, the sign of the elements for each column in B−10 is underdetermined. In
this case, relative demand shocks are actually identified as negative shocks in the
figure.3 Therefore, a permanent exchange rate appreciation is observed in response
of positive relative demand shocks, and the level of appreciation is 2.5% in the
long run, with smooth adjustment from the short-run dynamics. Nominal shocks
contribute to a 0.5% real exchange rate depreciation at a significant level during
the first 10 quarters, and the effect dies out in terms of the long-run restrictions
imposed in the model.
The relative price level initially falls slightly by 0.1% in response of relative sup-
ply shocks, and recovers at the 20-quarter horizon. Positive real relative demand
shocks, interpreted as the inverse of the figure, result in a small rise in the rel-
ative price level, which is theory-consistent. Also, nominal shocks contribute to
a perpetual rise in the relative price level in the long run, and it takes about 16
quarters for the relative price level to adjust to the new equilibrium level.
6.5.2 Forecast error variance decompositions
In order to determine the importance of each type of structural shocks in reaction
to a given change of a variable, forecast error variance decompositions are usually
calculated, as shown in Table 6.3. The numbers in the table represent the per-
centage of forecast error variance attributable to three types of structural shocks
3In this case, the response of the relative output to positive demand shocks in the first row
in Figure 6.2 is negative, which is not as expected. Nonetheless, the overall effect is small and
not statistically significant.
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Figure 6.2: Accumulated impulse responses to one standard deviation structural
shocks: full quarterly sample
at different forecast horizons. According to the results, China’s relative output
fluctuations are primarily attributable to real relative supply shocks by explaining
83.34% of the variance of relative output at the 20th quarter, which is in line with
the result from the impulse response analysis above. In fact, the long-run restric-
tions underlie this argument in the long run. However, the dominance of relative
supply shocks is also observed at shorter horizons during which no restrictions are
imposed. For example, relative supply shocks account for 83.46% of relative out-
put movements at the first quarter. Nominal shocks are considered as the second
largest contributor in the decomposition of relative output variance, according for
10.03% at the 20-quarter period. Relative demand shocks have the smallest effect
on the variance decomposition of relative output, with the number of 6.63% at the
20th quarter.
Relative demand shocks account for about 58.79% of real exchange rate variations
at the period for 20 quarters, which is therefore the main sources of movements
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of the RMB real exchange rate against a weighted average of eight trading part-
ners. This is consistent with most of literature for both developed and developing
countries (see Astley & Garratt, 2000; Detken et al., 2002; Wang, 2005; Huang
& Guo, 2007 and Ahmad & Pentecost, 2009). Besides, nominal shocks contribute
to 29.28% of the variations at the 1-quarter horizon, and continuously play an
important role in driving movements of real exchange rate in the long run, ac-
counting for 29.74% at the 20-quarter horizon. Ahmad & Pentecost (2009) also
found that nominal shocks acted as an important role in South Africa, explaining
28% of movements of real exchange rate at the 20-quarter horizon. Besides, Di-
booglu & Kutan (2001) discovered similar importance of nominal shocks in Poland
with a period of high inflation. Clarida & Gali (1994) found that nominal shocks
accounted for 28% and 15% of real exchange rate variations in Germany and Ja-
pan, respectively, at the 12-quarter horizon. The importance of nominal shocks
against supply shocks was also found in An & Kim (2010) for Japan and Mumtaz
& Sunder-Plassmann (2013) for the U.K. and the Euro zone. The reason, accord-
ing to Ahmad & Pentecost (2009), is because those countries, like South Africa,
Germany and Japan, are in fact financially developed economies. However, evid-
ence from other financially developed industrial countries in Astley & Garratt
(2000) and Clarida & Gali (1994) for example, fails to support the importance of
nominal shocks in driving real exchange rate movements by concluding a very low
degree of nominal shocks in driving the real exchange rate movements. The role
of nominal shocks needs further investigations. Wang (2005) and Huang & Guo
(2007) found little importance of nominal shocks in determining real exchange rate
fluctuations in China, which is in contrast to our result, and they proposed that
the little importance of nominal shocks were due to the actual fixed exchange rate
regimes and the strict control of capital accounts in China. In addition, Astley &
Garratt (2000) suggested the cross-checks of the robustness of the results by look-
ing at some bilateral exchange rates. Consequently, this section further selects the
GBP/CNY (RMB real exchange rate against British pounds) and the JPY/CNY
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(RMB real exchange rate against Japanese Yen) exchange rates, and the results4
suggest that relative demand shocks dominate real exchange rate fluctuations at
all horizons, and nominal shocks come as the second largest sources, accounting for
18.43% and 14.36% for variations of real exchange rate against GBP and JPY, re-
spectively, at the 20-quarter horizon. Relative supply shocks, nonetheless, account
for around 10% for real exchange rate variations in both cases. In this section,
relative supply shocks account for 11.28% at the first quarter, and increase slightly
to 11.47% at the 20-quarter horizon in the long run. Clarida & Gali (1994) sugges-
ted that less than 5% of real exchange rate variations were originated from supply
shocks among Germany, Japan, Britain, and Canada with flexible exchange rate
regime, but Huang & Guo (2007) also found a ratio of over 20% were attributable
to relative supply shocks during the period before 2005. In China, according to
Huang & Guo, the importance of relative supply shocks in driving real exchange
rate movements was reflected by the supply-side reforms such as the restructuring
of state-owned enterprises and technology innovations. The overall results confirm
that relative demand shocks are the main sources of fluctuations in real exchange
rate, but relative supply and nominal shocks play some roles as well.
Lastly, many of fluctuations of long-run relative price levels are attributable to
nominal shocks, with a ratio of 72.14% at the 20-quarter horizon. Relative demand
shocks come as the second, accounting for 24.34% at the 20-quarter horizon, and
relative supply shocks only account for 3.52%. This result is in contrast of Wang
(2005), where supply shocks are the main sources of fluctuations of relative price
levels.
6.5.3 Sub-sample analysis
Instead of introducing a dummy variable to capture potential regime changes in
the model above, this section investigates the period during which China has been
4See Appendix 6.8.3 for the table results.
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Table 6.3: Variance decomposition of forecast errors: full quarterly sample
Fraction of relative output variance due to Fraction of real exchange rate variance due to Fraction of relative price variance due to
Horizon Supply Demand Nominal Supply Demand Nominal Supply Demand Nominal
1 83.46% 6.47% 10.07% 11.28% 59.44% 29.28% 0.28% 28.63% 71.09%
2 83.26% 6.17% 10.57% 11.06% 60.27% 28.67% 2.99% 23.57% 73.44%
3 83.71% 6.41% 9.88% 11.52% 59.83% 28.65% 2.63% 25.16% 72.21%
4 83.53% 6.50% 9.97% 11.53% 59.46% 29.01% 3.56% 24.41% 72.03%
8 83.34% 6.63% 10.03% 11.48% 58.85% 29.67% 3.53% 24.36% 72.11%
12 83.34% 6.63% 10.03% 11.47% 58.80% 29.73% 3.53% 24.34% 72.14%
16 83.34% 6.63% 10.03% 11.47% 58.79% 29.74% 3.52% 24.34% 72.14%
20 83.34% 6.63% 10.03% 11.47% 58.79% 29.74% 3.52% 24.34% 72.14%
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Figure 6.3: Accumulated impulse responses of the real exchange rate: sub
quarterly sample
using a managed floating exchange rate regime where exchange rate is adjustable
with reference to a group of currencies since July 2005. In particular, the sub-
sample covers the period of 2005Q3 until 2015Q2. Furthermore, to capture the
potential effect of financial crisis during 2007 to 2008, a dummy variable is added
into the structural VAR(2) model with d = 1 for 2007Q4 to 2009Q1, and d = 0
for other periods. Impulse responses of real exchange rate to structural shocks
of one standard deviation are shown in Figure 6.3. The results are theoretical-
consistent, with a real depreciation of above 1% due to positive supply shocks,
and a real appreciation of 2% in response of positive demand shocks. Besides,
nominal shocks contribute to a small rise during the first 8 quarters, but the
effect dies out in the long run due to the restriction imposed in the model. The
variance decompositions of real exchange rate are presented in Table 6.4, and the
results confirm that relative demand shocks are the main sources of real exchange
rate fluctuations in the long run, by accounting for 73.18% of fluctuations of real
exchange rate for the period of 20 quarters. Nominal shocks are the next principal
sources of real exchange rate variations, which is consistent with the previous
finding. In fact, nominal shocks account for 12.08% at the 1-quarter horizon, and
17.5% at the 20-quarter horizon. Lastly, supply shocks account for 9.32% of the
fluctuations. Overall, the results from the sub-sample analysis are consistent with
the main results for the whole sample period.
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Table 6.4: Variance decompositions of real exchange rate: sub quarterly sample
Horizon Supply Demand Nominal
1 6.46% 81.46% 12.08%
2 8.53% 75.74% 15.74%
3 8.69% 75.19% 16.12%
4 8.98% 74.76% 16.26%
8 9.32% 73.23% 17.45%
12 9.32% 73.18% 17.50%
16 9.32% 73.18% 17.50%
20 9.32% 73.18% 17.50%
6.6 Further evidence from monthly data
In the previous section, a sub-sample analysis is conducted to investigate the
period when the RMB exchange rate has been managed floating with reference
to a basket of currencies. However, Juvenal (2011) questioned the precision of
impulse responses due to finite observations, and meanwhile it is challenging to
detect the shocks. To provide further evidence of sources of the real exchange
rate fluctuations during this period, this section uses monthly data to improve the
quality of impulse responses analysis.
6.6.1 The monthly data
The monthly data covers the period between July 2005 and June 2015. The three
variables in the structural VAR are constructed as before, referring to relative
levels to a traded-weighted average of major trading partners of China. However,
as monthly GDP data is not available for most countries, monthly industrial pro-
duction index is chosen to be a proxy of nominal output. Accordingly, the price
level is represented by the producer price index (PPI), and the real exchange rate
is thus calculated by the PPI and the end-period monthly nominal exchange rate.
Deflating the industrial production by the PPI gives real output. All the data
for China’s eight trading partners and the nominal exchange rates are collected
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from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The industrial
production index and the PPI for China are retrieved from the National Bureau
of Statistics database of China.
Before proceeding to the estimation of the structural VAR, unit root tests and
cointegration tests are conducted, with the same methods used in Section 6.5.
According to Table 6.5, results from the ADF test, the PP test, the KPSS test
and the Perron test suggest that all the variables are stationary at first differ-
ences, i.e. I (1). Johansen’s maximum likelihood trace and maximal eigenvalue
tests suggest no cointegration relationships among the variables, as reported in
Table 6.6. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider estimating a structural VAR
model in which ∆yt, ∆qt and ∆pt are endogenous variables. The lag order of the
structural VAR is chosen to be 3, according to the result based on the information
criteria. Also, to capture the potential effects of financial crisis during 2007 to
2008, a dummy variable is introduced into the model with d = 1 for the periods
between September 2007 and March 2009, and d = 0 otherwise. The likelihood
ratio test for the significance of the dummy variable gives a ratio of 17.876, which
is significant compared to the 5% critical value of 7.815.
6.6.2 Empirical results: monthly data
To study the direction and magnitude of responses of the variables, Figure 6.4
depicts the accumulated impulse responses to the structural shocks. The responses
of the relative output are shown in the first row. Positive supply shocks increase
the relative output level to 1.5% in the long run, whilst demand and nominal shocks
have no long-lasting effects, due to the prior restrictions imposed when solving the
model. However, both shocks trigger a slight increase at the 1 to 2-month horizon.
The second row suggests the responses of the real exchange rate to each structural
shock. Consistent with what the theoretical model suggests, positive supply shocks
bring about an immediate 1% real exchange rate depreciation, and the effects last
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Table 6.5: Unit root tests: monthly sample
Variable
ADF PP
Level 1st Diff Result Level 1st Diff Result
y -2.269 -9.761* I(1) -2.699 -9.711* I(1)
q -0.530 -10.772* I(1) -0.497 -10.773* I(1)
p -1.014 -8.820* I(1) -0.876 -8.633* I(1)
Variable
KPSS Perron
Level 1st Diff Result Level 1st Diff Result
y 1.273* 0.457 I(1) -2.674 -9.693* I(1)
q 1.244* 0.052 I(1) -4.593 -11.550* I(1)
p 0.678* 0.136 I(1) -3.509 -7.173* I(1)
Note: 1. t-statistics are reported in the table. 2. A superscript * hereafter indicates statistically
significant at the 5% level. 3. The null hypothesis of KPSS test is that data is stationary, whilst
the null hypothesis of all the other tests indicates a unit root. 4. The 5% critical values for the
ADF and PP tests with a constant is -2.886, 0.463 for the KPSS test, and -5.23 for the Perron
test.
Table 6.6: Johansen’s maximum likelihood cointegration test: monthly sample
Null hypothesis Trace test 5% Critical value Maximal eigenvalue test 5% Critical value
h = 0 22.560 24.276 15.584 17.797
h ≤ 1 6.976 12.321 6.942 11.225
h ≤ 2 0.034 4.130 0.034 4.130
Note: The results from lag length section criteria suggest the lag order is 6 for the VAR model
with levels of the underlying variables and h denotes the number of cointegrating relations under
different hypothesis.
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Figure 6.4: Accumulated impulse responses to one standard deviation structural
shocks: monthly sample
in the long run. Also, positive demand shocks contribute to more than 1.2%
real appreciation at the 20-month horizon, whilst nominal shocks contribute to a
temporary depreciation in the first 6 months, and the impact dies out afterwards.
Lastly, the relative price level reduces permanently by 0.4% in response of positive
supply shocks, and positive demand shocks lead to a short-run increase of the
relative price level by 0.2% at the 1-month horizon. Besides, nominal shocks raise
the new equilibrium relative price level by 0.5% above in the long run. Overall,
the results are consistent with the findings when using quarterly data for a full
sample period.
Table 6.7 outlines the results of variance decompositions of real exchange rate.
Given a variation in real exchange rate, relative demand shocks are considered
to be responsible for 74.76% of the fluctuations at the 1-month horizon, and then
72.17% of the variations at the 24-month horizon, which act as the principal sources
of real exchange rate fluctuations in all periods. This finding is consistent with
188
Table 6.7: Variance decompositions of real exchange rate: monthly sample
Horizon Supply Demand Nominal
1 21.22% 74.76% 4.02%
2 21.53% 73.22% 5.25%
3 22.62% 72.21% 5.17%
6 22.54% 72.18% 5.28%
9 22.53% 72.17% 5.30%
12 22.53% 72.17% 5.30%
18 22.53% 72.17% 5.30%
24 22.53% 72.17% 5.30%
the results from quarterly data. However, supply shocks act as the next important
role in explaining real exchange rate movements, rather than nominal shocks when
using quarterly data. Specifically, relative supply shocks contribute to 21.22% of
movements of the real exchange rate for the first month, and slightly increase to
22.53% after 24 months. Nominal shocks account for 5.3% of real exchange rate
fluctuations at the 24-month horizon. The results are consistent with Huang &
Guo (2007), which found that over 20% of real exchange rate fluctuations came
from relative supply shocks. Nevertheless, relative demand shocks remain as the
main sources of the real exchange rate variations in both short and long periods.
6.6.3 Sign-restrictions analysis: monthly data
As the credibility of imposing long-run restrictions in finite samples is questioned
by Faust & Leeper (1997), this section imposes sign restrictions to compare the
result with that of the long-run restrictions. To verify the importance of supply
and nominal shocks in explaining real exchange rate variations, sign restrictions
are imposed to identify these two types of shocks, as described in Table 6.8, whilst
demand shocks are left freely determined for simplicity. Following the spirit of the
theoretical model, the relative output does not decline for the first half year in
response of positive supply shocks, while the relative price level does not increase
for half a year. In addition, real exchange rate does not appreciate in response
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Table 6.8: Sign restrictions: monthly sample
Variable Relative supply shocks Nominal shocks
∆yt 1-6 months, + 1-6 months, +
∆qt 1-3 months, + 1-3 months, +
∆pt 1-6 months, - 1-6 months, +
Note: + indicates an increase whilst - represents a fall.
to positive supply shocks for the first quarter. Besides, nominal shocks boost the
relative output and price level for the first 6 months. Also, real exchange rate does
not appreciate for 3 months due to nominal shocks.
To solve the model and construct the impulse responses, a Monte Carlo experi-
ment is conducted by repeatedly drawing at random from the set Q of orthogonal
matrices Q, and recording the solutions for B−10 that match the prior signs. The
procedure is repeated until 1000 satisfactory draws are recorded5. Figure 6.5 de-
picts the impulses responses to supply and nominal structural shocks with the size
of one standard deviation. The solid line represents impulse median responses and
the two dashed lines refer to the confidence intervals. The results reflect the sign
restrictions imposed and are consistent with the theoretical framework. Positive
supply shocks bring about 1% increase in the relative output level, and reduce the
relative price level by less than 0.6%. In addition, the real exchange rate depreci-
ates in response to positive supply shocks. The magnitudes are not much different
from those under long-run restrictions in Figure 6.4. However, nominal shocks
lead to a permanent increase in the relative output and price level, and the real
exchange rate depreciates by 0.7% in the long run.
In the absence of identification of demand shocks, Table 6.9 provides the vari-
ance decompositions of real exchange rate, and nominal shocks are responsible
for 41.16% of real exchange rate variations for the first month, but the number
declines to 21.59% at the 48-month horizon. Supply shocks enter by contributing
to 27.25% of real exchange rate movements, and 7.99% at the 48-month horizon.
5The Matlab toolbox used to solve the model with sign restrictions are provided by Ambrogio
Cesa-Bianchi, available at https://sites.google.com/site/ambropo/MatlabCodes.
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Figure 6.5: Accumulated impulse responses to one standard deviation structural
shocks: monthly sample with sign restrictions
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Table 6.9: Variance decompositions of real exchange rate: monthly sample with
sign restrictions
Horizon Supply Nominal Horizon Supply Nominal
1 27.25% 41.16% 18 10.57% 24.39%
2 21.39% 37.85% 24 9.62% 23.43%
3 20.87% 35.61% 30 9.00% 22.97%
6 16.92% 31.22% 36 8.49% 22.45%
9 14.11% 27.85% 42 8.23% 22.02%
12 12.36% 26.18% 48 7.99% 21.59%
This result is consistent with that from quarterly data, but is not in favour of the
findings using monthly data with long-run restrictions. Nevertheless, it shows that
demand shocks dominate in real exchange rate variations, but the importance of
nominal and supply shocks could not be discarded.
6.7 Conclusion
China’s financial liberalisation has contributed to rapid economic growth and con-
siderable structural changes, and further directions of exchange rate reform are
highlighted in recent years. To investigate the sources of real exchange rate fluc-
tuations, this chapter employs a trivariate structural VAR model to find out to
what extent real exchange rate fluctuations are attributable to the fundamental
macroeconomic shocks. Meanwhile, the changes in the relative output and price
levels are also examined in the model. To estimate the structural VAR model,
this chapter imposes long-run restrictions proposed by Clarida & Gali (1994), and
also sign restrictions used by Uhlig (2005), Peersman (2005) and Fry & Pagan
(2007). Firstly, a full sample period covering 1995Q1 to 2015Q2 is investigated,
with long-run restrictions to solve the structural VAR model. Following that, this
chapter looks at a sub-sample period covering 2005Q3 to 2015Q2, when the RMB
exchange rate is under managed floating system. Different frequencies of data are
also considered in this chapter. It uses monthly data between July 2005 and June
2015 to estimate the model under the long-run restrictions, and then compares the
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supply and nominal shocks using the methods of imposing sign restrictions. Most
results from the impulse response analysis are theoretical-consistent, as relative
demand shocks bring about a long-run real appreciation, a rise in the relative out-
put and a decline in the relative price level. Nominal shocks increases the price
level in the long run, whilst relative supply shocks contribute to a decline in the
relative price level, a real depreciation and a significant permanent increase in the
relative output level.
The results from variance decompositions suggest that real relative demand shocks
are the principal sources of real exchange rate fluctuations in all cases during
the period of financial liberalisation, which is in favour of numerous literature
regarding to economies with managed floating exchange rate system. Relative
supply shocks are found to be important as well in driving real exchange rate
movements, as the supply-side structural reform in China has been successful in
recent decades. Moreover, the results based on monthly data under the long-
run restrictions indicate a more important role of supply shocks, whilst results
from quarterly data under the long-run restrictions, as well as monthly data using
the sign restrictions, suggest that supply shocks are less important than nominal
shocks. For example, nominal shocks also account for 10% to 30% of real exchange
rate movements in the model with quarterly data, indicating a certain degree of
financial liberalisation in the country. The role of nominal shocks is limited due to
the officially closed capital account and the de facto U.S. dollar-pegged exchange
rate regime currently in China. Nonetheless, both supply and nominal shocks play
a considerable role in explaining real exchange rate fluctuations. In addition, the
result from the model with quarterly data confirms that real supply shocks are the
main sources of relative output movements, and the relative price level is mainly
driven by nominal and demand shocks.
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6.8 Appendix
6.8.1 Solving the theoretical model
6.8.1.1 Long-run solutions: θ = 1
In the long run, equation (6.4) reads pt = p
∗
t and output is supply-determined, i.e.
y∗t = y
s
t , which is equation (6.8). To solve the long-run equilibrium level of the real
exchange rate, q∗t , assume q
∗
t takes the following form under rational expectations:
q∗t = h1y
s
t−1 + h2dt−1 + h3u
s
t + h4u
d
t + h5u
d
t−1 (6.20)
Taking expectations of above equation at t yields:
Etq
∗
t+1 = h1y
s
t + h2dt + h5u
d
t (6.21)
Substituting equation (6.3)(6.7)(6.8) and (6.21) into (6.1) and considering ydt = y
s
t
in equilibrium, one can obtain the following relationship:
q∗t =
1 + σh1
η + σ + στ/κ
(
yst−1 + u
s
t
)
+
σh2 − 1
η + σ + στ/κ
(
dt−1 + u
d
t − γu
d
t−1
)
+
σh5
η + σ + στ/κ
udt
(6.22)
Comparing equation (6.22) with (6.20) solves the parameters, hs, i.e. h1 =
1/ (η + στ/κ), h2 = −h1 and h5 = −γh2. Therefore, the long-run equilibrium
level of the real exchange rate, q∗t , is solved as indicated by equation (6.9):
q∗t = (η + στ/κ)
−1 (yst − dt) + (η + στ/κ)
−1 (η + σ + στ/κ)−1 σγudt
Similarly, to solve the long-run price level, p∗t , assume the “trial solution” is of the
form:
p∗t = g1y
s
t−1 + g2mt−1 + g3dt−1 + g4u
s
t + g5u
n
t + g6u
d
t + g7u
d
t−1 (6.23)
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Taking expectations at t gives:
Etp
∗
t+1 = g1y
s
t + g2mt + g3dt (6.24)
Recall and rearrange equation (6.2) and (6.3):
(1 + λ) p∗t = mt − y
s
t + λ
(
Etq
∗
t+1 − (1 + τ/κ) q
∗
t
)
+ λEtp
∗
t+1 (6.25)
Substituting equation (6.21) and (6.24) into (6.25) and solving for p∗t gives:
p∗t =
1 + λg2
1 + λ
(mt−1 + u
n
t ) +
λg1 − 1−
λτ/κ
η + στ/κ
1 + λ
(
yst−1 + u
s
t
)
(6.26)
+
λg3 +
λτ/κ
η + στ/κ
1 + λ
(
dt−1 + u
d
t − γu
d
t−1
)
+
λg7 +
ληγ
(η + στ/κ) (η + σ + στ/κ)
1 + λ
udt
Comparing equation (6.26) with (6.23) solves the parameters, gs. Therefore the
long-run price level can be solved as equation (6.10) indicates:
p∗t = mt − y
s
t − β (y
s
t − dt) + αγu
d
t
where α = λ (η − (λτ/κ) (η + σ + στ/κ)) (1 + λ)−1 (η + στ/κ)−1 (η + σ + στ/κ)−1
and β = (λτ/κ) (η + στ/κ)−1.
6.8.1.2 Short-run solutions: θ < 1
In the short run, θ < 1 indicates sluggish price adjustment. To solve the price
level, pt, recall equation (6.4) and taking expectations through it at time t − 1
gives:
Et−1pt = (1− θ)Et−1p
∗
t + θEt−1p
∗
t = Et−1p
∗
t (6.27)
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Substituting equation (6.4) into (6.27) under rational expectations gives:
Et−1p
∗
t = mt−1 − (1 + β) y
s
t−1 + β
(
dt − u
d
t
)
(6.28)
Substituting equation (6.28) back into the price setting equation (6.4) solves the
short-run price level, which is outlined in equation (6.11):
pt = p
∗
t − (1− θ)
(
unt − (1 + β)u
s
t + (αγ + β)u
d
t
)
Next, to solve qt, substitute equation (6.1) into (6.2) and rearrange the equation,
one can obtain the following relationship:
ηqt = mt − dt + (σ + λ) (Etqt+1 − (1 + τ/κ) qt) + λEtpt+1 − (1 + λ) pt (6.29)
where Etpt+1 = mt− (1 + β) y
s
t +β
(
dt − γu
d
t
)
is calculated by taking expectations
through equation (6.4).
Assume that the solution of qt is of the form:
qt = w1y
s
t−1 + w2dt−1 + w3u
s
t + w4u
d
t + w5u
d
t−1 + w6u
n
t (6.30)
Taking expectations at time t gives:
Etqt+1 = w1y
s
t + w2dt + w5u
d
t (6.31)
Substituting equation (6.31) into (6.29) and solving for qt, and comparing the
equation with equation (6.30) yields the solution for the short-run real exchange
rate, which is outlined in equation (6.12):
qt = q
∗
t + ν (1− θ)
(
unt − (1 + β)u
s
t + (αγ + β)u
d
t
)
where ν = (1 + λ) ((λ+ σ) (1 + τ/κ) + η)−1. The real exchange rate under slug-
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gish price adjustment is driven by all the three structural shocks in the short
run.
Finally, the relative output in the short run can be solved by rearranging equa-
tion (6.1):
yt = (η + σ + στ/κ) qt − σEtq
∗
t+1 + dt (6.32)
Substituting equation (6.12) and (6.21) into (6.32) reads the solution for the short-
run IS curve, which is equation (6.13):
yt = y
∗
t + (η + σ + στ/κ) ν (1− θ)
(
unt − (1 + β)u
s
t + (αγ + β)u
d
t
)
6.8.2 Trade weights used to construct relative variables in
structural VAR
Table 6.10 presents the trade weights of China’s major trading partners, i.e. the
Euro Area, the U.S., Japan, South of Korea, the U.K., Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand, which are used to construct the relative output and price level, as well
as the real exchange rate. The time-varying trade weights are compiled by the
Bank for International Settlements, and account for approximately 70% of China’s
exports and imports. The trade weights are normalised when constructing the
relative variables. For example, in 1995, the normalised trade weight of the Euro
Area in China with all the eight trading partners is 17.706%/76.669%=0.231.
6.8.3 Forecast error variance decomposition of bilateral
exchange rates
Results from variance decomposition of the real exchange rate against GBP and
JPY are reported in Table 6.11. Before construing the structural VAR models, all
the underlying variables are tested for unit roots and the results suggest that all
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Table 6.10: Trade weights of China’s major trading partners
1995 1996-1998 1999-2001 2002-2004 2005-2007 2008-2010 2011-2015
Euro Area 17.706% 17.183% 16.637% 17.946% 18.555% 19.555% 18.674%
U.S. 20.412% 22.811% 24.154% 22.044% 21.078% 18.982% 17.760%
Japan 25.886% 22.975% 21.474% 19.601% 16.254% 15.416% 14.126%
Korea 6.227% 7.177% 6.975% 7.847% 8.305% 8.148% 8.465%
U.K. 2.234% 2.573% 3.301% 3.147% 3.141% 2.915% 2.910%
Malaysia 0.979% 1.101% 1.358% 1.844% 1.938% 1.964% 2.154%
Singapore 2.299% 2.818% 2.485% 2.596% 2.930% 2.610% 2.744%
Thailand 0.926% 1.240% 1.386% 1.541% 1.758% 1.965% 2.147%
Total 76.669% 77.878% 77.771% 76.565% 73.957% 71.555% 68.980%
Note: Data reported in this table are calculated based on the original data from the Bank for
International Settlements.
the variables are I (1). Johansen maximum likelihood cointegration test indicates
no cointegration in the VAR models, and the lag order selected via information
criteria suggests VAR(2) for the GBP/CNY model and VAR(1) for the JPY/CNY
model, respectively.
Table 6.11: Variance decomposition of bilateral real exchange rates: full quarterly
sample
GBP/CNY JPY/CNY
Horizon Supply Demand Nominal Supply Demand Nominal
1 0.74% 83.10% 16.16% 10.85% 76.72% 12.43%
2 5.56% 78.82% 15.61% 10.72% 75.87% 13.41%
3 7.06% 74.84% 18.09% 10.66% 75.42% 13.92%
4 8.00% 73.75% 18.25% 10.64% 75.20% 14.16%
8 8.26% 73.36% 18.38% 10.62% 75.02% 14.35%
12 8.26% 73.30% 18.42% 10.62% 75.01% 14.36%
16 8.26% 73.30% 18.43% 10.62% 75.01% 14.36%
20 8.26% 73.29% 18.43% 10.62% 75.01% 14.36%
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and future research
Financial repression has long been an attractive research area since 1973 when
both McKinnon and Shaw introduced it in their respective research work. The
literature in this field have grown rapidly during the past decades owing to more
frequent financial crises in the world and accelerated financial liberalisation in less
developed countries. Price distortion, which is one of the most typical character-
istics in terms of financial repression, has been considered to exist extensively in
developing countries such as deposit and loan rates control, high required reserve
ratios, managed exchange rate regime and strict capital controls. China, like other
developing countries, has adopted repressive financial policies and started the fin-
ancial liberalisation process only in 1978. Interest rate liberalisation in China, the
main content of financial liberalisation, is considered to start in 1996 when the
Chibor was established and freely determined by the market. Both the floor of
loan rates and the ceiling of deposit rates have been removed recently, and it is be-
lieved that China has achieved a certain degree of financial liberalisation, but the
liberalisation process is still under way and it calls for more up-to-date empirical
research work regarding to China’s financial liberalisation. Therefore, this thesis
has examined China’s financial repression in several typical areas and provides
a comprehensive empirical investigation on the effects of financial repression and
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liberalisation. It suggests that China has achieved a certain degree of financial
liberalisation, but should be very prudent when liberalising interest rates, floating
exchange rates and even freeing capital controls in order to stabilise the economy
both internally and externally, and maintain economic growth at the same time.
The conclusions are drawn in each area accordingly.
The first empirical study in this thesis in Chapter 3 which focused on the examin-
ation of the credibility of McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis, where money
and physical capital are complements rather than substitutes, and investment is
positively associated with real deposit rates. The empirical results show some
weak evidence to support the hypothesis. Money demand is significantly posit-
ively linked to the investment to income ratio, whilst the long-run relationship
between fixed capital formation and real deposit rates is positive, but not signific-
ant. However, this positive relationship becomes significant when the investment
equation is augmented with some additional variables in addition to real deposit
rates, which is in favour of McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis. Following
that, the domestic savings to income ratio enters the models to replace the in-
vestment variable, as suggested by Fry (1978). The results are in contradiction
with McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis. The absence of strong evidence
to support the complementarity hypothesis in China in the long run may be due
to the certain degree of financial liberalisation China has reached, as Fry (1978)
argued that the hypothesis was only valid when a country is yet to start financial
liberalisation.
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) have argued that interest rates in developing
countries under financial repression like China are below the market equilibrium
levels and investment is subject to the shortage of savings, and China has un-
dertaken several steps to liberalise the interest rates on bank loans and deposits.
To understand the impacts of interest rate liberalisation, Chapters 4 and 5 con-
structed DSGE models to investigate interest rate liberalisation in two different
ways. In Chapter 4, interest rate liberalisation is reflected by raising its equilib-
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rium levels as suggested by Jin et al. (2013), and the result suggests that interest
rate liberalisation helps reduce the volatility of output by adjusting the structure
of China’s economy between consumption and investment. Also, it helps improve
the efficiency of transmission channel of monetary policy. In addition, China’s
interest rate liberalisation is subject to other repressive financial policies such as
the high required reserve ratio and the window guidance on bank loans. Chapter 5
considers these repressive monetary policies and the liberalisation process of loan
and deposit rates are reflected by increasing the weights in market-determined
loan and deposit rates relative to policy rates set by the PBoC. It shows that both
loan and deposit rates are more sensitive to exogenous shocks and work to reduce
the volatility of inflation. However, the effects of deregulation are significantly
affected by the PBoC’s administrative window guidance on bank loans. In fact, it
makes little difference to the liberalisation process when there is a certain degree
of freedom. In other words, the window guidance helps stabilise loan and deposit
rates to some extent even after deregulation. Therefore, the PBoC should gradu-
ally reduce the use of the window guidance rule during the deregulation of loan
and deposit rates in order to reduce the volatility of the economy.
China’s monetary policy is believed to vary with the process of financial liberal-
isation. The nominal money growth target has been the official monetary policy
indicator since 1994, and it has long been criticised to be too difficult to control as
the velocity of money is far from stable in China, as well as in many other coun-
tries. Chapter 4 thus evaluates the money growth rule and the interest rate rule
in DSGE models. The results from both sets of DSGE models suggest that the
interest rate rule is more efficient than the money growth rule, which is consistent
with Zhang (2009). Inflation lasts for a shorter period in response to a productiv-
ity shock when the interest rate rule takes effect. Also, the interest rate rule is
more powerful in response to a monetary-policy shock. Chapter 5 also considers
an aggressive interest rate rule, together with the effects of the PBoC’s window
guidance on bank loans. It concludes that the interest rate rule is more powerful
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in terms of reducing the volatility of inflation when the PBoC’s window guidance
is away. Moreover, Chapter 5 considers a modified interest rate rule which is aug-
mented with nominal money growth variable when the PBoC adjusts the interest
rate. The modified interest rate rule brings about more volatility of inflation.
In the recent 13th national five-year plan, China has designed to use price-based
monetary policy tools more frequently than quantity-based tools such as nominal
money growth, which is consistent with the results obtained in this thesis. In ad-
dition, unlike many advanced economies where the central banks rarely adjust the
required reserve ratio, the PBoC actively uses it in order to control the liquidity.
The result suggests that the required-reserve-ratio rule contributes little to con-
trolling inflation and stabilising the economy, though it helps reduce bank loans.
However, the effectiveness of the required reserve ratio in terms of maintaining
financial stability as a macroprudential policy needs to be investigated in an open
economy model, as the PBoC has to actively adjust it due to China’s increasing
official foreign reserves and domestic money supply under an actual fixed exchange
rate regime.
Finally, China’s financial liberalisation calls for further reform of the exchange
rate regime, as China has been more exposed to various types of macroeconomic
shocks during financial liberalisation. In Chapter 6, the sources of real exchange
rate fluctuations are investigated during the period of financial reform and the res-
ults, based on structural VAR models, suggest that real relative demand shocks
are the main sources of real exchange rate movements both at short and long hori-
zons. The dominance of demand shocks in determining real exchange rate fluctu-
ations is confirmed regardless of the long-run restrictions and the sign restrictions
imposed when estimating the model. The result suggests that a more flexible ex-
change rate system should be helpful to offset possible risks and indetermination
caused by real demand shocks. However, floating the exchange rate is not a vi-
able policy option at present for China, because its immature creditor status and
undeveloped capital markets such a policy may only stimulate hot money flows
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and precipitate a currency crisis. Besides, the impulse response analysis suggests
the theoretical-consistent results, as relative demand shocks contribute to a long-
run real appreciation, a rise in relative output and a descent in the relative price
level. Additionally, relative supply shocks exert considerable influence as well in
driving real exchange rate fluctuations, as China has witnessed many supply-side
structural reforms in recent decades.
One proposal for future research work following current progress in this thesis
should look at an open economy DSGE model in Chapter 5 so as to have an
exchange rate variable and some foreign shocks included in the analysis. Also,
some advanced techniques about imposing sign restrictions on the structural VAR
model should be employed in Chapter 6 to identify more possible structural shocks
that may affect real exchange rate fluctuations. In addition, future research work
may consider the regional effects of financial liberalisation in China, as it is ac-
knowledged that East China is more developed than Middle and West China. The
effects of financial liberalisation on China’s bank industry are also worth studying
and what commercial banks will do in response of future reform of interest rates is
another direction to study further, because since removing the ceilings of deposit
rates in late 2015 the PBoC has not announced further steps regarding the interest
rate reform. Lastly, as liberalising the capital market in China is often considered
as the last step to achieve full financial liberalisation, it is important to look into
possible risks and benefits when removing capital controls in the future.
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